Brian Michael Jenkins
Bruce R. Butterworth
This monograph is published under the auspices of the National Transportation Security Center at the Norman Y. Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI).
The authors wish to thank the following individuals whose help and guidance were essential: Stephan Parker of the National Academy of Science's Transportation Research Board (TRB); Kelly Leone of the Volpe Transportation Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts; Greg Hull of the American Public Transportation Association (APTA); Roshni Sherbondy, formerly of the Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate (for her technical advice on security technologies); and Robert Hertan of APTA's Committee on Public Safety.
The authors are indebted to Janet DeLand for her valuable editing assistance. Thanks are offered also to MTI staff, including Research Director Trixie Johnson, Communications and Special Projects Director Leslee Hamilton, Research and Publications Assistant Sonya Cardenas, Webmaster Barney Murray, and Graphic Artist Shun Nelson. Editing and publication services were provided by Catherine Frazier and Irene Rush.
Organization of This Monograph 4
Scope of the Study and Definition of Terms 7
The Current Terrorist Threat 9
The Objectives of Screening 15
Methods of Selecting and Screening Passengers 19
Threat Information and Racial Profiling 24
Limitations on Passenger Screening 27
General Observations about Attitudes Toward
Security
and Passenger Screening 31
The State of Policies and Planning for Screening 33
Current Passenger Search Procedures and
Contingency
Plans 36
The Role of Screening after an Attack or
Specific
Intelligence Indicating an Attack 38
Technologies for Screening in the
Public-Transit Environment 41
Technology Field Demonstrations to Date 43
The Value of Selective Screening Regimes in
Different
Threat Situations 47
Characteristics of a Good Screening Program 53
Characteristics of an Effective Mass-Transit
Screening
System 53
General Management Practices 54
Conclusions and Recommendations 59
Appendix: Security Survey for Transportation Organizations 61
Scope of the Study and Definition of Terms 65
The Current Terrorist Threat 65
Methods of Selecting and Screening Passengers 66
Limitations on Passenger Screening 66
Technologies for Screening in the Public
Transit
Environment 67
Those charged with the security of public surface transportation systems in the United States face a dilemma. The terrorist threat is unquestionably real, yet terrorist attacks remain statistically remote events. Terrorists see public transportation as an attractive target, but there have been no major attacks on surface transportation in the United States in the past 10 years. Recent terrorist attacks on public transportation systems in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and Mumbai (2006), however, are seen by other terrorists as successes to be emulated, and similar attacks on the United States have been plotted. Were an attack on public transportation in the United States to occur tomorrow, no one could claim to be surprised.
Public or mass transit systems, particularly large urban systems that use heavy and commuter rail, are attractive terrorist targets for several reasons.
First, attacks on urban mass transit create economic harm and great disruption. More than half the workers in the central city areas of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut use public transit. Nationally, 14 million people use public transit every weekday; another 25 million use it less frequently, but regularly.See "A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters," Surface Transportation Security, Vol. 10, Transportation Research Board, National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report # 525, pp. 60-61.
Disruption of the transit system brings serious economic harm to local economies, more so if it causes a decrease in tourism.
Second, the level of security in surface transportation systems is relatively low. Public transit is designed and must operate as an open system with multiple points of entry and exit. Moreover, the volume of rail and transit passengers, which is significantly higher than in air travel, precludes the imposition of anything approaching the rigorous and costly security procedures now in effect at commercial airports. The delays would be unacceptable, and the net security benefits would be slender.
Third, crowds of anonymous strangers on mass transit create a relatively easy environment in which to attack and also to escape.
Fourth, the crowded, contained environments of rail cars, buses, and tunnels make both conventional explosives and nonconventional attacks more deadly.
The pattern of recent jihadist incidents also suggests public mass transit as a probable target. About one-fifth of all jihadist attacks contemplated or executed since 9/11 have targeted urban mass transportation. The average number of people killed per bomb in the successful attacks is relatively high, and the means for achieving these casualties are neither sophisticated nor expensive.
National terrorism alerts, specific threat information, or attacks on public transportation targets in the United States or elsewhere in the world may dictate that security be increased to prevent additional attacks, discourage copycats and pranksters, and reassure riders. In addition to ongoing efforts to improve the design of transportation facilities and increase surveillance, for example, by deploying closed-circuit television, local authorities and system operators should be prepared to rapidly increase security, even if only temporarily. This has generally been done by exhorting staff and riders to increase their vigilance and by deploying additional police and security personnel in the system. These additional security personnel may act as passive observers, or they may interact with riders, observing their behavior, engaging them in conversation, and selectively searching their carry-on luggage, backpacks, briefcases, purses, and parcels.
Various efforts have been made by federal agencies, nonprofit organizations, and transit operators to increase security.See For a current overview of efforts to increase the security of passengers in rail (including transit) transportation, see Cathleen A. Berrick, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-225T, January 18, 2007. The Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) have issued useful training materials and guidelines for mass transit. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have also provided funds, guidance, publications, and resource centers. In 2004, TSA included mass transit in its security directives, mandating measures largely based on FTA and American Public Transportation Association (APTA) best practices,See Ibid., p. 14. including increased police officer presence, removing or hardening trash containers, video surveillance around platforms, encouraging passengers to look for suspicious behavior, and randomly inspecting passengers and packages, sometimes using canines. Many of these measures were already in place.See David Randall Peterman, Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL32625, updated May 26, 2005, p. 2, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32625.pdf. In December 2006, TSA issued a proposed rule that would require transit operators (and certain other transportation operators) to establish a 24-hour security coordinator, immediately report incidents and threats to TSA, and allow DHS/TSA personnel to test, inspect, and conduct other duties within their systems--in other words, TSA appears to be strengthening a federal regulatory system for transit security. See Berrick, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
DHS/TSA has awarded grants for planning, training, equipment, and other security enhancements; has provided direct personnel (for example, federal air marshals) to enhance security; has trained and provided canine teams (53 teams in 13 mass transit systems);See Berrick, op. cit., p. 15. has inspected larger rail systems and provided law enforcement training for local authorities; has developed and tested equipment for detecting explosives and chemicals; and has conducted security assessments to define best practices and vulnerabilities.See "Securing Our Nation's Rail Systems," July 2006, available at www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0895.shtm, accessed December 5, 2006. Grant programs have been initiated to assess risks, strengthen security, and bolster both security and emergency response capabilities as part of a consequence-management effort.
The Transportation Research Board (TRB) has published a number of practical studies and guidance materials on subjects ranging from emergency planning to communications, robotics devices, and exercises and drills. APTA has a vigorous program of standards development and auditing and has developed useful best practices. The Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) has produced several useful works on transportation security.1
By and large, these efforts have focused on risk assessment; the need to create additional detection and deterrence, primarily through passive means such as surveillance and observation; and consequence management. Calls for action in Congress focus on federal funding in general and have not considered whether any kind of passenger screening could be introduced in public transit, or under what circumstances. The issue is only now being addressed, although the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (DHS/S&T) and TSA demonstrations of technology to assist in screening have been useful.
Despite the fact that TSA security directives apparently touch on random screening of bags and passengers and eight transit agencies use behavioral observation to "screen" passengers,See Berrick, op. cit., p. 19. only two transit agencies have active programs of passenger screening that include inspection. Both of these programs involve partial, voluntary screening. However, interviews with transit officials suggest that most are keenly aware of the need for screening, and most believe that at some time in the future they will possibly, or even probably, have to implement a screening system that includes passenger inspections.
While screening is the most effective way to combine the essential elements of deterrence and defense, a host of factors--including resource limitations, legal constraints, and public acceptance--make transit authorities view this prospect with great trepidation. Anyone who has been through the development and implementation of airport screening knows that operators face a set of conflicting problems that can be managed but not fully solved.
In the case of mass transit, the only screening approach that is practical--screening less than 100 percent of all passengers--is the one the U.S. population resists the most. There is a general distrust of anything that seems intrusive and is not egalitarian, as well as dissatisfaction with any security solution that does not promise certainty of success. Until the traveling public understands security better and accepts a more realistic long-term level of risk, it will want passive security that promises full protection, equal treatment, and no delay--currently an impossible set of demands to meet.
Still, we strongly believe that maintaining the status quo is just as wrong as trying to implement a screening solution that is fundamentally incompatible with mass transit. We have, therefore, attempted to identify a screening approach that can be sustained for the long term, one that reduces risk while maintaining operational efficiency and public support.
Selective screening raises a number of questions regarding utility, effectiveness, application, workforce requirements, costs, public acceptance, even legality. This report addresses the following questions:
If 100 percent screening is not possible, do selective searches make sense?
If only some passengers are screened, where there is no specific intelligence, what should be the appropriate selection process?
What combinations of selection methods are appropriate under different conditions?
What role can current and future technology play in passenger screening?
We review the current terrorist threat, which suggests a challenge to security that seems almost certain to persist because attacks on public or mass transportation, urban mass transit in particular, offer terrorists a good "return on investment"; and we examine the objectives and benefits of selective passenger screening and measures of its effectiveness.
The document is organized as follows:
The first chapter, See Scope of the Study and Definition of Terms defines the forms of public transportation considered in the report.
Next, See The Current Terrorist Threat examines past jihadist attacks, modes of operation, and trends, and identifies factors that are of particular relevance to public surface transportation generally and urban mass transit in particular. It assesses the value of urban mass transit as a jihadist target in absolute and relative terms.
specifies the goals screening should be designed (and not designed) to accomplish in the current threat environment.
See Methods of Selecting and Screening Passengers describes different methods of selecting and screening passengers.
See Limitations on Passenger Screening considers the structural, operational, legal, and public limitations on security screening, in particular, selective screening.
See Current Practices provides a snapshot of current security surveillance and screening practices and plans for future implementation to provide an appropriate level of security in the public transit environment.
See Technologies for Screening in the Public-Transit Environment briefly explores what technology can and cannot do now, and what it may be able to do in the future.
See The Value of Selective Screening Regimes in Different Threat Situations explores whether the screening of less than 100 percent of passengers provides value, the kinds of selection methods that are available, and the optimal mixes for different threat environments.
points out some basic mandates for maintaining effective and professional screening.
The final chapter, See Conclusions and Recommendations summarizes our answers to the questions addressed in the study and presents some key recommendations for the transit industry and the government.
This document concludes with an appendix that presents a security survey administered to transportation organizations; endnotes; abbreviations and acronyms; a bibliography; information about the monograph's authors; and an explanation of the report's peer review process.
Our conclusions and recommendations are summarized below:
Terrorists see urban mass transportation as an attractive target--an easy means of inflicting civilian casualties, causing massive disruption, and provoking alarm. This threat will persist for years to come.
Screening 100 percent of urban mass transit passengers is not a realistic security option. The human resources required, added security costs, and delays would destroy urban mass transit.
The goal of any security measure is risk reduction, not the prevention of all attacks. Selective searches can contribute to deterrence, oblige terrorists to take greater risks, complicate their planning, force them to use smaller amounts of explosives, and, better yet, divert them to less lucrative venues, thereby reducing casualties.
The introduction of any passenger-screening program, especially one that involves selection, runs against Americans' preference for security that is passive and egalitarian. Screening programs must be carefully planned and closely managed to reduce the inevitable allegations of discrimination or profiling based upon race or ethnicity.
A good selection process must be planned in advance; must be based on clear policies and procedures; must combine random selection, behavioral profiling, and specific or general threat information; must maximize unpredictability and deterrence; must allow for program expansion, redeployment, and reduction; should use existing technology; and must maximize interaction with riders, but not in a way that is perceived as harassment.
Scope of the Study and Definition of Terms
Profiling can distinguish by behavior (e.g., buying a one-way airline ticket); a combination of behavior and appearance (e.g., wearing a large loose overcoat in weather not calling for overcoats); or appearance alone (apparent racial or ethnic identity). Singling out particular types of clothing (that is, clothing that could conceal weapons or explosives) or particular sizes of packages (those that could conceal weapons or explosives) could be deemed profiling and could be used to target security screening. However, the term "profiling" most commonly calls to mind racial or ethnic profiling, which has given rise to considerable controversy. It should be noted that the use of racial classifications are [sic] not per se unconstitutional, but [they] are subject to strict scrutiny to justify them.See Jocelyn Waite, "The Case for Searches on Public Transportation," TRB Legal Research Digest, No. 22, October 2005 (published under TCRP Project J-5, "Legal Aspects of Transit and Intermodal Transportation Programs"), pp. 18-19.
Certain kinds of clothing or bags can conceal weapons or explosives. Where specific threat information about a weapon or device is available, passengers could be selected for screening on the basis of the size or type of bag or parcel they are carrying.
Time and route of travel. Selective screening can focus on routes and stations that are the most central to the system and through which the greatest number of people travel. Both the Madrid and London bombings took place during the rush hour, and although the terrorists initially entered at other stations, the attacks focused on central stations and trains at times of peak capacity. Locations where evacuation or access by emergency personnel are the most difficult--including trains between stations--could also be factors in deploying searches. Countering an attack that might involve chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons would entail different considerations, including a focus on places where air circulation could reach the greatest number of people.
There is no technological method for screening all mass transit passengers as is done in airports, and the development and deployment of technologies suitable for screening passengers in a rail environment for explosives at standoff distances of 10 meters or more is many years off. However, using technology to search those selected more effectively by some other means holds out some intriguing possibilities, if only because the amounts of explosives used in the London and Madrid bombs were 10 to 20 times the amounts that can bring down a pressurized airliner and are thus relatively easy to detect, even in the "dirtier," more cluttered, fast-moving environment of mass transit.
Well-trained canine teams are available now and could be considered an effective "technology." Subject to proper quality controls and training and used for short periods of time, a well-functioning and alert canine team can be effective at detecting particles and vapors of explosives. The dogs have the unique ability to follow the vapor to its source and therefore hold considerable promise for examining suspicious or unaccompanied bags and for searching areas after an alert. If trained to focus on people in a transit environment rather than objects, they can also help screen passengers. However, "the potential benefits of K-9 deployment will not be achieved in the transportation environment unless management actively attempts to understand what will be gained from the K-9 unit and how its performance can be measured."See K-9 Units in Public Transportation: A Guide for Decision Makers, Report 86: Public Transportation Security, Vol. 2, Washington, DC: TRB Transit Cooperative Research Program, June 2002, p. vii. This guide did not consider canine units for routine screening of passengers. Public and handler response to canines is generally positive and can mask the significant challenges of ensuring solid initial and recurrent training and acceptable detection, particularly since most search dogs cannot function accurately for more than 30 minutes at a time. This factor suggests that the only canine approach to 100 percent screening would be to rotate large numbers of search dogs trained specifically to focus on moving people in a transit environment, which could entail many complications and costs.
Limitations on Passenger Screening
Because of time and budgetary constraints, site visits were not made to verify the information provided. Nevertheless, the responses provide an informative outline of security surveillance and screening practices in place now and plans for future implementations; current resources and constraints; and prevailing concepts about the challenges of providing an appropriate level of security in a public-transit environment. The responses are generally consistent with the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's) January 18, 2007, report on passenger rail security.See Berrick, op. cit.
Attitudes differ. Some believe from past experience and their own gut reaction that a terrorist attack is wholly probable. They "lean forward," look for solutions, and fervently worry about the future. They know passenger screening is or will be essential; they already have programs in place or want to have them, and they are always looking for ways to make security programs more robust. Other transit officials are less aggressive.
In two other systems, the importance of plainclothes officers was downplayed because they were not seen as providing any deterrent value.
All the security chiefs surveyed believe strongly that there are two ways to maximize the security effectiveness of their police forces: using community policing, that is, active interaction with passengers and the public, and applying massive, visible forces in stations and on trains chosen at random. Both practices seem to be excellent force multipliers.
All the chiefs expressed a strong belief in community policing. The most aggressive approaches were espoused by Los Angeles and New Jersey, where police officers are trained to interact with as many members of the public as possible; in New Jersey, they engage the public within three blocks of each station after surges.
New York and New Jersey make the most aggressive use of the "deterrent surges" concept. New York's "Operational Sentinel" and the parallel use of "Hercules teams" by the New York Police Department (NYPD) are based on the Israeli pop-up philosophy, in which heavily armed police officers and canine teams inundate stations chosen at random. Other systems apply the same approach, but in more limited fashion because of resource constraints. The remaining agencies would like to apply this approach, but they seem to be even more resource constrained.
All transit agencies have attempted to maximize the use of their existing staff to increase their ability to deter or detect terrorist attacks. In some cases, station agents or fare collectors have been trained to move outside their booths and engage passengers in conversation. In other cases, the duties of fare enforcers have been expanded to include being on the alert for suspicious behavior or packages. In many systems, administrative staffs would be deployed in an emergency to increase manpower in the system. In some systems, unarmed transit staffs are highly visible on the platforms, in distinct uniforms, engaging actively with passengers and watching for suspicious behavior.
All transit chiefs viewed passenger involvement as key, for two reasons: First, passengers are much more likely to notice suspicious packages and suspicious behavior, such as terrorists engaging in countersecurity surveillance or initiating an actual attempt. Second, engaging the public encourages a sense of security. Some security chiefs want to train passengers on how to evacuate in the event of an emergency, whether a terrorist attack or some other event.
Public participation programs, the most common of which is called "see something, say something," include frequent public announcements on trains and buses and in stations, along with billboards, pamphlets, and other written materials, some of which are particularly creative.
Public reaction has been generally positive. There is probably a direct correlation between the positive reaction of the public and the time lag since the most recent terrorist event or threat, whether or not it involved transit. In at least one instance, passengers reported suspicious activity that was simultaneously reported by transit employees. The suspicious behavior was countersecurity surveillance, which was reported to federal law enforcement agencies and corresponded to similar activity taking place in other systems.
The BASS training was first tested at Boston's Logan airport by TSA. A variation of BASS, known as the Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT), was developed and then implemented by TSA. Other agencies developed systems that predated BASS but used the same basic techniques. This training, which involves an initial multiday training course followed by one day of recurrent training each year, has become a de facto industry standard.
Two agencies indicated that they would be making BASS more aggressive with the help of Israeli or Israeli-trained experts.
The National Transit Institute's Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction program seems to have become another de facto standard. Designed to help transit employees identify the behavioral signs that might indicate surveillance or attack operations and the steps to take when such activity is observed, the initial training takes less than a day, and the recurrent training takes several hours.
Common to both training regimes is an explicit rejection of racial or ethnic profiling as being both unlawful and ineffective. However, many transit officials stated that intelligence-based determinations to focus on passengers by gender, age, or apparent ethnicity would be effective and appropriate under certain circumstances, although such screening would need to be monitored carefully.
Only New York and New Jersey currently have actual passenger-screening regimes in place. Boston instituted such a regime during the Democratic National Convention in 2004 but has not reinstituted it.See One transit agency gave some indication of having at least tested a search regime.
The New York and New Jersey search programs are characterized by the following:
Both programs use a random selection method, but police officers can use their behavioral recognition training to select passengers in addition to those chosen randomly.
Stations that are high-value targets, either because of high passenger volume, name recognition, or location under or near prominent sites, are preferred for conducting searches. Screening in these stations can capture the most people without causing unnecessary congestion.
Passenger baggage is inspected or searched, not passengers. The search is conducted with explosives trace detection (ETD) devices or by canine units. Although they were not mentioned, hand searches are presumably used as well.
The search is voluntary; passengers can choose to forgo the search, but those who do so cannot enter the system at that point.
The key to system effectiveness is the presence of officers (including undercover officers) who observe the behavior of the passengers, particularly those who obviously avoid or refuse to undergo screening.
The stations where screening takes place are chosen at random and without announcement, to create additional deterrence.
Public reaction to screening has been generally positive. New Jersey reports very positive responses to baggage searches.
New York, New Jersey, and Boston all have written procedures established.
One location that has no search program recently acquired explosives canine teams trained to sniff the vapor trails of passengers arriving at its two main stations. The program is in its infancy, but passenger reaction thus far has been positive.
Other transit agencies indicated that, if necessary, they would implement a program based on those in New York and Boston. The search program would be random, voluntary, and announced ahead of time; passenger reaction would be monitored; screening would be done by hand, by canine teams, or by explosives trace units; search stations would be set up in an unpredictable fashion to maximize deterrent value. All the transit agencies examined in this study would utilize BASS or BASS-type training for officers. All are concerned with ensuring that the legal authority to conduct searches is solid, and one was concerned that officers themselves incur no personal liability for conducting searches. The extent to which the logistics of managing screening at main stations in peak periods has been thought through is unclear.
Most important, all agencies would prefer to have more specific intelligence to use when conducting searches, intelligence that better describes the explosives and the method used to secrete them or the identity of the attackers. In one case, a transit agency indicated that specific intelligence had in fact guided officers in attempting to detect terrorist surveillance.
The choice of locations for conducting screening was generally consistent. In addition to ensuring some kind of unpredictability in screening locations, all wished to include the following factors:
Stations and times at which passenger loads are the highest.
Stations that are themselves, or are located next to, sites of national significance, such as Times Square in New York or Universal City (with its theme park and City Walk) in Los Angeles.
Smaller stations where attackers might enter the system (as they did in Madrid).
Times other than rush hour, especially after the recent attacks in India that were timed outside of morning or evening rush hours.
Transit systems appear to be able to sustain increased screening and surveillance without significant additional resources for about two weeks to one month. Beyond this time, available law enforcement and staff will become exhausted, and help from federal, state, or other local authorities will be needed. The most commonly cited sources of support were local city and county police departments, state police, the National Guard, and in two cases, TSA. At this time, there are no firm estimates of the amount of time that a strengthened screening regime could be sustained or what that screening regime would constitute.
Probably the most difficult question for respondents to answer was, If there was an attack on your system or a neighboring system, or specific and credible intelligence were received that such an attack were imminent, what security measures would you immediately implement, and specifically, what role would a screening regime take?
All respondents stated that their first step would be to close the system and search it (particularly with canine teams); they would then reopen it, possibly slowly. All acknowledged that they would have to deploy a significantly increased police presence at this point and probably would institute a screening regime.
However, planning as to where resources would be required, how they would be used, and how long they would be needed seemed hazy, except at those agencies that already have instituted a regime. The most common response was that planning was in progress and that some kind of random screening would take place, possibly combined with the closure of some stations.
As indicated earlier, many respondents expressed great concern about intelligence-based ramp-ups in security measures that do not include any logical sequence for reduction in intensity. The need to share more specifics of intelligence, now and in the future, was a strong and understandable thread throughout the interviews. New Jersey was the only authority that had a program in place to ensure that screening procedures were effective and being carried out as written. The lack of an evaluation program was common to all other respondents, most of whom indicated that they would use the normal supervisory chain instead.See Berrick, op. cit., pp. 23-24. The GAO recently found that while two of thirteen foreign transit authorities reviewed have active programs of covert testing in place, as of September 2005, no such program was actively being conducted by the U.S. transit agencies the GAO had contacted.
The technological or nonhuman screening method of most interest was the use of explosives canine teams (which are already commonplace, used primarily to clear areas or suspicious items, but also in searches), ETDs, and closed-circuit television (CCTV). There is considerable interest in "smart" CCTV that can be programmed to detect unusual movement or lack of movement in tunnels, in stations, or on trains.
The benefits and limitations of these current technologies do not seem to be well understood. Transit agencies do appreciate the field tests recently conducted by TSA, but practical knowledge of the benefits and costs may not have made their way to the senior officials interviewed for this study. More reports similar to those published by the TRB on the costs and effectiveness of ETDs and canine teams would be helpful.
Many agencies have unrealistic expectations of future technology. What is wanted most is a system that screens large numbers of people for explosives. Some agencies also want a system that screens not only for explosives, but also for CBRN agents. Unfortunately, best estimates are that it will take five or more years to field and test the first type of system and additional years to deploy it. The second type of system is many more years away. Placing hopes on technology is not an answer to the question of how to implement screening in mass-transit systems today.
Several chiefs said that TSA should play two roles in technology development, and for some, these constituted the largest plea for help. First, they wanted TSA to be a clearinghouse for technology so that transit agencies would not be the victims of exaggerated vendor claims and marketing efforts. Second, they wanted more R&D dollars to be concentrated on systems that could reliably detect explosives used in bombings, without having to create lines for screening. This would also allow for a selection method based on more than behavior.
Technologies for
Screening in the
Public-Transit Environment
The technologies evaluated are described below.
Trace document scanners. This technology can be applied to cards (such as fare cards), papers touched by people, and hands. The most stable explosives are sticky, and only professional bomb makers can use laboratory procedures and hermetical sealing that would avoid detection. Trace document scanners have been tested by TSA twice in public transit (in the TRIP 1 test at New Carrolton and the Trip III test on the New Haven, Connecticut, Shore Line East commuter train). The scanner was used in combination with an X-ray and tabletop trace detector that screened passengers after they boarded the train. Passengers had to touch a card, and if the card activated an alarm when analyzed, the passenger went through secondary screening. This technology could be useful for screening selectees. A fingerprint scanner was evaluated during phase II of the S&T rail pilot at the MARC system at The Johns Hopkins University, apparently with successful results.
Trace portals. Trace portals and infrared scanning are the only available technologies for screening individuals for explosives. Throughput is relatively slow (an average of 30 seconds per passenger).
Explosives canine teams. While canine teams are commonly used in transit environments to clear areas after bomb threats or to respond to suspicious packages (TSA has trained and provided 53 teams to 8 transit agencies), the only mass-transit system using them to screen passengers at the time of writing this monograph was Atlanta's Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) system. Two canine teams from TSA's canine program were deployed at MARTA in a demonstration mode. The dogs were specifically trained to focus on people in a mass-transit environment, rather than on objects. MARTA claims that the demonstration results were positive. Canines were also used to resolve alarms on checked bags screened with EDS (see below) during the TRIP II demonstration.
Explosives detection systems (EDSs). Advanced-technology bulk detectors, or certified EDS, detect the bulk of explosives rather than trace amounts. During TRIP II, conducted on Amtrak trains departing Union Station in Washington, DC, in June and July 2004, an EDS was used to screen baggage checked onto the train, and alarms were resolved using trace detectors or canine units (the former being a standard configuration for screening checked bags). TSA concluded that the EDS did not affect operations.
Millimeter-wave (MMW) and IR detection. Infrared (IR) technology has been used in military applications and is well understood. Millimeter-wave technology (which has both an active and a passive form) was included in the second phase of the congressionally funded PATH tests. Although the report on the tests is not yet available, it appears that several performance and operational issues need to be resolved before MMW can be applied in the transit screening environment.See E-mail to Bruce Butterworth from Christopher C. Kelly, Associate Director, Strategic Communications, Science and Technology, Department of Homeland Security, dated January 30, 2007.
The Value of Selective Screening Regimes in Different Threat Situations
These screening system elements can be changed, expanded, or decreased, but only three are under the exclusive control of the transit agency. Random selection can be intensified or changed easily, behavioral profiling can be continuously improved through retraining, and canine units can be deployed and redeployed. But valid threat information either exists or it doesn't; it will be communicated, or it won't.
The general public may assume that situations of increased threat are always accompanied by specific threat information, but as transit agencies and other security professionals know all too well, this is more the exception than the rule. Nevertheless, when a threat situation is declared as elevated, a number of questions should be asked of federal intelligence agencies, and asked aggressively. Here are a few:
Credible, specific, and short-term. A specific event or piece of intelligence or an actual attack on a similar target has elevated the threat in ways that can be defined by some combination of location, timing, attackers, and method. All components should be strengthened to the maximum, but the highest priority should be given to combining behavioral profiling with specific threat information.
Credible, less-specific, and evolving/longer-term. Intelligence or an attack provides credible information but with fewer specifics on the actual attack mode. The threat is robust, and attackers can change tactics in unknown ways. The random element and behavioral profiling should be increased but could be altered in unpredictable ways to conserve resources. Canine teams, if available, should be added.
Nonspecific and short-term. Situations of general increased threat across the nation, or in a city, are assessed as including public transportation, but there are no specifics on the method of attack. Such situations may be tied to an anniversary, trial, or some other time-limited event. Because the threat is short-term, random selection, behavioral profiling, and the use of canine teams (if available) should be intensified.
Nonspecific and long-term. The threat exists, but there is no specific event or time period known and no apparent likelihood of it ending soon. This is the threat situation that currently applies to public or mass transit. Given resource constraints, increased random selection and behavioral profiling would be appropriate, supplemented where possible by canine presence.
Easily expanded or contracted screening. The ability to expand or contract screening is important not only because of the deterrence advantages of moving locations, but also because threat situations will require screening functions to intensify and decline. Flexibility is key.
Use of the most appropriate, field-deployable technologies. An effective system will use the technologies that are most appropriate to the search function and that can operate effectively in a transit environment. Currently available technologies include ETD, some less expensive bulk-detection equipment, and canine units. As DHS/TSA research continues and demonstrations show the utility (and limitations) of new equipment, new technologies can be introduced.
Public outreach and education. As noted earlier, public resistance to screening and delays increases with time and distance from a terrorist event or specific intelligence information. The effectiveness and constitutionality of selective screening regimes will continue to be questioned. Public affairs officers need to be clear in explaining screening objectives without providing sensitive information; supervisors must respond quickly and thoroughly to complaints of unprofessional screening, and they must create and nurture support in key sectors of the public and the media. This will be hard work, particularly in communities that have not suffered an immediate attack, are highly sensitive to perceived invasions of civil liberties, or, perhaps most important, may already be suspicious of transit authorities for reasons unrelated to security.
Planning. Instituting a screening regime is a daunting and complex task that cannot be done both quickly and effectively. Transit authorities need to think ahead to the strong possibility that they will have to implement a selective screening regime, and they must specifically tie such a regime to events or threat levels that would demand immediate implementation. Contingency plans are key, and tabletop exercises should be repeated until roles and responsibilities are clearly understood and internalized and external relationships are established that will sustain the transit agency through the start-up process.
Policies and procedures. It is important to be explicit about what a screening regime is designed to accomplish, but also what it cannot accomplish. Concisely written policies should be implemented that treat, among other things, method of selection, search methods, training requirements, and supervisory controls. Detailed procedures that lay out specifically the who, what, where, and how of screening should be developed to support the policies. Procedural documents should be usable by first-line supervisors and subject to continuing review. They must be considered protected information.
Full costing of primary elements. Screening is expensive, and costs for a screening operation should be conservatively estimated, with adequate margin built in. Provision for funding must be made internally or through prior agreement with local, state, or federal authorities. Planning to perform screening cheaply is programmed failure. Honest and careful cost estimating is important. Most cost elements are obvious, but some important elements may be hidden. Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Project J-10J will create a user-friendly guide for agency use and will provide some guidance on determining cost elements. For the moment, some of the more obvious items and complications are listed below:
Staffing. Screening is workforce intensive, and salaries and benefits for all periods of work (including overtime, weekends, and holidays) must be factored in. It is critical to include consideration of turnover and burnout: Understaffing can create a dangerous situation of sudden attrition; overstaffing can result in obvious (and potentially publicly noticed and ridiculed) waste. Airport screening experiences should be reviewed for important lessons learned on how to create workforce and pay schedules that maintain morale but allow for flexibility.
Equipment. The use of canine units or special equipment needs to be fully costed. Canine expenses have been well documented by the TRB; they are surprisingly large and include, among other things, overtime, canine acquisition, training and kenneling costs, management, and quality control.See Transit Cooperative Research Program, June 2002, op. cit. The expenses for currently available trace units or X-ray machines (which may be effective in finding large amounts of explosives) are considerably less but can be underestimated easily. Elements that should be considered include:
Acquisition, maintenance, and replacement. It is important to study the past use of the equipment, build in margins, and ensure that servicing is part of the contract with the supplier.
Consumables. Many screening devices require consumables to be provided and stored properly.
Initial and recurrent training. Most equipment manufacturers provide training manuals. Care should be taken to ensure that the initial and recurrent training are of good quality and fully costed.
Power and environment. Care must be taken to ensure that the equipment selected can operate effectively in the real environment.
Protocols and training. Protocols and the initial and recurrent training based on them are key. Protocols should be developed for all elements of the system: selection of passengers; interactions with passengers; physical searching of persons or items carried by passengers; and methods to use when a suspicious object is found and for calling for backup or police presence. For both operational and legal reasons, all these protocols should be clearly written, taught, practiced, and reviewed. Recurrent, and, when needed, remedial training are equally important. Lessons learned from past searches should be imparted to the officers or screening personnel. Training itself is costly--instructors must be paid, rooms must be found and rented, acceptable teaching materials must be procured, and appropriate areas for simulations must be found. It is vital that the full cost of training be included in cost estimates.
If special equipment, such as portable trace detectors, is used, additional protocols and procedures must be included in the training, in particular for alarm resolution. There is always the possibility of a false positive caused by pharmaceutical products, residue of firearms legally used by citizens or law enforcement and military personnel, or explosives used in mining. Protocols are needed that combine searching with questioning to ensure that false positives are resolved without infringing on passenger rights or letting true positives through.
Quality control/test and evaluation. It is important to maintain quality control, not only to ensure continued detection and professionalism, but also to ensure compliance with legal requirements, prevent abuses, and respond to those that may occur. This can be more complicated than it appears. Targets and metrics need to be determined and tracked in a carefully guarded, but simple data system. A few well-trained individuals will be needed to collect data and run internal (and possibly covert) evaluations on screenings, perhaps posing as passengers.
First-line supervision. First-line supervision is an essential element in maintaining effective and professional screening. Organizational theory and common sense both hold that if first-line supervisors are not knowledgeable, conscientious, energetic, ethical, and supportive of those who report to them, all the investment made will be for naught. Walking-around management and hands-on observation and supervision must be the order of the day.
Top-level support. Top-level management commitment is even more important than first-line management commitment. Far too often, security departments rank significantly lower than other passenger service functions in corporate hierarchies. In the airline industry before September 11, 2001, security was a minor afterthought compared with the investment in aviation safety, and with a couple of notable exceptions, its management was placed in the hands of people more trained in internal security and preventing fraud and theft than in defense against terrorist attacks. Effective screening has to be a top-level requirement of the most senior transit manager, who should also bear the responsibility for managing the screening function.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The terrorist threat will persist, and urban mass transportation presents an attractive target. While a number of steps have been taken by transit agencies and by government to increase security, passenger screening has been implemented by only two transit agencies, one local and one state. For a number of reasons, systemwide 100 percent passenger screening will be impossible until technology is developed and demonstrated that can screen large groups of people for explosives at standoff distances. Although not all attacks can be stopped and the public may support only systems that (falsely) promise no risk for the long run, steps can and must be taken to reduce significantly the possibility of terrorist attacks on urban mass transit. Selective screening regimes can reduce risk, particularly if they use an optimum mix of selection procedures; maximize deterrence; are planned, managed, and monitored professionally; and are accompanied by a campaign of public education and community involvement.
To return to the questions posed at the beginning of this monograph, we can answer them as follows:
If 100 percent passenger screening is not possible, does screening of only some passengers, even on a voluntary basis, make sense? It does.
If only some passengers are screened, in the absence of specific intelligence, what should be the appropriate selection process? A combination of random selection, behavioral profiling, and specific threat information, augmented in some instances by canine teams.
What combinations of selection methods are appropriate for different threat situations? Where there is a credible but nonspecific threat, use of all methods should increase. When there is a credible and specific threat, specific intelligence information should guide behavioral profiling, with random selection being maintained as a base. Where there is a general long-term threat, random selection should remain the prominent mode.
What role can current and future technology play in passenger screening? With the possible exception of using trained canine units to select passengers for screening, current technology can only make the selective searching of passengers and baggage less intrusive. Future technology, however, can play a major role in screening and should focus on improving current technologies and developing field-deployable systems that can detect explosives on individuals and in groups at standoff distances.
What are the characteristics of a good screening program? A good screening program is carefully planned, is fully and realistically budgeted, has a downward flow of policies and procedures that clearly define its objectives and how it will achieve them, can be increased or reduced flexibly, maximizes practices that increase unpredictability and deterrence, utilizes technology efficiently, is subject to a quality-assurance program, has continuing public outreach and education, and, most important, has strong senior-level support and first-class first-line supervision.
Appendix: Security
Survey for
Transportation Organizations
What, if any, are the current methods used for surveillance and screening of transit passengers?
Are you currently using any methods of randomly selecting passengers for searches and, if so, what is the method used?
Are your staff and police officers trained in any method of behavioral recognition or "profiling"? If so, what is the method and how intensive is the initial and recurrent training?
How do you differentiate security measures during peak and off-peak hours, and between large and smaller stations? In other words, do you focus your passenger-based methods on large numbers of people or are you required, in order to maintain operational efficiency, to avoid imposing security during times of maximum passenger loads?
Have you ever received intelligence specific and credible enough to guide your surveillance or search program?
Do you have law enforcement presence that is dedicated to transit safety and security and can you estimate the size of this force? Asking the question another way, do you have police officers who are familiar enough with the transit environment to recognize and respond to something unusual or someone who is acting in a suspicious fashion?
What do you think is the right ratio of uniformed to undercover officers for the transit environment, assuming a continuation of the current threat assessment?
What in general is the procedure used if a transit staff member sees a suspicious object or person? Similarly, what procedure would a law enforcement officer use? What is the operating philosophy you teach and reinforce?
What is your operating philosophy on creating unpredictability in defensive measures obvious to a potential attacker? How have you implemented this philosophy where passengers are concerned?
How do you monitor your transit staff and police officers to ensure that they are alert and perform tasks assigned?
Do you have, or do you have plans to acquire, either trace detection or K-9 teams for resolving unclaimed bags or clearing after a bomb threat? What do you perceive the benefits and limitations of K-9 and trace detectors to be?
Have you ever considered or had advocated to you applying airport screening procedures and technologies (to a section of passengers)? What is your reaction to this concept?
What legal constraints do you understand authorities have interpreted to be in place for passenger screening?
If you have screened passengers before, what lessons did you learn? If you had to do it over again, what would you have done differently and what would you have done the same way?
What has been the general reaction of the public and passengers to any of the security efforts you have taken so far that are focused on passengers?
Do you currently have contingency plans that include passenger screening? If so, what "events" or "threat levels" do you believe would have to exist before such screening--in any form--was to take place?
Do you currently have any contingency budget set up for screening or an agreed method for obtaining funds necessary for passenger screening?
If a confirmed act of terrorism were to take place on your system or to take place in a neighboring system with an assessment that a threat remains that can include yours, one presumes that the system would be closed and cleared. Before the system is put back into operation, what set of security measures would you advocate be put in place if the threat were that of a suicide bomber using a vest or a bag, or someone leaving a large bomb (like that used in Madrid or London) behind? Would you include some increased surveillance or screening of passengers and, if so, what methods would you advocate?
Do you envision putting into place a passenger screening system given a continuation of the current threat environment? Do you envision operationally testing such a system?
What are your thoughts on the use of random selection, behavioral profiling, or intelligence-based or compatible selection (type of bags carried, clothing, and even apparent ethnicity, age, and gender) in a screening regime?
Do you have any thoughts on the minimum number of passengers you believe should be screened in order to maximize deterrence?
Going back to the question of passenger loads, at what stations and during which hours would you concentrate your screening methods?
If you had to impose a passenger-screening regime, how would your transit agency attempt to maintain passenger or public support for it? How difficult would this become over time if there were no event reinforcing in the public's mind the need for the security procedure?
Do you have any grassroots estimates of how long you could sustain screening regimes based on the number of stations included, the number of passengers monitored and screened, or the manpower used?
Would you budget for resources to evaluate and test the screening regime? How do you think this should be done?
Passenger screening in transit is a difficult subject. Assuming no one actually advocates 100% screening, what do you fear most from governmental authorities on this subject? Conversely, what information and assistance would be most helpful to you?
"A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters," Surface Transportation Security , Vol. 10, Transportation Research Board, National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report # 525, pp. 60-61.
For a current overview of efforts to increase the security of passengers in rail (including transit) transportation, see Cathleen A. Berrick, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts , Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-225T, January 18, 2007.
David Randall Peterman, Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues , Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL32625, updated May 26, 2005, p. 2, available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL32625.pdf.
"Securing Our Nation's Rail Systems," July 2006, available at www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0895.shtm, accessed December 5, 2006.
In London, the bomber (Hasib Hussain) apparently detonated aboard a bus either because of delays in the subway on the way to his target train or because his device malfunctioned and required a new battery. The bus appears to have been a secondary target. See Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 , House of Commons Report HC 1087, May 11, 2006, pp. 5-6.
Brian Taylor et al., Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Current Practices in the United States and Abroad , MTI Report 04-05, San José, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, November 2005.
American Public Transit Association (APTA) Teleconference, "Transit Security Priorities Post-9/11," October 2006.
Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual-2nd Edition , Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Report # 100, Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2003, pp. 2-21.
"Chicago's Airports Forecast Record Summer Travel," Chicago Airport System News Release, City of Chicago, Department of Aviation, May 25, 2006.
At some ferry terminals, the throughput demands are less, the access points are fewer, and the departures are less frequent, so while problems of staffing, costs, equipment, screening protocols, and passenger delay and frustration would remain, the design of a screening system is less inherently problematic.
Jocelyn Waite, "The Case for Searches on Public Transportation," TRB Legal Research Digest , No. 22, October 2005 (published under TCRP Project J-5, "Legal Aspects of Transit and Intermodal Transportation Programs"), pp. 18-19.
Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction for Transit Employees , National Transit Institute, Federal Transit Administration (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, n.d.).
Waite, op.cit., p. 19. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the use of racial profiling by U.S. Border Patrol agents making stops along the U.S.-Mexico Border.
An increase in the use of smart cards and contactless smart cards will facilitate a faster flow of passengers than is currently the case, making screening lines even more infeasible.
K-9 Units in Public Transportation: A Guide for Decision Makers , Report 86: Public Transportation Security, Vol. 2, Washington, DC: TRB Transit Cooperative Research Program, June 2002, p. vii. This guide did not consider canine units for routine screening of passengers.
Bruce Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism," Atlantic Monthly , June 2003, p. 2.
W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorist Risks , Cambridge, MA: John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No 401, p. 32.
The questionnaire is reproduced in the appendix of this report.
BASS was developed by Richard DiDomenica's Protecting the Homeland Innovations, LCC, after September 11, 2001.
One transit agency gave some indication of having at least tested a search regime.
Committee on the Review of Existing and Potential Standoff Explosives Detection Techniques, National Research Council, National Academies of Science, Existing and Potential Standoff Explosive Detection Techniques , ISBN: 0-309-09130-6, available at National Academies Press, http://www.nap.edu/, accessed December 5, 2006.
Applicability of Portable Explosive Detection Devices in Transit Environments , Public Transportation Security Volume 6, Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Report 86, Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, 2004, pp. 1-3.
E-mail to Bruce Butterworth from Christopher C. Kelly, Associate Director, Strategic Communications, Science and Technology, Department of Homeland Security, dated January 30, 2007.
Transit Cooperative Research Program, June 2002, op. cit.
"A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters." Surface Transportation Security , Volume 10. Transportation Research Board, National Cooperative Highway Research Program Report # 525, pp. 60 & 61.
Applicability of Portable Explosive Detection Devices in Transit Environments. Public Transportation Security Volume 6, Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Report 86. Washington DC: Transportation Research Board, 2004: p. 1-3.
APTA Annual Conference, San José, California, October 2006.
"Chicago's Airports Forecast Record Summer Travel." Chicago Airport System News Release. City of Chicago, Department of Aviation. May 26, 2006.
Committee on the Review of Existing and Potential Standoff Explosives Detection Techniques, National Research Council, National Academies of Science. Existing and Potential Standoff Explosive Detection Techniques, ISBN: 0-309-09130-6. Available National Academies Press, http://www.nap.edu/. Accessed December 5, 2006.
Hoffman, Bruce. "The Logic of Suicide Terrorism." Atlantic Monthly, June 2003.
K-9 Units in Public Transportation: A Guide for Decision Makers. Report 86: Public Transportation Security, Volume 2. Washington DC: TRB Transit Cooperative Research Program, 2002.
"Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issues." Updated July 14, 2005. CRS Report # 21514, p. 2.
"Securing Our Nation's Rail Systems." July 2006. Available at www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0895.shtm. Accessed December 5, 2006.
Taylor, Brian, et al. Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Current Practices in the United States and Abroad . MTI Report 04-05. San José, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 2005.
Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction for Transit Employees . National Transit Institute, Federal Transit Administration. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 2005.
Transit Capacity and Quality of Service Manual-2nd Edition . Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) Report # 100. Washington DC: Transportation Research Board, 2003.
Viscusi, W. Kip and Richard J. Zeckhauser. "Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorist Risks." John F. Kennedy School of Government, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business, Discussion Paper No 401, p. 32.
Waite, Jocelyn. "The Case for Searches on Public Transportation." TRB Legal Research Digest 22. October 2005. Published under TCRP Project J-5, "Legal Aspects of Transit and Intermodal Transportation Programs," p. 18-19.
Brian Michael Jenkins is one of the world's foremost authorities on terrorism and sophisticated crime. From 1989 to 1998, Mr. Jenkins was the Deputy Chairman of Kroll Associates, an international investigative and consulting firm. Before that, he was chairman of RAND's political science department, where from 1972 to 1989, he also directed RAND's research on political violence. He is currently a senior advisor to the president of RAND.
Mr. Jenkins has a bachelor of arts degree in fine arts and a master's degree in history, both from UCLA. He studied at the University of Guanajuato in Mexico and in the Department of Humanities at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala, where he was a Fulbright Fellow and recipient of a second fellowship from the Organization of American States.
Commissioned in the infantry at the age of 19, Mr. Jenkins became a paratrooper and ultimately, a captain in the Green Berets. He is a decorated combat veteran, having served in the Seventh Special Forces Group in the Dominican Republic during the American intervention and later as a member of the Fifth Special Forces Group in Vietnam (1966-1967). He returned to Vietnam on a special assignment in 1968 to serve as a civilian member of the Long Range Planning Task Group; he remained with the group until the end of 1969, receiving the Department of the Army's highest award for his service. Mr. Jenkins returned to Vietnam in 1971 on a special assignment.
Mr. Jenkins is the author of International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, the editor and coauthor of Terrorism and Personal Protection, co-editor and co-author of Aviation Terrorism and Security, and co-author of The Fall of South Vietnam. He is also the author of numerous articles, book chapters, and published research reports on conflict and crime.
In 1996, President Bill Clinton appointed Mr. Jenkins to be a member of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security. From 1999 to 2000, he served as an advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism and in 2000 was appointed to be a member of the U.S. Comptroller General's International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and a member of the board of directors of the ICC's Commercial Crime Services. Mr. Jenkins was also a member of the Transportation Research Board/National Research Council Panel on Transportation: Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism in 2002.
Mr. Jenkins has led the Mineta Transportation Institute's counterterrorism research team since 1997, producing three volumes of case studies of major terrorist attacks on surface transportation.
Bruce Butterworth has had a distinguished government career in the Congress and the Executive Branch. Between 1975 and 1980, as a professional staff member for the House Government Operations Committee, he ran investigations and hearings on many transportation safety issues, particularly in aviation. He spent 11 years in the Department of Transportation, eight of them in the Office of the Secretary of Transportation. He managed negotiations on the inclusion of air and maritime services in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT--now the World Trade Organization[WTO]), chaired U.S. delegations to United Nations Committees, dealt with transport and aviation issues related to border inspections, and was part of the response to the attack on Pan Am 103.
Mr. Butterworth has held two executive posts in aviation security. As Director of Policy and Planning (l991-1995), he established strategic, long-term, and contingency plans and federal rules. As Director of Operations (1995-2000), he was responsible for federal air marshals, hijacking response, and 900 field agents; he worked hard to improve security and the performance of security measures by U.S. airports here and by U.S. airlines worldwide. He ran the FAA's aviation command center, successfully managing the resolution of hijackings and security emergencies. He launched a successful program of dangerous-goods regulation and cargo security after the 1995 ValuJet crash, oversaw the conversion of the air marshal program to a full-time program with high standards, was a key player in the response to the ValuJet and TWA 800 accidents, and was a frequent media spokesperson. He worked closely with the Congress, the National Security Council staff, the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and authorities of other nations.
Between September 2001 and January 2003, he was an associate director at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and was responsible for security there.
Mr. Butterworth received a master of science degree from the London School of Economics in 1974 and a bachelor of arts degree from the University of the Pacific in 1972 (Magna cum Laude). He was a California State Scholar and a Rotary Foundation Fellow. He has received numerous special achievement and performance awards.
San José State University, of the California State University system, and the MTI Board of Trustees have agreed upon a peer view process to ensure that the results presented are based upon a professionally acceptable research protocol.
Research projects begin with the approval of a scope of work by the sponsoring entities, with in-process reviews by the MTI Research Director and the project sponsor. Periodic progress reports are provided to the MTI Research Director and the Research Associates Policy Oversight Committee ( rapoc ). Review of the draft research product is conducted by the Research Committee of the Board of Trustees and may include invited critiques from other professionals in the subject field. The review is based on the professional propriety of the research methodology.
1. Jenkins, Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Attacks , MTI Report 97-4, December 1997; Brian Michael Jenkins, Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices , MTI Report 01-07, October 2001; Jenkins, Terrorism Overview , MTI Report 01-14, October 2001; Jenkins, Saving City Lifelines,: Lessons Learned in the 9-11 Terrorist Attacks , MTI Report 02-06, September 2003; Brian Taylor, Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Current Practices in the United States and Abroad , MTI Report 04-05, November 2005.