MTI Report 01-07
Protecting Public Surface Transportation Against Terrorism and
Serious Crime:
Continuing Research on Best Security Practices
September 2001
Brian Michael Jenkins
Larry N. Gersten
a publication of the
Mineta Transportation Institute
College of Business
San Jose State University
San Jose, CA 95192-0219
Created by Congress in 1991
The United Kingdom's Response to the
IRA'S Terrorism Campaign Against
Mainland Surface Transportation 7
The IRA's Terrorist Campaign 10
Chronology of IRA Terrorist
Attacks on Public Transportation in
England 25
British Secure Stations Scheme:
Manage and Design to Cut Down Crime 29
Best Practices Across Britain 30
Government Research Findings 32
Perceptions of Safety from Crime on Public Transport 32
The Valley Transportation Authority 35
Security Organization and Personnel 37
Security and Detection Technology 37
Communications Equipment and Procedures 39
Terrorism? What Terrorism? BART and VTA
Compared 40
The Bay Area Rapid Transit District 41
Maintaining Vigilance Against Surface
Terrorism 41
Crisis Management Strategy--Personnel and Procedures 43
The Tokyo, March 20, 1995, Subway Sarin
Attack 49
Experiments with Exotic Weapons 51
Issues Raised During the Attack 64
A Chronology of Recent Terrorist
Attacks and Other Serious Incidents
of Crime Involving Public Surface
Transportation Systems (JULY 1, 1997 - DECEMBER 31, 2000) 67
Acronyms and Abbreviations 111
Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems
(1920 - 2000) 71
Tacticts Used Against Public Transportation Systems (1920 - 2000) 71
Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems
(July 1997 - December 2000) 72
Tactics Used Against Public Transportation Systems
(July 1997 - December 2000) 72
Location of Attacks with Fatalities on Public Surface
Transportation Systems (July 1997 - December 2000) 73
Location of Attacks with Fatalities on Public Surface
Transportation Systems (1920 - 2000) 73
Countries with the Most Fatalities in Attacks on Public Surface
Transportation Systems (July 1997 - December 2000) 74
Countries with the Most Fatalities in Attacks on Public Surface
Transportation Systems (1920 - 2000) 74
Terrorist attacks on commercial aviation had declined significantly after reaching a high point in the 1970s. The devastating consequences of the four coordinated hijackings and deliberate crashes of three of the planes into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001--an event unprecedented in the annals of terrorism--have wiped out all sense of progress and focused national attention on aviation security. Meanwhile, terrorists have continued to attack public surface transportation worldwide with no indication of abatement in these attacks.1 With large-scale indiscriminate violence clearly the reality of contemporary terrorism and growing concerns that terrorists might use chemical and biological weapons, to which public transportation systems are extremely vulnerable, the threat has increased.
Surface transportation systems cannot be protected as easily as airplanes, which are housed in fairly closed and reasonably controlled locations; additionally, the airport terminal access to airplanes is controlled by relatively few entry points. Conversely, trains, buses, and light rail systems must remain readily accessible, convenient, and inexpensive for the traveling public.
There are other differences between surface and air transport. Unlike airplanes, which make relatively few passenger transfers, trains and buses make numerous stops along vast open and penetrable corridors. Passenger profiling, passenger screening, and the elaborate deployments of metal detectors, X-ray machines, explosives sniffers, hand searchers, and armed guards that have become features of the passenger landscape at airports cannot be transferred easily to subway stations, bus stops, or light rail platforms. The delays would be enormous and the costs prohibitive. The same open targets that permit penetration serve as easy conduits for escape by assailants. Surface transportation lines, like power lines and pipelines, are extremely difficult to protect.
Open to relatively easy penetration, trains, buses, and light rail systems offer an array of vulnerable targets to terrorists who seek publicity, political disruption, or high body counts. High concentrations of people in relatively crowded quarters are inviting fodder for those who would cause mayhem and death. The massive amounts of explosives needed for truck bombs are unnecessary in crowded train stations, bus depots, carriages, or coaches. Even without large numbers of casualties, disruptions to transit can seriously impact a region's economy and the public's faith in the government's ability to provide basic protections to its citizens.
Such conditions do not mean that authorities are without tools of their own. Transportation operators and security officials in areas that have been subjected to terrorist attacks have developed some effective security countermeasures. No security system can stop determined terrorists from setting off bombs, biological weapons, or chemical reactions in public places. Nevertheless, good security measures can make terrorist operations more difficult, increase the terrorists' likelihood of being detected and identified, keep casualties and disruptions to a minimum, reduce panic, and reassure alarmed passengers in a crisis.
For the past five years, the Mineta Transportation Institute at San José State University has led a continuing research program focusing on the security of public surface transportation against terrorist attacks and other serious violent crimes. The effort began with a surface transportation terrorism symposium held in 1996, which brought together security experts from transportation entities, law enforcement, and other government agencies. Their discussions were published by the Institute in Terrorism in Transportation--A Symposium (San Jose: Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies, March 1996).
The following year, the Mineta Institute launched a more formal research program aimed at identifying the best security practices. The initial phase of this effort included four case studies that reviewed transportation security measures in Paris, Atlanta, New York, and on the Amtrak rail system. The Paris case study focused on the immediate aftermath of the 1995 terrorist bombing of a commuter rail station in Paris. The Atlanta case study examined the security preparations connected with the 1996 Olympics and the aftermath of the Centennial Park bombing. The Amtrak case study focused on the response to the deliberate derailing of the Sunset Limited in November 1995. New York was included because of the size and complexity of its system and the incidents and threats that affected it in the 1990s, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1997 terrorist plot to carry out suicide bombings on the city's subways.
In addition to the case studies cited above, Phase I of the research reviewed the security measures employed by nine other transportation systems in the United States, ranging from small rural bus systems to larger multimodal operations. A chronology and analysis of terrorist attacks on surface transport from 1920 to mid-1997 and an annotated bibliography completed the research effort. The results of the examination were published in Brian Jenkins, Protecting Surface Transportation Systems and Patrons from Terrorist Activities: Case Studies of Best Security Practices and a Chronology of Attacks (San Jose: Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies, December 1997).
Phase II of the research has continued to the present time and is reported upon in this study. It comprises four case studies: the 1995 sarin attack on Tokyo's subways, the United Kingdom's response to the IRA's terrorist campaign against British surface transportation, and security at the Bay Area Rapid Transit District and the Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority. The chronology that began in Phase I has been brought forward to the end of the 2000 calendar year; the annotated bibliography has been updated.
Taken together, this and the earlier two volumes give a comprehensive review of surface transportation security. The case studies cover 14 transportation systems in the United States plus those in Japan, France, and the United Kingdom, yielding a truly global perspective on what has become a global threat to travelers and citizens alike.
The last three case studies were included because they offer an opportunity to examine security and crisis management at transportation systems that have been the targets of major terrorist attacks. Each system experienced a completely different threat. The United Kingdom had to cope with a long-running terrorist campaign aimed at causing major disruption and occasionally some casualties. France confronted a terrorist campaign aimed at causing heavy casualties. Tokyo's subways saw the first large-scale terrorist use of a chemical weapona possibility of growing concern in other parts of the world. There have been more attacks and a greater number of casualties in places like India and Pakistan, but the experiences of the United Kingdom, France, and Japan are more comparable to the conditions in the United States.
The studies of the IRA's campaign in England and the sarin attack in Tokyo included in this volume offer us something not available in the other case studies: insight into the terrorists themselves--what they were trying to achieve and how they decided to go about it. Such knowledge is a valuable first step for developing successful countermeasures. That said, the British and Japanese experiences presented completely different terrorist rationales and operations.
The ongoing campaign in the United Kingdom enabled those charged with security to carefully analyze the modus operandi of the adversary, determine appropriate countermeasures, discern results, and make adjustments as the campaign evolved. Authorities were able to diagnose, comprehend, and respond to the threat.
The sarin attack was different. Although the Aum Shinrikyo sect made test runs of nerve gas releases prior to the March 20 attack (not recognized by authorities as precursors) and additional low-level attacks occurred afterward, the March 20 attack was a single stunning event. There were no patterns to be discerned, no ongoing campaign to be analyzed. Security was increased, but the system remained virtually defenseless against chemical attacks. Japanese authorities focused on destroying the group and its capacity to wage chemical or biological warfare. The major lessons fell within the category of crisis management, which must be a part of all security programs.
The two studies of security measures in effect at the two transportation systems in Northern California, in turn, differ from the London and Tokyo examples. Crime occurs everywhere and an incident of terrorism can occur anywhere--witness the Tokyo sarin attack and the Oklahoma City bombing--but the terrorist threat to California must be assessed as less than that in the United Kingdom or other places where terrorist activity has regularly occurred over a long period of time.
Given the relative quiet on the domestic front, the security measures taken by the Bay Area Rapid Transit Agency (BART) and the Santa Clara County Valley Transit Authority (VTA) are not nearly as elaborate as those taken in England or Tokyo. This raises the question of threat assessment: If no apparent threat is on the horizon, yet nothing can ever be ruled out, how much security is enough? Is a full-scale terrorist threat the only way to marshal enough security, or should public agencies take action to prevent such a threat? Given scarce resources and relatively low levels of public concern, such questions are always a part of the public policy matrix and not easily answered.
The updated chronology adds 195 entries to the 631 entries listed in the first volume. Inasmuch as some of these entries are multiple events, we now have a database of terrorist attacks and serious violent crimes exceeding 800 incidents, which offers greater confidence in the statistical analysis. The updated chronology shows that the patterns of terrorism in terms of targets and tactics remain stable. The locations of the attacks shift somewhat, reflecting slowly changing patterns of global conflict. Terrorist attacks on transportation targets continue to be significantly more lethal than terrorist attacks overall, underlining the fact that terrorists see train stations, bus depots, cars, and coaches as killing fields.
A separate Executive Overview distills the lessons learned in both phases of the research and describes the best security practices identified in all the case studies and the accompanying security literature. This document will serve as a primer to accompany further briefings and detailed discussions with transportation system operators and security officials, which are envisioned for Phase III.
The United Kingdom's Response to the IRA'S
Terrorism Campaign Against
Mainland Surface Transportation
Any study of "best practices" in securing transportation against terrorist attacks must include an examination of the British experience in dealing with terrorist attacks carried out by the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Few other counties have faced such a sustained campaign of violence. Unlike many other contemporary terrorist groups, the IRA did not hijack or sabotage commercial airliners; armies "do not do such things." However, the organization waged a 25-year campaign against surface transportation, attacking targets in Northern Ireland and Britain.
Transport was not the IRA's only target on the British mainland. The group also attacked public officials, government buildings, tourist sites, public events, and commercial property. The organization's reason for such activities was simple: to remind British officials and the British public that the "troubles" would not be confined to Northern Ireland alone; as long as turmoil existed in Northern Ireland, it would exist in the heart of Great Britain as well. In response to the IRA's terrorist campaign, British authorities were forced to implement extraordinary security measures. The analysis of the terrorist threat, the government's strategic approach to security, response procedures, and involvement of the public are all worthy of examination.2
The following case study describes London's Underground, a favorite target of the IRA, as well as light railways, buses, and the national rail network. It then examines the IRA's strategy and the evolution of its terrorist campaign, and describes the transportation security structure and the general approach and specific countermeasures taken to save lives and reduce disruption.
The London Underground is the world's oldest and one of its largest underground railway systems. Its first line opened in 1863. Additional lines were added as London grew during the nineteenth century, and expansion continued throughout the twentieth century. The last route, the Jubilee Line, was completed in 1979. Today, the Underground, or "tube" as it is known, comprises 12 separate lines that crisscross London and extend well into the suburbs.
Only 42 percent of the Underground's rails actually run underground; operation takes place through two types of tunnels. One form, "cut and cover" tunnels, are created by excavating from the surface, then covering the trench; in some parts, the trenches are left uncovered and the trains run just below or at ground level. These tunnels carry 8 percent of the system's lines. The second form, deep-level tubes, are excavated far below the surface and are completely covered upon completion. Thirty-four percent of the rails are deep-level tubes.
To a considerable extent, the form of rail design determines the type of engines that move rail traffic. While steam locomotives initially were used on the subsurface lines, only electrical trains could operate in the deep tunnels, the first of which was completed in 1890. Electrification accompanied expansion of the system, although the last steam engines were not removed until 1962. During World War II, the tunnels were used as air raid shelters and thousands of people slept in them during the bombing campaign. One of the lines was closed and its tunnel used to store treasures from the British Museum.
The Underground's routes total approximately 259 miles (416.7 kilometers) and serve 278 stations. Trains move 150,000 people every hour. During the morning peak travel hours, 34,000 passengers pass through Victoria Station, which has been attacked by the IRA several times. The District Line, the system's busiest, carries 545,000 passengers a day; the Northern Line carries 530,000 passengers; the Piccadilly Line, 520,000 passengers; the Metropolitan and Circle Lines, 500,000 each. In 1999, the Underground carried passengers on 930 million trips, a figure that was expected to surpass 1 billion in 2000. Because the Underground is the circulatory system of the city, even short disruptions can produce enormous problems. This has made it a preferred target of the terrorist campaign.3
Two recently completed light rail systems expand London's Underground network, the Docklands Light Railway and the Croyden Tramlink. Opened in 1987, the Docklands connects the Underground with the Canary Wharf business complex, the Millennium Dome, and other new developments in London's old Dockland area on the eastern edge of the city; eventually the line will reach London's City Airport. Currently the system has 27 kilometers (17 miles) of track, mostly elevated, connecting 34 stations. It operates 30 trains, which carry 110,000 passengers a day.
In February 1996, the IRA detonated a bomb under the railway bridge at Surrey Quay in the Docklands. Two people were killed, and more than 100 people were injured, seven seriously. In a statement to the news media, the IRA indicated that the bombing signaled the end to its 17-month cease-fire and demanded that the British government convene talks involving all parties, including the IRA's political wing, to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
The Croyden Tramlink, which opened in May 2000, connects the suburb of Croyden with London. Its 21 trams connect 38 stops along 28 kilometers (18 miles) of winding track. The trams, which are designed to handle tight curves, run both on city streets and on previous, abandoned rail lines. Configured in six-car formats, each tram can carry as many as 200 passengers.
The double-deck red bus is a symbol of London. More than 4,000 of them move nearly 4 million people daily throughout the 1,500 square miles of Greater London. At one time, there were twice that many, but new Underground lines and private automobiles reduced bus ridership, while budget constraints limited modernization and expansion. Forced to contend with growing surface-street traffic, the buses lost their advantage as efficient and inexpensive transportation sources. Recent policy changes, however, may precipitate a reversal of this trend. Urban architects readily concede that building more roads to and from a city already choked with traffic and suffering from pollution is not the answer.
Buses take up less road space, move more people with less energy, and can be made nearly pollution-free, in contrast to the old black-smoke-belching diesel engines. Restrictions on automobile parking, dedicated bus lanes, and smart traffic signals can reduce delays in schedules.
As noted in the chronology presented in Appendix See Chronology of IRA Terrorist Attacks on Public Transportation in England at the end of this chapter, terrorist bombs on buses can yield exceptionally deadly results. Recent attacks in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Israel bear witness to the toll of human devastation. However, bus explosions cause less disruption to a system than attacks on railways. If the bus is halted and evacuated, or even if the bomb detonates causing casualties, traffic can be rerouted and service restored more easily. Sabotaging rails and placing bombs in stations provide greater opportunities for escape and more time to give warnings that could prevent catastrophe, but the disruptive effects are enormous. Putting bombs on buses entails greater risk and offers fewer opportunities for warning would-be victims.
Although the IRA terrorist campaign in England focused on rail transportation rather than buses, the organization selected buses as the targets of several attacks. On February 18, 1996, less than 10 days after the bombing of the Docklands Light Railway, a terrorist bomb exploded on a London bus near Covent Garden. One person died and eight others were injured in the explosion. The following day, the IRA claimed responsibility, expressing regret for any casualties. The fact that the bombing occurred without any warning caused authorities to suspect that the bomb may have exploded accidentally while being transported to another target. However, because it came so soon after the IRA's deadly attack on the Docklands Light Rail, some people feared that the IRA was intensifying its terrorist attacks in England.
Commuter trains, which provide transportation into and out of London, are part of UK Rail, a network of 25 independent railroads that provide passenger service throughout the United Kingdom. International transfers are available via the EuroStar, a high-speed passenger service that connects London with Paris and Brussels via the Channel Tunnel, or "Chunnel."
As part of its disruptive activities, the IRA carried out a number of attacks on train stations and the rail network, and vandals disrupted the UK Rail high-speed service. Because of these efforts, extraordinary security precautions were put into place to protect the Channel Tunnel against terrorist attack. In 1996, British security forces foiled the only documented attempt by the IRA to shut down the Channel Tunnel by sabotaging the electricity supply.
Irish resistance to British rule of the island has continued for centuries under a variety of banners. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) traces its history to the 1920 armed rebellion that ultimately paved the way to independence for the Irish Free State while British rule continued in Northern Ireland. Opposing this partition, the IRA continued a sporadic campaign of terrorism.
In the late 1960s, shortly after widespread violence broke out between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, the IRA split into the official and provisional wings. It was the Provisional IRA that waged an intense terrorist campaign against the British from 1969 to 1998, at which time the organization agreed to a cease-fire. However, a splinter group calling itself the "Real IRA" has continued to carry out terrorist attacks.4
The IRA's strategy was never especially profound. With active members numbering between 50 and several hundred, depending on the year, the group initially confined its campaign to Northern Ireland. Principal efforts focused upon attacking police and military targets, while waging economic warfare through bombings of commercial targets. The organization realized from the start that it could not defeat the security forces arrayed against it in a true military sense; it could try only to keep the faith alive, survive organizationally, continue the fight, and hope to eventually wear down British resolve. Thus, the opposition group operated essentially with a strategy of economic and psychological attrition, or, as one IRA leader described it, "blattering on until the Brits leave."
In 1973, the IRA exported its terrorist campaign to England. Wales and Scotland were left untouched because, like the Irish, they were considered "culters," not English; as such, these groups were perceived as ethnic allies. The terrorists hoped that attacks in England would increase security problems and costs for the British government. Indeed, some of the major terrorist bombings in London caused hundreds of millions of pounds in damages and wiped out insurance coverage, forcing the government to step in as the insurer of last resort. The terrorist threat to London also obliged security authorities to erect the so-called "ring of steel," an elaborate array of traffic diversions, checkpoints, and surveillance designed to keep truck bombs out of the city's financial center.
Terrorist bombs in London, even smaller ones, captured more headlines than terrorist bombs in Northern Ireland, had great psychological impact, and exaggerated the power of the IRA. Terrorism in England also kept the struggle on the British political agenda. Still, the IRA's expectations had to be realistic. As one knowledgeable analyst of the IRA's campaign put it, "If Hitler had not bombed London into submission, the IRA certainly lacked the capacity to do so."5 The IRA did not seek true submission, however; instead it sought the erosion of public patience and political will. It forced people to ask whether the commitment of British troops in Northern Ireland was worth the blood, the inconvenience, and the fear.
With goals so broadly defined, almost any terrorist action would serve the needs of a terrorist organization. Political or strategic rationales did not dictate IRA targets in England; operational considerations did. The IRA did what was possible, using its available resources. Capabilities in England were limited. Volunteers were its most precious commodity and had to be preserved. This dictated low-risk operationstargets had to be "soft" with few defenses and offering an easy escape.
Two levels of IRA operatives participated in the attacks. Active Service Units composed of better trained volunteers, the "A team," carried out the major terrorist attacks; less sophisticated volunteers, the "B team," waged a continuing campaign of low-level terrorism. There were few technically demanding operations--the attack on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at a Brighton Beach hotel, the mortar attack on Number 10 Downing Street, and the two truck bombs in London's financial district. The attacks on the Underground and rail system appeared to be the work of the less sophisticated operators--low-level, but potentially still deadly.
Of the 81 explosive devices that were placed at transport targets, 79 were hand-placed time bombs. Fifty percent of them did not work as intended. Altogether, three people were killed by IRA bombs on the rail system, one at Victoria Station in 1991, and two on the Docklands Light Railway in 1996. This low number of casualties, however, is not due solely to the terrorists' great pains to avoid casualties. Without the authorities' prompt response to threats, the death toll could have been much higher.
Killing by itself, however, was seldom the IRA's goal. The IRA did not seek mass casualties like the Islamic extremists who bombed the Paris Metro or the Aum Shinrikyo cult members who spread sarin in Tokyo's subways. It had a different set of values and objectives. Too many corpses could alienate perceived constituents--Catholics in Northern Ireland as well as sympathizers and supporters abroad.
A target was chosen simply because it was vulnerable, and once it was selected, the IRA would continue to attack it for as long as circumstances permitted. London's vulnerable Underground met these criteria. While perimeters around government buildings could be pushed out further and hardened, and the financial district of London could be surrounded with a ring of steel, millions of people still had to ride the Underground every day. Surveillance and security could be increased, but, like the Belfast-to-Dublin rail line, which the IRA also bombed repeatedly, terrorist attacks on the Underground and mainland rail lines could not be entirely prevented.
Assaults on the Underground disrupted the lives of millions of passengers, offering the IRA banner headlines and inspiring footage for television news. Moreover, the IRA could magnify the disruption through bomb threats, which required nothing more than phone calls. Because real bombings occurred often enough, authorities could not afford to ignore such phone calls.
The result, as we see in the chronology at the end of this chapter, was a long-running terrorist campaign aimed at the mainland's surface transportation system, with the majority of attacks occurring in four discernible stages:
between February 1976 and March 1976, comprising four incidents
between December 1991 and February 1993, comprising 18 incidents
between February 1996 (the end of a 17-month cease-fire) and April 1996, comprising three incidents
a final surge in April 1997, comprising four incidents.
Putting aside bomb threats, it appears that except for one period in 1976, the IRA was able to carry out only one or two attacks a month with long hiatuses in between.
Seventeen persons were killed in attacks on all transport in England, 11 of them in the single attack on soldiers and their families traveling on a bus in England. The IRA regarded this as a military target. More than 200 persons were injured, over half of them in a single incident--the 1996 bombing of the Docklands Light Railway. Disruption rather than casualties appears to have been the objective, but the disruption caused by threats and consequent evacuations and shutdowns rested on the IRA's credibility, and credibility required casualties.
The chronology does not give the total picture of the IRA terrorist campaign. Bombings and shootings occurred frequently in Northern Ireland. The IRA also attacked the Belfast-to-Dublin rail line on numerous occasions. In addition to attacks on public transport in England, the IRA carried out mortar attacks against the Prime Minister's residence and Heathrow Airport, and a number of other attacks including two devastating truck bombs set off in the heart of London in 1992 and 1993. The terrorist threat remained high throughout the period.
Along with the inevitable copycats and malicious pranksters who were inspired by terrorist events, the IRA's campaign imposed a staggering burden on transportation security and a nervous public. Between 1991 and 1997, there were 41 IRA attacks on transportation targets in England involving 81 devices, 29 explosions, and 3 deaths. In addition, there were 6,569 telephone bomb threats; 9,430 suspicious objects were reported and investigated. The Underground and railroads also had to deal with more than a quarter-million lost or abandoned items every year, any one of which might have been a bomb.
The security network for combating terrorism comprised the intelligence agencies of the British government, the Home Office, the Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard), other local police departments, and the National Terrorist Crime Prevention Unit (NTCPU). Two organizations focused specifically on the security of surface transportation. These are the Transport Security Division of the Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR), and the British Transport Police.
The DETR's Transport Security Division is a policy-making body responsible for the security of British surface transportation. The division conducts analysis, recommends legislation, and provides security directions and guidance to transportation operators. One of its special areas of concern is the security of the Channel Tunnel, which has implemented elaborate security precautions in response to the flurry of terrorist threats. In 1998, the DETR initiated its own "best practices" review to improve security at rail stations throughout the United Kingdom and, as part of the process, issued a number of guideline documents. One review of the DETR status is presented in Appendix B at the end of this chapter.
The British Transport Police (BTP) is the national police force for the railways that provides policing service to rail operators, their staff, and passengers in England, Wales, and Scotland. The BTP also is responsible for policing the London Underground system, the Docklands Light Railway, the Midland Metro Tram System, and Croyden Tramlink. The force does not cover bus transport, which is left to local police departments. In 2000, the British Transport Police had 2,106 police officers and 524 civilian support staff deployed in eight territorial areas. Areas 6 and 7 encompass North and South London respectively, while Area 8 comprises London's Underground.
The devastating results from an IRA bombing of a shopping center in Manchester in 1996 led to an increased demand for security advice from the private sector. Local police departments had no centralized operation for assisting retail stores and other commercial enterprises, nor was there a consistent national approach. In 1998, the Association of Chief Police Officers established the National Terrorist Crime Prevention Unit (NTCPU), a small office that began by formulating a National Terrorist Crime Prevention Strategy. The NTCPU also collates and disseminates "best practices" information for preventing terrorist crimes. It provides training and supporting literature to its "core customers," commercial and professional bodies like the British Retail Consortium and Association of Town Centre Managers. The NTCPU extended its activities at the local level through Counter Terrorist Crime Prevention Officers (CTCPOs) provided by each police department; these individuals, in turn, distribute NTCPU materials to the private sector.
By tradition, security has largely been a reactive enterprise. Although the terrorist threat level remains high, the NTCPU knows that it has to convince business consumers that implementation of recommended security measures will deter or prevent terrorism and reduce ordinary crime. In the United States, liability lawyers provide an additional incentive for implementing security measures, because failure to do so can lead to a charge of negligence and punitive damages; the United Kingdom is less litigious. The NTCPU's approach is to have packages of advice-containing material ready to go. When threats or incidents heighten concern, the material is distributed to a sensitized audience.
Two goals drove the security strategy of public authorities: the protection of lives, and the reduction of disruption. Obviously, lives could not be imperiled just to keep the trains running, but shutting down for long periods could disrupt the entire network. Through careful analysis and research, the police learned how to distinguish what terrorists typically do from public behavior. Every incident was closely analyzed; as incidents accumulated, patterns could be discerned. This effort was facilitated by the high volume of terrorist activity and by the tendency of the IRA to adhere to certain patterns.
Security was increased in a variety of ways. Many of these are part of a program called Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), which has attained widespread acceptance.
Architectural Liaison Officers . Each police department designated an Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO) to gather detailed knowledge of blast effects on structure, cladding, glazing, principles of bomb shelter areas (see below), policy and initiatives on new buildings and refurbishments, the counterterrorist impact on fixtures, street furniture, etc. ALOs advise local commercial entities on security issues in design and construction.
Visibility . Where new stations were being constructed or old ones remodeled, new designs ensured good visibility for passengers and camera surveillance systems.
Bomb shelter areas . Bomb shelter areas (BSAs) were identified as areas within a building or other facility likely to suffer minimal damage from any explosion. If time or specific circumstances (such as a car bomb on the street outside) prevented evacuation, people would be routed to a bomb shelter area prequalified by an experienced structural engineer. Government guidelines recommended locating BSAs away from windows, external doors and walls, the "perimeter structural bay," the floor structure between a building's perimeter, and the first line of supporting columns. The guidelines also recommended shelters surrounded by full-height masonry or concrete walls, but not in stairwells or areas with access to elevator shafts that open to the ground level. BSAs were designed to permit access to the "outside" world.
Litter bins . Blast-resistant litter bins approved by the Police Scientific and Development Branch were deployed in accordance with NTCPU guidelines. Operators were warned against removing trash containers, because this could lead to piles of rubbish that might conceal explosive devices. Litter bins were to be located in prominent, well-lit areas, within view of closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems and away from sources of secondary fragmentation such as windows, mirrors, or overhead glass. Operators were advised to consider all materials located above, below, and to the sides of the litter bin. They were not to be located adjacent to obvious terrorist targets like police stations, post offices, or banks. Bin liners were to be transparent to provide a clear view of litter bin contents.
Fencing . Fencing was improved around stations and, where possible, along rail lines. Analysis showed that when IRA saboteurs placed bombs on rail lines, they followed the existing paths used by trespassers. They also chose locations that had good access from nearby roads to minimize their own risk.
Lighting . Lighting was improved inside the stations to deter crime of all types, facilitate surveillance, and reassure passengers. Bombs often were located in poorly lit areas.
Closed-Circuit Television . British authorities have used CCTV extensively as a deterrent. Initially, more than 3,500--and ultimately more than 5,000--cameras monitored transport activity. CCTV was used to monitor activity, detect suspicious action, recognize individuals, and identify suspects beyond reasonable doubt. All station cameras were directly accessible to the police and could be called up on demand. In locating cameras, transport operators were advised to identify areas where passengers were most vulnerable; situate cameras so that they could not easily be avoided, damaged, or obscured; and use cameras for extending coverage to the immediate surrounding area. Although CCTV proved enormously effective in reducing crime and contributing to the deterrence of terrorism, authorities found that CCTV by itself was not enough. A combination of CCTV coverage plus police patrols and prompt police response made the greatest contribution to security.
Passenger communications systems . Passenger communications systems included public address systems, help points, telephones, and emergency alarms. Passengers were instructed as to what constituted an emergency and were encouraged to use the help points and alarms when appropriate. CCTV cameras covered the help points and alarms so that staff could see who was calling and why. Staff communicated through mobile telephones and two-way radios.
Bomb threat paging . One unique use of technology in the United Kingdom was bomb threat paging. Customers with pagers who subscribed to the service were alerted through pagers and provided with directions on evacuation or areas to avoid.
Extra staff . Extra rail staff members were deployed to assist in surveillance, help passengers, and contribute to deterrence.
Patrols . Overt and covert police patrols were increased. Both rail staff and police constantly kept a lookout for suspicious objects. In some cases, Underground and rail stations were searched hourly.
Handling of unattended items . The quarter million items left unattended or abandoned in stations and on trains each year imposed a tremendous burden on security. Although no unattended bag was ever linked to an explosive device, every unattended bag had to be checked. A standardized reporting form was used to record where the item was found, its contents, whether the bag was X-rayed, and whether the bomb squad had been called. Every left item was photographed.
Detailed guidance . Security required the active participation of the transport police and local police departments, transport system operators, rail staff, and the general public. To ensure that operators would get the most out of the security measures taken by the operators and their staffs, the police and NTCPU disseminated easy-to-understand guidelines and advice on everything from deploying CCTV cameras and litter bin placements to handling left parcels and responding to bomb threats. These were distributed as booklets, flyers, laminated cards, videos, and through Web sites.
Private sector involvement . The authorities enlisted the private sector as a security partner. As part of an effort to achieve consistency and improve prevention and response, police shared confidential threat information, provided an array of instructional material, and offered direct advice to commercial centers, facility managers, and transport operators.
Alert levels with predetermined security menus . The Security Service distributed written assessments of any terrorist threat to all police forces and to retail and commercial sectors on a confidential basis. Rail operators and commercial centers in train stations also received threat assessments. The system identified four levels of alert. At Level Four, the lowest, commercial companies were advised to continue routine crime prevention measures, terrorism awareness training, frequent testing and regular auditing of security and CCTV systems, and periodic checks of building perimeters. Level Three advised, in addition to Level Four measures, "good housekeeping checks" on perimeters at opening and closing times, practicing search plans and emergency evacuations, updating emergency contact lists, checking security systems, reporting all suspicious incidents, and raising the profile of security personnel. Level Two advised increasing the frequency of perimeter checks, identifying and securing high-risk areas, escorting all visitors, carefully examining all items brought into the premises, searching regularly for suspicious packages, controlling access to staff and customer car parks, and postponing non-essential maintenance. A Level One notice, the highest level of alert, contained specific guidance from the police and security service to precise locations and companies.
Training . Operating in ways similar to bomb squad hostage negotiators, the CTCPOs and ALOs had specific counterterrorist missions. The nature of terrorism--the fact that terrorists could attack anything, anywhere, anytime--dictated special training for the police. Great emphasis was placed on standardized procedures that would ensure consistency and thereby facilitate coordination.
Covert testing . To ensure that security was being maintained, authorities regularly conducted covert tests, such as leaving a bag containing a suspicious object on a train or in a station.
Involvement of the public . Public involvement was critical to the security strategy, despite the limitations and risks of false alarms, especially immediately following terrorist attacks. Signage and repeated public announcements kept the public alert to the terrorist threat and the need to keep personal packages under direct control, remain vigilant for left parcels, and immediately report suspicious activity or articles to staff. Police remained confident that any left parcels would be discovered in minutes, and because most IRA bombs were set with one hour or more on the timer, police would have time to respond.
Dissemination of "good" or "best practices." Authorities made a continuing effort to identify good security measures or "best practices" and disseminate them through instructional material and advice offered by the NTCPU and the designated Counter Terrorist Crime Prevention Officers in each police force.
Few transport systems experience terrorist events, making it difficult to gauge the effectiveness of security measures. In Britain, however, the persistence of the IRA campaign allowed such measurement. The evolution of the terrorist campaign indicates that the security measures had a discernible effect. In 1991, IRA terrorist attacks centered on stations in London. By 1992, the attackers were pushed out to suburban stations, and by 1993, they were confined to home counties. The targets of the attackers also shifted from stations to switch boxes and rail lines away from stations. In the later years of the terrorist campaign, there were fewer bombs and more bomb threats.
The security measures against terrorism also had the additional effect of reducing ordinary crime (as did the "ring of steel" around London's financial district). Crime in the Underground, which had been increasing in the late 1980s, reversed direction and declined 54 percent in the 1990s, bucking a national trend.
Despite the increased security and positive effects, the nature of the target precluded any hope of completely preventing terrorist attacks. Some things could not be done: For example, passenger screening or the examination of all briefcases and parcels were not considered realistic measures for a public transportation system used by millions of people daily.
Another measure of effectiveness was disruption. As the authorities became more familiar with the IRA's modus operandi, they were able to develop procedures that reduced response time and the duration of disruptions. Increased camera coverage enabled them to identify and deal with suspicious objects or promptly diagnose the situation, while rehearsed procedures reduced the amount of search time. Authorities measured total disruption time in minutes much in the same way that train operators tracked total delays. As responses improved, total disruption time was reduced. However, this type of measure would be possible only in cases of a long-term continuing terrorist campaign.
Bomb threat responses posed the most common problem, owing to the great number of hoax threats by pranksters as well as efforts by the IRA to capitalize on their actual bombs in order to increase the overall disruption. Bomb threats might be telephoned to the police, but the potential targets included commercial properties, shopping malls, hotels, and transport operators. Anyone in any of these facilities might receive the call--a secretary, switchboard operator, headquarters office, information line--whatever telephone number the terrorists or hoax perpetrators had available or chose to call.
Given the multiplicity of potential targets, authorities attempted to train everyone involved to obtain as much information as possible and promptly forward it to the police. Armed with accurate information, the police could assist in the assessment and respond without delay. The government disseminated manuals giving detailed instructions on how to respond to bomb threats, letter bombs, incendiary devices, bombs or suspicious objects found in the facility, and bombs found in adjacent properties. Each new bombing attack was examined for lessons learned, which were then shared with the private sector. The authorities emphasized planning and established procedures for notification, searches, and, when necessary, evacuation. Although there was some risk that the distribution of some of this material outside the police force might enable terrorists and hoax perpetrators to improve their efforts, ensuring public safety took precedence. Interestingly, the IRA never mounted any elaborate hoaxes. They planted bombs and made telephone calls.
Police carefully analyzed each and every terrorist incident and threat to look for patterns that would enable them to more easily distinguish hoaxes from genuine terrorist threats, the merely disruptive from the potentially deadly. Did terrorists communicate differently from hoaxers? Where and how did terrorists plant their bombs as opposed to the hoax devices sometimes found? The objective was to establish guidelines that would take the pressure off the individual decision maker and establish a routine that would protect lives, reduce shutdowns, and be legally defensible if people were hurt.
The patterns were put into the context of the existing threat level, which varied according to whether there was an ongoing surge in terrorist activity, upcoming political events that had prompted terrorist activity in the past, or intelligence indicating possible terrorist attacks. All threats were treated seriously initially and then, depending on the available information, downgraded to probable hoaxes but not dismissed until after the deadline expired. Authorities treated threats thought to come from terrorists more seriously. In such cases, an evacuation might be considered, but evacuations generally were not ordered unless the search turned up a suspect object. Without a located device, it was considered dangerous to evacuate, because people might be moved toward a bomb. Even then, authorities had to worry about a secondary device, which the IRA sometimes employed.
Of the more than 6,500 bomb threats directed against the Underground and railroads between 1991 and 1997, about 100, fewer than 2 percent, were considered serious. Of the 100 serious cases, evacuations or partial evacuations were ordered in 41 cases, or less than two-thirds of 1 percent of the total volume of reported threats.
There is a popular misconception that the IRA deliberately assisted authorities in distinguishing real threats from hoaxes by attaching a secret code word to their communications. The IRA's 1973 attack on the Baker Street Underground Station was the first of the so-called coded calls. The IRA's use of a code ostensibly was intended to advise authorities when and where they had placed a bomb so that the threat would not be considered merely another hoax. This would enable the authorities to evacuate the target, thereby avoiding civilian casualtiesthe IRA considered members of the bomb squad to be fair game. Thus, the IRA would not bear the moral consequences of wanton killing, while achieving its goals of disruption and property damage if the bomb went off.
All this, however, was only theory. According to authorities, there was never any agreed-upon code, and hoaxers who read about the IRA codes could invent and append their own codes. During the years of the IRA's terrorist campaign, London's Metropolitan Police Department sometimes received up to 200 calls a day, at least 50 of which contained some kind of code word. IRA members themselves invented code words, leaving the authorities to ponder their authenticity.6
Even when IRA callers provided a code word they had used before, thus signaling the authenticity of the threat, they were often vague about the location of the device or its timing. Part of this may be credited to the inevitable "fog of war," the confusion that accompanies all military or terrorist operations; poor communications; not calling the right party; and erroneous or ambiguous descriptions of locales that the attackers themselves did not know well. However, some of it also may have been deliberate. Many hoaxes with assorted code words that caused great disruption augmented the IRA's own terrorist campaign. If the public believed that IRA always used a code, then they might blame explosions on the incompetence of the authorities in responding, or worse, think that the government cynically wanted casualties to fan public outrage against the IRA. A perfect arrangement was not in the IRA's interest.
Early in its terrorist campaign, IRA terrorists identified public surface transportation in England as a preferred target for terrorist activity. From the inception of their campaign in 1973 to the cease-fire in 1997, IRA terrorists continued to attack public transport, principally the London Underground and commuter rail network. The authorities responded to the IRA's campaign by developing a national strategy aimed both at prevention and response and at involving the police, the private sector, and the general public. A feature of this response was the careful analysis of terrorist tactics, an analysis made possible by the volume of the attacks and the terrorists' adherence to set patterns.
Strong security measures did not prevent the terrorists from continuing their campaign against public transport. Indeed, no security measures can prevent terrorists from setting off bombs in public places. However, security did have a discernible effect in obliging the terrorists to retreat to more remote targets, while prompt, well-planned responses avoided needless casualties. A visibly effective response also made it more difficult for the terrorists to carry out incidents calculated to kill, while blaming the result on incompetent authorities. The IRA could have killed wantonly had it chosen to do so, but it could not easily slip the moral burden of its decision. Although second-rate terrorists, reinforced by hoaxers, were able to achieve what the authorities admitted were staggering results, the casualties remained very low and disruptions were kept to a tolerable minimum.
Rail transport security benefited from the existence of a national-level office in the Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions devoted to security and a dedicated and experienced Transport Police. This ensured consistent and high-quality systemwide security. Security measures, by themselves, cannot end the terrorist campaign--that will require a political settlement.
Chronology of IRA Terrorist Attacks on Public Transportation in England
August 23, 1973 Bomb defused at Baker Street Underground Station in London.
September 8, 1973 Bombing at Victoria Station injures 4 people.
February 3, 1974 Bomb on bus in Yorkshire carrying soldiers and their families back to camp kills 11, injures 14.
April 6, 1974 Bomb damages railway station in Birmingham.
October 9, 1975 Bomb at bus stop in London kills 1 person.
February 12, 1976 Bomb defused at Oxford Circus Underground station.
March 4, 1976 Bomb explodes on commuter train in London.
March 15, 1976 Bomb explodes on Underground in London, injuring 8 after the bomber shoots and kills the engineer.
March 18, 1976 Bomb explodes on Underground, injuring 1 person.
February 18, 1991 IRA renews terrorist campaign with bombings of Victoria and Paddington Stations in London, leaving 1 dead, 43 injured.
February 25, 1991 Bomb destroys track in Hertfordshire.
August 29, 1991 Three bombs found under seat in Underground coach.
December 16, 1991 Bomb explodes near Clapham Station in South London.
December 23, 1991 Incendiary devices found on Underground cars in London.
January 30, 1992 Incendiary device found under seat in Underground coach.
February 7, 1992 Incendiary device ignites on Underground track in east London.
February 28, 1992 Bomb explodes in London Underground station, injuring 25.
March 2, 1992 Bomb defused on tracks in Northern London.
March 10, 1992 Bomb explodes on tracks in South London.
May 8, 1992 Bomb alert empties London's Victoria Station.
June 11, 1992 Bomb scares disrupt Underground.
August 28, 1992 Bomb threats temporarily stop London commuter service.
October 9, 1992 Two bombs explode under cars parked near railway stations in London.
October 13, 1992 Four bombings in central London.
October 21, 1992 Bomb detonates under Harrow Road Bridge in London.
October 22, 1992 Three bombs go off in London; two destroy rail tracks.
December 9, 1992 Bomb explodes in London Underground station.
December 23, 1992 Bomb explodes in London Underground station.
February 3, 1993 Bomb explodes on London-Kent train.
February 4, 1993 Bomb explodes on commuter train in London; another explodes at Underground Station.
October 2, 1993 Three bombs explode in northern London, one near a railway station.
December 14, 1993 Explosion on rail line southwest of London.
December 21, 1993 Three bombs are found in London, one near Victoria train station; coded warnings shut down 40 train stations in southeast England.
March 15, 1994 Bomb found on rail line in Kent.
June 6, 1994 Bomb discovered at railway station in Kent.
February 9, 1996 Bomb on Dockland Railway kills 2, injures 100.
February 18, 1996 Bomb on London bus kills 1, injures 8.
April 25, 1996 Two bombs found under Hammersmith Bridge in London.
September 30, 1996 IRA attempts to block Channel Tunnel.
April 7, 1997 Coded bomb threats disrupt London transportation.
April 18, 1997 Bombs explode at stations in Leeds and Doncaster.
April 21, 1997 Bomb threats at London Underground and train stations.
April 29, 1997 More bomb threats on roads around London.
July 19, 2000 Bomb explodes on tracks in Underground station; coded bomb threats disrupt system.
October 17, 2000 Bomb threats on rail lines north of London.
British Secure Stations Scheme:
Manage and Design to Cut Down Crime
In the United Kingdom, public transportation systems present unique challenges for passengers and public authorities. Government research shows that passengers on public transport are most concerned about their wellbeing when waiting at stations. To combat this apprehension, the Government, British Transport Police, and Crime Concern have launched the Secure Stations Scheme, which encourages Britain's rail companies to improve security at stations and reassure customers of the government's commitment to passenger safety.
The national scheme includes all aboveground and underground rail stations across England, Scotland, and Wales, which are policed by the British Transport Police (BTP). The program has established national standards of good practice in security, and expects the individual stations, which have worked with the BTP and other local law enforcement partners, to implement a package of security measures. Such measures include the following:
Good lighting and secure fencing in the station, car parks and approaches
Up-to-date information and clear signs
Security staff presence/closed-circuit television surveillance
Regular inspection and maintenance
Special training for staff to deal with conflict and emergencies
Rail authorities are required by the plan to conduct an independent passenger survey to ascertain whether passengers actually feel safe at the stations. Authorities also are required to provide quantifiable evidence of decreasing crime rates over a sustained period of time.
Many train operating companies have already taken the initiative to improve security and passenger safety at stations. The specific entities and their efforts include:
Closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitoring at stations and car parks
Security staff at commuter stations between 7 a.m. and 10 p.m. Monday to Friday
Clear lines of vision and security mirrors in subways, on platforms, and at station approaches
Well-positioned lighting and secure railing
Dedicated assistance areas such as public telephones on station platforms (trial scheme)
Staff training to deal with conflict and emergencies
Work in close cooperation with police and local communities
Security guards at stations and mobile patrols
Security patrols at station car parks
Crime prevention officers and station staff cooperate closely with the police and local communities
Help points are being introduced on all station platforms
Clear and up-to-date travel and local area information
Emergency and information help points at stations
Mirrors to give clear line of vision
Staffed stations throughout opening hours
CCTV on every platform linked to the control room, which is monitored during opening hours
A police patrol unit dedicated to the station and immediately surrounding area
Good lighting and secure fencing
Passenger emergency call point on all platforms, which goes directly to a member of staff
CCTV monitoring on stations linked to 24-hour control center
Rapid response and covert security guards
CCTV monitoring at 13 stations and car parks linked to staffed control centers; these will be extended to 31 more sites.
Information and emergency help points on platforms (monitored by CCTV) and linked to staffed control center for immediate response
Control centers have direct link to the British Transport Police
Help points (currently linked to 24-hour control center) to be installed at 176 stations
Security patrols at Richmond, Clapham, and Wimbledon
Alarm and enquiry points to be installed at all stations
CCTV monitoring at all stations linked to 24-hour control center
Employ extra staff to provide assistance to passengers
Play classical music at their stations (ongoing at 5 stations)
Upgraded lighting at all stations
Youth workers to work with children who loiter at stations
Public transport users feel least safe when they are waiting for train services.
Twenty-two percent of respondents stated that they would make more journeys by public transport if security measures were introduced. Forty percent of the extra journeys would be for social purposes and in the evening.
Measures to improve personal safety would result overall in an 11 percent increase in the number of trips by public transport.
Help points in train stations were widely regarded as an effective and important measure for personal security when there is a immediate response if activated.
Respondents rated the following as the most effective safety measures at train and underground stations:
CCTV should be highly visible to reassure passengers as well as to deter potential criminals. Publicity should highlight that the CCTV is monitored and is linked to someone who can provide help.
Staff should wear uniforms that stand out, and they should be out in the stations to reassure the public by their presence.
Good quality information in stations was felt to be essential to help plan safe journeys (for example, up-to-date information on service departures and interconnecting services).
The Valley Transportation Authority
The Valley Transportation Authority (VTA) offers two forms of public transportation for users in Santa Clara County--the heart of Silicon Valley. Since 1972, the agency has provided bus service, with a fleet that now numbers 525. Approximately 154,000 riders use the bus system each weekday, with service connecting 79 routes at six transit centers located in Eastridge Shopping Center, Gilroy, Mountain View, Palo Alto, San Jose Transit Mall (downtown), and West Valley College. A tax measure passed in November 2000 allows for a substantial increase in the fleet.
In 1987, the VTA also began service on light rail, a small system that was originally 21 miles in length and which, in December 1999, was increased to 28 miles. According to VTA officials, the system is one of the longest built in the past 50 years. Currently, the system operates 50 rail cars that pass through 45 stations, all at ground level or above. The light rail system carries about 24,000 passengers per day. Service operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week, at various intervals.
VTA light rail service is growing. As a result of a measure passed by the voters in 1996, a new 8.3-mile east-west extension (the Tasman East-Capitol line) is under construction, providing linkage between north First Street (site of much high-tech business) and Capitol Avenue in east San Jose. With the passage of Measure A in 2000, funds have been set aside for construction of the Vasona line, a north-south route between downtown and Campbell. Work on this 6.8-mile route, which began in 2001, will be completed in approximately 2004. The VTA is rapidly becoming a major source of surface transportation in Santa Clara County.
The VTA has never experienced an incident remotely similar to terrorism on surface transportation. Nevertheless, the agency has a crisis management protocol for responding to questionable activities. Whether bus or light rail, drivers are the "first line of defense" in detecting and responding to suspicious circumstances. Thus, their job goes well beyond the roles of strictly transportation providers.
In addition to vigilant drivers, the VTA considers other personnel part of the agency's counterintelligence group. These individuals include mechanics, administrators, and custodians, along with the traveling public. As the Chief of VTA security states, "they're [anyone remotely connected with VTA functions] all part of the team. We need all of them to be aware." The major areas of concern are means for dealing with the following:
Chemical weapons . Employees are instructed to determine the content of any suspicious substance to the best of their ability, without endangering themselves in the process. Employees are instructed to contact the Fire Department, which is much more prepared to respond to chemical-related issues, as soon as the situation has been assessed.
Although chemical attacks would be very effective against a single bus or a single light rail car, most chemicals would dissipate once the doors opened. Agency personnel are not overly concerned about the threat of chemical weapons, because VTA operates above ground throughout the system. In addition, the open-air configuration of light rail stations and the fact that buses have limited exposure beyond the individual units of operation further mitigate the likelihood of damage, should a chemical assault take place. However, military-grade chemical weapons like VX or mustard gas, which are persistent, would pose a significant threat to both initial victims and rescuers and would make cleanup complex.
Bombs . The presence of a bomb aboard a VTA transportation unit generates a different response, depending upon whether the unit is a bus or a light rail train. In the case of a bomb (or suspicious package believed to be a bomb) on a bus, drivers are instructed to notify local authorities, then remove the bus from a populated area. If drivers or other onboard authorities believe that the bomb is unstable (because of a timing device or its physical location), drivers are directed to clear the bus of all passengers immediately without regard to location.
Light rail drivers have less flexibility because of the fixed track upon which the system operates. Should operating personnel determine or suspect that a questionable device is on board, they are instructed to stop the train and remove all passengers as soon as possible; VTA personnel will proceed to cordon off the area.
Mentally disturbed passengers and physical property damage . VTA officials are much more concerned with the presence of unstable individuals on agency vehicles than with chemical or bomb attacks. Whether the problem is emotional instability, inebriation, or substance abuse, the Chief of Security defines these as the real instances of "surface transportation terrorism" in Santa Clara County. "Tagging," or the use of spray paint in public areas, is another agency concern. Here the problem rests in offenses to the eye, rather than any potential loss of human life.
The potential disruption by individuals with emotional problems and those who would cause property damage creates problems for VTA officials in terms of obtaining assistance from higher levels of government. Because these activities do not fit within established definitions of surface terrorism, agency officials find it almost impossible to capture the attention of public policy makers and bureaucrats, let alone any funds that are organized in specific categories.
The VTA operates with a very small security staff. With virtually no history of terrorism or terrorist threats, agency officials believe that it is unnecessary to dedicate more than minimum funds to this area. The security staff includes 25 armed deputies, 125 contracted security officers who are unarmed, and 9 unarmed fare inspectors who move randomly from train to train on the light rail system.
Buses carry fare boxes, unlike the light rail service, for which passengers purchase tickets on the honor system. Therefore, agency fare inspectors do not board buses. However, a three-person troubleshooting unit travels by car along problem-prone routes, with officers occasionally boarding a bus on a random basis to check for any problems (see the Rapid Deployment Team discussion, below).
In addition to the presence of these permanent personnel, agency officials occasionally call upon a small number of Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department Reserve deputies. However, the number of Sheriff's Reserve deputies changes daily, and they are not considered part of the VTA security network. The permanent personnel generally are considered sufficient for the perceived level of threat.
The VTA has no modern technology designed to deal with surface transportation terrorism threats. Agency personnel are not overly concerned about this because of the long peaceful history of the system. Should any serious issue or terrorist threat arise, the agency's security personnel would call upon local police or the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department. "We're not in the policing business," the Security Chief notes, expressing a point of view considerably different from that of his security-minded colleagues in Tokyo and London. "Our job is to move passengers from part of the service area to another, period."
The VTA has come to rely upon the City of San Jose to plan a response to potential terrorism. With 900,000 residents, this city's police department has jurisdiction for most of the VTA light rail and bus system lines. Because the city's Fire Department covers the area where most of the transit lines operate, there are no plans for VTA personnel to go through hazardous materials training.
The VTA does utilize some anticrime resources in a preventive capacity, although it remains unclear as to the value of their assistance in a true terrorism crisis or other volatile situation. The major activity lies with what is described as a Rapid Deployment Team, a three-person unit that drives throughout the district along selected bus lines. Two of the members randomly board buses in these targeted areas, while the third follows behind the bus in an unmarked car. The agency hopes to add at least one more team in the near future. Other than random fare inspectors, there are no security personnel on light rail vehicles.
The VTA clearly expects user tranquility as part of the daily operating regimen, but such optimism may have limits. Given the possibility of disruption, the agency is becoming more active in its security management. One change with respect to detection may soon come in selected elements of the light rail system. The Security Chief hopes to install closed-circuit television at all of the light rail stations and vehicles in the near future. In August of 2000, the cost for this network was estimated to be between $2 million and $3 million. The head of VTA security believes that with the installation of such security cameras, "50 percent of the agency's problems will go away."
There are no closed circuit camera plans for the network of agency buses. These vehicles are considered less vulnerable from the standpoint of systemwide shutdown because of their relative mobility and detachment from other elements of the transportation network.
All VTA vehicles have two-way radios for communication with the Control Center near VTA headquarters. When a threat to the system occurs or is detected, personnel are to call the Control Center for instructions. Serious issues usually are transferred to local police or fire agencies in the region. The agency makes no pretense of being self-contained in its ability to manage serious problems.
A new Control Center is currently under construction. It will be located adjacent to the Sheriff's Department headquarters, permitting even closer cooperation between the two jurisdictions, although not suggesting any change in the dependency upon other law enforcement personnel.
VTA bus drivers and light rail train operators go through six to eight weeks of training. Virtually all the instruction deals either with bus and train mechanics or passenger treatment. There is no employee training per se on terrorism or potential assaults on either the bus or light rail systems. The lack of attention to these matters reflects the opinion of the Chief of Security that the occurrence of such events is highly unlikely. Instead, the Chief of Security says, drivers and operators need to use "common sense."
Despite the paucity of terrorism training, the agency depends upon drivers and operators to use a simple "psychological profile" to determine the presence of suspicious individuals or behavior. For example, if a driver spots a "suspicious package" or something out of the mainstream, he or she is to call headquarters if, upon exercising his or her own judgment, there is reason to do so. Indeed, "judgment" stands out as the key word for action. With little attention other than common sense directed to the terrorism question, it would appear that the agency is allowing each driver to decide when and how to respond.
The biggest concern in the minds of security personnel is the possibility of a person boarding a bus or train with a gun or other weapon. Such a person might be a gang member, someone who needs to show off, or a mentally disturbed individual. Because the appearance of these individuals often blends in with other passengers, they are difficult to spot and, therefore, to manage.
The Bay Area Rapid Transit Authority (BART) and VTA cases simultaneously reveal similarity and distinct contrast. They are similar in that neither system has ever experienced any act remotely related to terrorist activity.
The two transportation agencies are quite different with respect to their expressed concerns about potential terrorist activity. BART security representatives worry about such a possibility and attempt to prevent it through training and coordination; this effort is ongoing internally as well as through interagency cooperation. Although VTA is part of interagency terrorism response planning, its personnel are less concerned with the thought of a terrorist threat than such issues as fare avoidance and graffiti.
The Bay Area Rapid Transit District
The Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) is the largest automated rail system in California. Currently serving a potential population of more than three million people in Alameda County, Contra Costa County, San Francisco County, and northern San Mateo County, BART tracks cover 95 miles (153 kilometers).
In existence since 1972, BART has carried over 1.5 billion passengers more than 18 billion passenger miles. Today, the system averages approximately 325,000 passengers per day. The rail system has slowly expanded over its 30-year history, with service connecting to San Francisco International Airport expected to begin in late 2001. The fiscal year 2002 budget for BART will be $367,931,100.
Currently, Santa Clara County hopes to expand BART service to several locations in the county. With nearly two million people in a fast-growing part of the greater San Francisco Bay Area, the county hopes to connect residents and commuters with employment sites. This need has been exacerbated by the fact that as of 2001, San Francisco-Oakland and San Jose had the dubious distinctions of having the second- and fifteenth-worst automobile traffic congestion in the nation. In November 2000, more than 70 percent of the voters in Santa Clara County passed a ballot initiative that called for the addition of one-half cent to the local sales tax for 30 years, estimating the collection of $6 billion over the period. Of that amount, approximately $2 billion will be set aside to fund BART, an amount that represents about half the total cost of the 21-mile extension. Negotiations are underway to resolve the many institutional, financial, technical, and other issues remaining before the expansion can occur.
BART is a valuable link for moving people throughout the area, making the system's policies against surface terrorism worthy of examination.
BART has never had a terrorism-related incident; the dissemination of mace by a disgruntled passenger is the most serious incident ever to plague this regional transportation agency. Nevertheless, its public safety personnel are acutely aware of incidents such as the 1995 event in Tokyo and IRA threats in the United Kingdom and maintain vigilance at all times. Uniformed and station personnel are on constant alert. In addition, the agency cooperates with the Bay Area Terrorism Working Group, a planning organization whose members include the FBI, the state's Office of Emergency Services, and some transit agencies, as well as police, fire, and other emergency personnel in various jurisdictions between San Jose and Marin County. They also participate in simulated transportation-related disaster exercises conducted annually by the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC). Since 1995, the agency has attempted to enhance its agility by dividing its territory into four decentralized zones.
BART uses the federal definition of terrorist threats:
Chemical, perceived as the most serious threat because of the relative ease with which harmful materials can be transported into or along a transportation corridor and the fact that its use gives the terrorist instant, yet potentially long-lasting, gratification from his or her activities;
Biological, serious because of the nature of the potential disaster and the fact that the full effects of activity may not be determined for three to five days after it takes place;
Radiological (nuclear), which is significant--although rarely discussed--because of the ease with which someone can expose thousands of people to low-tech, easy-to-get devices.
As part of its general preparedness, BART management personnel have strategies for radiological, chemical, and biological incidents that could take place along the system's train lines and in stations. Each plan carries detailed instructions and procedures pertaining to a particular type of incident and place where it occurs. General elements include:
Isolating the incident area to contain the effects of the material in the smallest space possible
An evacuation process that works to move people away from the source of the attack in an orderly, yet quick, fashion
Cessation of train service to prevent material from spreading into previously uninfected areas
Turning off the ventilation system to the extent that it helps to contain materials that would otherwise travel by air
Dealing with the media to keep people apprised of events
Coordination with other governments in ways that are seamless, rather than duplicative or contradictory.
According to agency protocol, any remotely related terrorism incident, or terrorist threat, will trigger a notification to the FBI. Because of the FBI's superior resources, availability of experts for rapid threat assessments and evaluation of technical feasibility, and ability to marshal other federal resources in response to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), their early notification is considered critical to a coordinated and effective response.
As part of its ongoing preparedness program, BART maintains an elite group of personnel who will serve as the first response team to a surface terrorism-related incident. This carefully trained group of specialists (approximately five to eight people on any given day) is available to assist with the management of any WMD incident related to system disruption, including terrorist-related activities. With agile responsiveness a high priority, the group can assemble at any crisis site along the 95-mile system within 45 to 60 minutes of an incident's occurrence.
To ensure the most rapid response possible, core group members carry special suits, hoods, gloves, and other protective equipment in their cars. Protective equipment also is stored at strategic locations throughout the BART system. These locations are known only to the specialists who have access to these materials.
BART relies upon its trained personnel as a first line of defense against terrorism or any other disruptive behavior. All employees are on alert at and near each of the system's 39 stations. Of particular concern are the 14 subway stations along the lines of the system because of the inherent difficulties in ventilating toxic fumes and removing people. The 12 surface and 13 aerial stations present less risk to the system because they are located in open environments, although they are more vulnerable to penetration by assailants.
In the event of an incident, the train operator, circulating patrol officer, or station attendant is expected to notify the operations control center (known as Central) in Oakland. Upon receiving such information, Central will isolate the area and organize immediate evacuation. Central and the BART Police Department assume responsibility for contacting all other agencies with specially trained first responders such as cooperating police departments, fire departments, hazardous materials agencies, and the FBI. The potential for downwind plume impacts and a concern for the surrounding community can affect the extent of the contacts.
BART recognizes that a terrorist act, or use of any WMD, will require a coordinated response by all first responders to minimize casualties among both the responders and impacted citizens. BART's Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Response plan and its general emergency plan are distributed to other first-responding agencies to enable them to understand BART's anticipated response activities. In addition, BART has been the simulated venue for regional table-top exercises involving the handling of terrorist incidents by first responders from throughout the San Francisco Bay Area.
BART personnel acknowledge that there are no foolproof preventive measures against a terrorist determined to disrupt the system or harm passengers. Except for the tubes and underground corridor, the system is too open. Nevertheless, the agency's mission is to discourage antisocial behavior through carefully trained personnel and equipment. Thus, BART officials rely primarily upon a battery of cameras, police patrols, and psychological profiles as a collective first line of defense against would-be terrorist activity.
The BART system operates with 175 sworn (armed) officers, all of whom have received police academy training. The system also employs approximately 300 unarmed station attendants. Although located only in the front cab of the train, operators are also trained to watch for suspicious people both on board trains and along the 95-mile track system.
Each officer employed by BART goes through four hours of training related to chemical/biological/nuclear/explosive terrorism threats. A core set of specialists takes another four hours of training. Every new employee must attend a four-hour training video as a condition of employment, and several attend conferences on terrorism and terrorism-related issues each year.
The BART crisis team has periodic table-top meetings, at which members discuss potential crises, exercises, and possible responses. Once a year, the BART system conducts a simulated multicasualty terrorist or disaster activity with dozens of participants at a designated site. This drill is usually carried out early on a Sunday morning so as not to disrupt normal traffic.
As part of its interaction with residents and passengers, the agency maintains an awareness of any festering community issues as well as any threats that could occur because of unusually challenging events or activities. These include the Millennium, sports events, concerts, ethnic-related events, or other activities that bring unusually large numbers of individuals into the system over a brief time span.
Police patrols circulate through the stations on a regular basis. The presence of these personnel is a valuable deterrent to would-be assailants. As part of their deterrence activities, agency personnel routinely intercept questionable people, those who appear out of place or out of sorts. Such individuals usually depart the area after such meetings.
Station attendants perform a second-tier level of ongoing surveillance. While they have neither the training nor coercive power of BART police, attendants serve as "eyes and ears" for any unusual activities. Often their mere appearance is enough to discourage antisocial activities, because they are eye witnesses to any unusual activities.
Stations contain emergency alarms inside each agent's booth. In addition, white courtesy telephones are located near the elevators that take passengers to and from the platforms. At selected stations, fixed cameras remain focused on the telephones and elevator waiting areas at all times. Outside the stations, cameras and infrared spotlights placed in BART parking lots ensure continuous surveillance of these areas for any type of criminal activity.