MTI Report 06-03
HIGH-SPEED RAIL PROJECTS
IN THE UNITED STATES:
IDENTIFYING THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS
PART 2
November 2006
Allison L. C.
de Cerreño, Ph.D.
Shishir Mathur, Ph.D.
a report cosponsored by the
a publication of the
Mineta Transportation Institute
Created by Congress in 1991
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many individuals from around the
country aided the authors in the creation of this report. Some provided their
time for interviews and reviews of the different drafts, while others helped to
find written documentation of historical and current facts. In particular,
Allison C. de Cerreño would like to thank the following individuals for their
contributions to the Northeast Corridor and Keystone Corridor cases: Charlie
Banks, R.L. Banks & Associates; John Bennett, Amtrak; James Boice,
Connecticut Department of Transportation; Eric Bugaile; Peter Cannito, MTA
Metro-North; David Carol, Charlotte Area Transit System; Calvin Cassidy,
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation; Mortimer Downey, PB Consult, Inc.;
Toby Fauver, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation; David Gunn; Emmanuel
"Bruce" Horowitz, ESH Consult; David Matsuda, Office of Senator
Lautenberg; Richard Peltz, Appalachian Regional Commission; Catherine
Popp-McDonough, SEPTA; Michael Saunders, Federal Highway Administration; Bill
Schafer, Norfolk Southern Corporation; Peter Stangl; Brian Sterman, FTA; Louis
Thompson, Thompson, Galenson and Associates, LLC; and Thomas Till, Discovery
Institute. She also thanks Dan Leavitt, California High-Speed Rail Authority
for his time in updating her on the current status of high-speed rail efforts
in
Special thanks are extended to George Haikalis, who provided a number of historical documents no longer easily found, including the summary report that Dr. de Cerreño in search of the Keystone Corridor's earlier attempts at high-speed rail which were all but forgotten, and Steven Greenfield of Parsons Brinckerhoff, who managed to track down the full preliminary report on the feasibility of high-speed rail in the Keystone Corridor. And, finally to members of Amtrak's Planning and Analysis and Government Affairs Departments who provided several documents and the speed restriction tables for the NEC, spent time with the author showing her how to interpret them, and arranged for additional discussions on numerous technical questions.
Shishir Mathur would like to thank the following individuals for their contributions to the Chicago Hub case: John Bennett, Amtrak; David Carol, Charlotte Area Transit System; Emmanuel "Bruce" Horowitz, ESH Consult; Merrill Travis, Lower Cost Solutions, Inc,; John Schwalbauch, Illinois Department of Transportation; Ethan Johnson, Wisconsin Department of Transportation; Stuart Nicholson, the Ohio Rail Development Commission; John Hey, Iowa Department of Transportation; Ellis Tompkins, Nebraska Department of Roads; Rodney Massman, Missouri Department of Transportation; Mike Bedore, Michigan Department of Transportation; Drew Galloway, Amtrak; Joby Berman, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority; Emil Frankel, Parsons Brinckerhoff; Rick Harnish, Midwest High Speed Rail Coalition; and Rick Tidwell, Metra.
Finally, both authors extend their thanks to Howard Permut, MTA Metro-North, for his thoughtful comments and suggestions during numerous rounds of the report. Thanks are offered also to MTI staff, including Research Director Trixie Johnson, Research and Publications Assistant Sonya Cardenas, Webmaster Barney Murray, and Graphic Artist Shun Nelson. Editing and publication services were provided by Catherine Frazier and Project Solutions Network, Inc.
Table
of Contents
Key Findings and Lessons Learned 2
Goals, Definitions, and Methodology 9
Update on Earlier Cases and HSR Initiatives 10
Challenges in Implementing HSR in the States 14
The Chicago Hub and Midwest Regional Rail Initiative 17
History of HSR in the Midwest 17
HSR Efforts within the States 28
Possible Issues and Next Steps 50
History and Development of the Corridor 56
History and Development of the Corridor 92
Findings, Lessons, and Themes 139
Key Findings and Lessons Learned 139
List of Figures
Map of Proposed Midwest Regional Rail System 24
The Keystone Corridor, Philadelphia to Harrisburg 53
The Keystone Corridor, Philadelphia to Pittsburgh 54
Bypass of 30th Street Station 77
Ownership of and Operations on the NEC 89
NEC Weekday Revenue Passenger Train Movement, 2006 91
Recommended Time Line from Redirection Study 105
List of Tables
Lines Comprising the Chicago Hub 21
MWRRS Plan: Train Travel Times 25
MWRRS Plan: Operating Revenues, Costs, and Operating Ratio 26
MWRRS Plan: Capital Investment by Corridor 27
Attributes Related to HSR Alternatives C, D, and E 60
Costs of SOGR and High-Speed Service (millions of 1996 $) 65
Service Alternatives under SOGR 65
Funding Share of KCIP Program Elements ($ millions) 69
Funding Schedule ($ millions) 70
KCIP Program Element Costs, 2002 vs. 2004 ($ millions) 73
Revised Funding Schedule ($ millions) 74
Program Elements: Total Expenditures per Time Period ($ millions) 74
December 2004 Revised Funding Schedule ($ millions) 75
Planned Work on the Keystone Corridor in FY 2005 75
NEC Ridership: DC-NYC, 1968-1976 (thousands) 94
Cost of Program Elements by State ($ millions) 100
PEIS and Redirection Study Program Elements and Costs ($ millions) 104
NECIP Budget Revisions, 04/79-01/82 ($ millions) 108
Redirection Study/FPEIS Recommendations vs. Actual Improvements 110
Estimated Cost of Trip-Time-Related Improvements ($ millions) 117
Funds Obligated under NECIP, FY 1976-1995 ($ thousands) 120
NEC Goals for and Current Status of Trip Times and Frequencies 133
Executive Summary
In August 2005, the Mineta
Transportation Institute issued the report, High-Speed Rail Projects in the
This report is, in essence, volume 2 of the previous study. Like the first study, this report also used a comparative case study approach based on an extensive literature review as well as interviews with primary and secondary sources. Sources in the literature review were drawn from historical, governmental, and legal documents, as well as business plans, feasibility studies, and related media articles.
This effort adds to the earlier work
with three additional cases--the Chicago Hub consisting of eight lines in eight
states; the Keystone Corridor between
Some of the key findings and lessons learned from the previous study are bolstered by these three cases. Furthermore, this study provides several additional themes for consideration, the following in particular:
The Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridor experiences call into question whether they can be replicated in areas where Amtrak (National Railroad Passenger Corporation) does not own the line.
The cases in the report help highlight the tension between needing to keep costs low and finding the needed funds so that goals can be met.
Finally, together with the
examples from the first study, the cases in this study suggest that an
important discussion needs to occur about whether efforts aimed at incremental
HSR (that is, rail that uses existing technologies and rights-of-way [ROW], but
undergoes improvements to allow for speeds up to 150 mph) are more likely to
meet with success in the current political climate than are those aimed at new
HSR (rail requiring new ROW and technologies imported from Europe or Asia that
typically allow for speeds in excess of 200 mph). The answer to this question
could change the course of both policies and funding aimed at instituting HSR
in the
Key Findings and Lessons
Learned
While each case summary provides a discussion of key findings and lessons specific to that corridor, the cases presented in this report, along with those of the first report, provide several broader findings and lessons. This section highlights these findings, along with lessons that will prove important for HSR initiatives around the country.
Leadership, Means, and
Authority
Leadership coupled with means and
authority are required to implement change. HSR projects are expensive, take
many years to complete, and require coordination among and between a number of
key actors and stakeholders. The case studies of this report and its
predecessor, which included
In the Keystone Corridor, this set of
factors has been the most important in contributing to its current success. In
earlier attempts at HSR in
Given the need for the combination of these three factors to be present for successful HSR outcomes, the Chicago Hub faces several obstacles. First, despite the support of several state legislators and state department of transportation (DOT) officials, as a whole, the Hub has lacked strong and consistent leadership. Second, funding for the Hub has not been secured (though two small segments have funding for certain improvements). Third, no formal authority or structural process that would make HSR-specific improvements has been identified. The end result is that while some coordination exists, specific roles and responsibilities are unclear, and overall, the states and other stakeholders are not moving in concert with each other to implement HSR.
Who Should
Play These Roles?
The actors providing the leadership, the means, and the authority to implement change may vary according to specific circumstances and factors. On the NEC, the federal government and Amtrak played the central roles, while on the Keystone Corridor, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT); and Amtrak, under the leadership of David Gunn, played these critical roles. In both cases, Amtrak could provide authority since it owned the lines, or in the case of the NEC, most of the line. On the Keystone Corridor, because the costs associated with the modifications were not extensive, the state government and Amtrak could include them in their annual budgets, thus providing the means and avoiding the need for political campaigns to build support.
On the NEC, the costs were more
significant as were the challenges faced by multiple owners, multiple states,
and many more operators. Thus, the involvement of the federal government was
more important. On the Chicago Hub, progress has been piecemeal, with only two
relatively small segments progressing forward at this point--one between
Need for a
Federal Vision
The Keystone Corridor demonstrates the potential for HSR improvements without major federal support. Nevertheless, given the experience on the Northeast Corridor and the overall lack of progress on HSR in the United States over the past four decades, there is good reason to believe that a federal vision for HSR is needed along with a national network strategy for rail that combines passenger, freight, non-HSR intercity, and HSR rail, and addresses how each also links to nonrail modes of transportation. Along with this, federal funding is also important, especially for the larger and multistate projects. Indeed, as the experience of the NEC demonstrates, without the public funding provided by the federal government, even the successes that have been realized would not have occurred.
Reiterating the findings in the first
study, without a broad vision, or at least guidance and standards, states will
continue to fill the void with multiple types of models--constitutional
amendments and legislation (like Florida and California), multistate compacts
(like the Chicago Hub), public-private partnerships (like what was envisioned
during the 1980s in Pennsylvania)--without a sense of what is most likely to
succeed. Worse, without a national network strategy for rail, the
Clear Identification of Goals
and Benefits
The goals for any major capital investment project are rarely unidimensional. However, in the case of HSR, the goals are not only multidimensional but also sometimes conflicting. While some focus on the need for the highest speeds, others argue that accessibility, frequency, and on-time performance are more important (basically, more efficient and reliable intercity rail). These different goals lead to very different markets, technologies, funding sources, and overall outcomes, with those focusing on speeds proposing new HSR and those focusing on other attributes looking toward incremental HSR.
Developing clear and consistent goals around which to build a consensus is important for successful outcomes in HSR. On the Keystone Corridor, the unsuccessful effort in the 1980s that resulted in a recommendation for magnetic levitation (Maglev) had multiple goals--economic development, higher rail share of travel, travel-time savings--with no clear prioritization among them. Indeed, a substantial minority of those involved in the effort did not fully support the final recommendation, believing that lower cost alternatives should be considered. In contrast, the most recent effort on the Keystone Corridor stressed two much more straightforward goals--bringing the line up to a state of good repair and improving trip times.
Equally important, all the key
stakeholders (in this case, operators) along the Keystone Corridor see some
benefit accruing from the goals and related projects entailed in the current
effort. Amtrak will increase and enhance its service, with corresponding ridership
and revenue increases. PennDOT will be able to fulfill several objectives
related to its broader transportation goals for the corridor.
The NEC's experience has been somewhat mixed in terms of goals and benefits. The earliest goals were identified in terms of reducing trip times, but they were negotiated based on political need rather than objective criteria or analysis, and whether they were fully agreed upon by all the stakeholders involved is not clear. In terms of benefits, as early as 1978, the Federal Railroad Administration and Amtrak came under criticism for not addressing the concerns and needs of the various stakeholders along the corridor, notably the commuter and freight railroad operators. Under the later electrification project on the north-end of the corridor, similar concerns were raised as well as additional concerns by other nonoperating stakeholders along the NEC, and as was seen, finding operational support and funding for those improvements that do not clearly benefit certain stakeholders has proven difficult.
To date, the overarching goals of the Midwestern states are to increase connectivity, reduce trip times between major Midwestern cities, and provide multimodal connections to improve system access. These goals have meant that the Midwestern states have moved toward a more regional framework to plan for HSR, which, critics point out, has meant inclusion of corridors that have little potential to attract ridership, and an estimated project cost that, in light of limited funding, is almost impossible to finance. Further, the matrix of benefits in the Chicago Hub remains very much unclear. For the Chicago Hub to have any opportunity for success, it is critical that the private railroad companies that own the majority of the ROW, Metra (the commuter rail), and the environmental groups be included in the planning process so they can work together to develop and prioritize goals and identify benefits.
Themes for Consideration
In addition to the findings and lessons learned, some important themes for consideration bear mentioning.
Private ROW Ownership and
Success
Can the
NEC and the Keystone Corridor be replicated without ownership of the ROW by a
single passenger rail entity?
On both the NEC and the Keystone Corridor, ownership of the ROW by Amtrak proved critical. Ownership of the ROW allowed Amtrak the authority to more easily deal with capital investment decisions, signaling, dispatching, power distribution, and maintenance decisions to implement HSR. It also reduced costs since there was no need to purchase new ROW and, in the case of the Keystone Corridor Improvement Program (KCIP), allowed the avoidance of certain environmental requirements because most of the improvements occurred in the current ROW and did not reflect a new service in themselves.
In contrast, except for one relatively
small segment, the Chicago Hub is not owned by Amtrak, and unlike the NEC on
which the other owners were public entities, the Chicago Hub's spokes are
primarily owned by various private railroad companies. The result is similar to
what is seen on the western portion of the Keystone Corridor, between
Harrisburg and Pittsburgh--there is no clear authority for implementing HSR,
and the costs to do so will be much more significant since in many cases
separate tracks will be required for passenger trains operating at higher
speeds. In fact, the only section of the Chicago Hub that has been upgraded in
speed in recent years (95 mph) is the Amtrak-owned segment from just outside of
The Cost of Keeping Costs Lower
Keeping costs lower helps,
but there are costs to "doing it on the cheap."
Among the key findings on the Keystone Corridor was that because the costs to implement change in the most recent effort were reasonable, they were more easily accepted and achieved. This was also seen on the two segments of the Chicago Hub where track improvements have been made to eventually allow for 110 mph service; associated costs were relatively low and could be budgeted within an already existing program. However, as the experience on the NEC demonstrates, trying to reduce costs too much can lead to the situation where the goals are left unmet. From the earliest years of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP) through the later electrification project on the north-end, there was a reluctance to commit the necessary funding to fully complete the project. The end result of this lack of commitment was difficulty in meeting many of the goals that were set. Worse, without the necessary funding, the plans had to be redrawn and revised numerous times, leading to delayed implementation and higher costs in the long term. Finally, making decisions based on the trip-time savings and costs of each project individually ignored the possibility of reaping greater savings by combining the projects.
Moving Beyond U.S.
Is the United States
The first study suggested that there
were opportunities for both incremental and new HSR in the
Should the
focus be on incremental HSR?
Perhaps the most resounding theme for
consideration is that in the
Nevertheless, this is a point worth
serious consideration, given the costs of new HSR; current political apathy
(and in some cases outright antipathy) surrounding rail more broadly and new
HSR more specifically; the perceived risks associated with "unproven"
HSR technologies in the United States; and the fact that the few places where
success has occurred (even if modest in many respects) have implemented
incremental HSR. While incremental rail may be viewed by some as
"settling" for the second-best choice, without stronger and
consistent financial and political commitment on both the part of the federal
government and the states, it may be the only means for having any HSR in the
Introduction
In August 2005, the Mineta Transportation Institute issued the report, High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States: Identifying the Elements for Success . The report noted that since the 1960s, high-speed ground transportation (HSGT) has "held the promise of fast, convenient, and environmentally sound travel for distances between 40 and 600 miles."See C. de Cerreño, et. al., High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States., p. 1. After briefly discussing the difference in experiences with HSGT between the United States and its Asian and European counterparts, the report proceeded to review three U.S. cases--Florida, California, and the Pacific Northwest--as a means for identifying lessons learned for successfully implementing high-speed rail (HSR) in the United States.
This report follows and adds to the earlier study, also using a comparative case study approach, with three additional cases--the Chicago Hub, the Keystone Corridor, and the Northeast Corridor. While some of the lessons learned and themes for consideration from the previous study are bolstered by these three cases, additional lessons are more apparent, particularly as one looks to the two cases--the Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridor--in which higher speeds have been achieved.
Goals, Definitions, and
Methodology
As with the earlier report, the goal of
this study is to identify lessons learned for successfully implementing HSR in
the
Given the early stages of most of these projects, "success" is defined by whether a given HSR project is still actively pursuing development or funding. However, in the case of the Northeast Corridor, a fuller discussion of success is provided, since HSR has been implemented on that corridor for some time now.
With respect to other definitions, HSR
in the
Incremental HSR--uses existing
technologies and rights-of-way (ROW) but makes improvements to allow for speeds
up to 150 mph (though most projects in the
New HSR--requires new ROW
and technologies imported from Europe or
Additionally, some efforts have been
aimed at implementing an entirely new type of technology--magnetic levitation
(Maglev)--now in revenue service in
Update on Earlier Cases and HSR
Initiatives
Since the publication of the first
report, there has been little movement on HSR in the
At the time the work was being
conducted on the first report, the situations in
Florida
In 2006 the Florida High Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA) issued its report to the governor and legislature. The report noted that although the amendment had been repealed, the FHSRA continued negotiations with Fluor-Bombardier, which had provided the first-ranked proposal responding to FHSRA's 2002 Request for Proposals. The negotiations have centered on certain potential changes to the proposal that would incorporate several attributes of the second-ranked proposal, including the addition of a second track in certain locations. At the same time, FHSRA has remained in discussions with Global Rail Consortium, which submitted the second-ranked proposal and has solicited additional information from them, specifically related to the levels of private participation in the project.See Florida High Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA), 2006 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, http://www.floridahighspeedrail.org/uploaddocuments/p25 2006_Report_to_the_Governor_and_the_Legislature.pdf (accessed 6/9/06), 2; also see C. de Cerreño, et.al., High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States, pp. 27-43.
In addition to continuing negotiations
and discussions with Fluor-Bombardier and Global Rail Consortium, the FHSRA
also changed its preferred route option for the new HSR, which would connect
No new recommendations were offered by the FHSRA to the governor and legislature, though the Authority reiterated the 2005 recommendation to complete the two key memoranda of agreement--one with Florida Department of Transportation and one with the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority--which are needed before the Record of Decision can be finalized. FHSRA believes that these steps need to be taken to preserve the ability to locate a new HSR system in the existing public right-of-way along a key section of the corridor, even if HSR is not pursued at this time.See FHSRA, 2006 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, pp. 3-4.
Nevertheless, given that funding for
HSR was cut by Governor Jeb Bush in fiscal year (FY) 2004 and has not been
reintroduced, and that the Governor's office remains not only unsupportive but
also actively opposed to HSR, at the moment the situation appears rather bleak,
at least for new HSR in
California
In some ways
In November 2005, the California High Speed Rail Authority
(CHSRA) unanimously approved the certification of the final Environmental
Impact Statement. This was followed by the Federal Railroad Administration's
issuance of a Record of Decision. Yet, after more than a decade of working
toward the implementation of a 700-mile, new HSR system in
In January 2006, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger announced a $222 billion, 10-year public works bond, which while mentioning HSR, did not include any funding for it. As a result, members of the Legislature began discussing postponing a $9.95 billion HSR bond measure from November 2006 to November 2008 (it had already been postponed from the November 2004 ballot).See California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA), "What's New," http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/wahts_new/default.asp (accessed 6/1/06). On June 29, 2006, the legislature voted unanimously to postpone the vote again.See "Lawmakers Vote to Axe High-Speed Rail Bond From November Ballot," Associated Press, http://www.sacbee.com/state_wire/story/14271924p-15082433c.html (accessed 6/29/06).
According to Dan Leavitt, Deputy
Director of the CHSRA, postponing the ballot has serious consequences for HSR
in
The Current Cases
The three cases together in this report provide some interesting comparisons to each other and to the earlier cases as well. While the Chicago Hub remains in the planning stages (and significantly behind California and Florida), the Keystone Corridor is in the midst of incremental improvements to increase speeds up to 110 mph (with potential additional increases over time), and the Northeast Corridor (NEC) is the closest the United States comes to true HSR, with speeds of up to 150 mph in certain locations.
Like
Unlike
The Chicago Hub (2,313 miles) is significantly larger than either the NEC (456 miles) or the Keystone Corridor (104 miles). There are two segments of the Chicago Hub that are roughly the same length as the Keystone Corridor (118 miles and 80 miles) and on which some improvements are being made. However, each of these segments is significantly smaller than the full Hub, each represents only a portion of two different spokes of the Hub, and unlike the Keystone Corridor, they do not connect the end-point cities.
The costs associated with change on the full extent of the Chicago Hub are significantly higher than with the most recent efforts on the Keystone Corridor (though on the segments mentioned above, the costs are comparable).
The ROW is largely owned by private freight operators on the Chicago Hub; on the Keystone Corridor, Amtrak (National Railroad Passenger Corporation) owns the portion of the corridor on which incremental improvements are being made; and on the NEC, Amtrak owns the majority of the line, with public agencies owning the remainder.
There is no clear overall authority or dominant player on the Chicago Hub, while on the Keystone Corridor, Amtrak and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation clearly played the lead role.
Owing in part to its multistate nature, there is no formal institutional framework on the Chicago Hub as one sees on the Keystone Corridor or even on the NEC.
Who benefits and by how much is less clear with the Chicago Hub than with the Keystone Corridor or the NEC. Worse, while on the Keystone Corridor all the stakeholders see some benefit, on the Chicago Hub some stakeholders may see a negative impact if HSR is implemented.
As will be seen after reviewing the experiences on the Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridors, all of these points call into question the ability of the Chicago Hub to move from early planning to full implementation of HSR.
Challenges in Implementing HSR
in the States
In an October 1994 article by Louis
Thompson, "High-Speed Rail (HSR) in the
HSR carries large volumes of people using limited space.
HSR consumes less energy and emits less pollution than automobiles and airplanes under certain conditions.
HSR can operate directly in and out of city centers, unlike airplanes.
HSR's marginal operating cost per person is small once the infrastructure is built, so that if volumes are high enough, this mode can provide the lowest-cost travel.See Louis S. Thompson, "High-Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States--Why Isn't There More?" Japan Railway & Transport Review (October 1994): pp. 34-35.
On the other hand, Thompson also notes several disadvantages:
HSR can be extremely expensive to build (particularly for new HSR).
HSR is limited in coverage, since it can only go where there are tracks (and finding those tracks and ROW today is increasingly difficult).
HSR is not a proven mode in
the
Additional challenges for HSR in the
To date, in most attempts to implement
HSR in the
Outline of the Report
The subsequent pages of this report
explore the cases in depth, tracing historical efforts aimed at implementing
high-speed rail as well as the most recent challenges and status of each of the
corridors. The next section of this report covers the Chicago Hub and Midwest
Regional Rail Initiative, describing the initiatives being taken by each state
to move HSR forward in the region and providing an assessment of the various
stakeholder interests that will need to be taken into account as the effort
progresses. The fourth section explores the Keystone Corridor, tracing several
unsuccessful attempts aimed at implementing HSR in the
The Chicago Hub and Midwest
Regional Rail Initiative
The Midwest, with
The
Nevertheless, the Chicago Hub and Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) together serve as a counterpoint to the experiences of the Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridor. The Chicago Hub and MWRRI demonstrate the difficulty in moving HSR initiatives forward without the combined presence of leadership, means, and authority. They also demonstrate the difficulty in trying to implement an HSR network that crosses multiple states in the absence of significant political and financial support from the federal government.
History of HSR in the Midwest
Historically, the motivation to plan for HSR in the
However, development of HSR in the
The Early Attempts
One of the first attempts to examine the feasibility of HSR in
the
All of these studies were conducted in
parallel with and sometimes as a result of regional-level efforts to develop
HSR in the
Because the beneficial service of and profitability of a high speed intercity rail passenger system would be enhanced by establishing such a system which would operate across state lines it is the policy of the states party to this compact to cooperate and share jointly the administrative and financial responsibilities of preparing a feasibility study concerning the operation of such a system connecting major cities in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri, and any other State which subsequently becomes a participant through enactment of the compact.See Missouri Revised Statutes, Transportation Services, § 680.175 (August 1997), "Interstate High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Network Compact," http://ssl.csg.org/compactlaws/intercityhighspeedrail.html (accessed 4/3/06).
The compact further noted that:
The states of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri and all other states which subsequently enter into this compact, hereinafter referred to as "participating states," agree to, upon adoption of this compact by the respective states, jointly conduct and participate in a high speed intercity rail passenger feasibility study by providing such information and data as is available and may be requested by a participating state or any consulting firms representing a participating state or the compact. It is mutually understood by the participating states that such information shall not include matters not of public record or of a nature considered to be privileged and confidential unless the state providing such information agrees to waive the confidentiality.See Ibid.
Although the compact did not result in actual development of regional HSR, and was ultimately repealed by many of the participating states, it represented the first formal attempt by a group of Midwestern and Eastern states to study the feasibility of developing a regional HSR system.
Interest in HSR in the Midwest received
a boost in 1990 when a group of high-level public and government officials
toured
The purpose of the report was, "to
investigate the economic and financial potential for constructing and operating
a HSR system in one of two corridors...between Chicago and Minneapolis-St. Paul."
The corridors examined were a southern corridor linking
Similar interest in exploring the
potential for HSR in the Chicago-Detroit line led the DOTs of Illinois,
Federal Action--Chicago
In 1991 the federal government, under
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) called for
selection of not more than five corridors to be designated as HSR corridors.
These included the
While the earlier regionwide effort--through the Interstate High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Network Compact--was unsuccessful, renewed regional efforts were made in the form of the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission (MIPRC) and the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI).
Renewed
Regional Efforts--MIPRC and MWRRI
Under the auspices of the Midwestern
Legislative Conference (MLC), the pro-HSR legislators of several Midwestern
states formed a task force in December 1996. A regional association of state
legislatures representing 11 Midwestern states (
Over the next four years, the task
force decided to create the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission
(MIPRC) through the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Compact drafted by the
task force. The states of
While the legislators were garnering
political support for HSR, the state DOT officials joined efforts to prepare a
regional plan for HSR. This effort gave rise to a loose consortium of state DOT
officials called the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI), of which the
MIPRC is supportive. The MWRRI "began in 1996 under the auspices of the
Mississippi Valley Conference--a regional division of the American Association
of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)."See Indiana High Speed Rail Association, "A
History of the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative,"
http://www.indianahighspeedrail.org/history.htm (accessed 12/1/05). The
representatives of the state DOTs of Indiana,
The MWRRS Plan
The MWRRS plan, as per its latest version prepared in 2004, envisions trains carrying passengers between the region's big cities at speeds up to 110 mph. This speed was picked as the upper limit, because the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) dictated that no at-grade crossings would be allowed at speeds at or over 125 mph, and that "some positive barrier device" would be required for train speeds from 110-125 mph. No such barrier system was found to be practical.See Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06. An estimated 13.6 million passengers are expected to annually travel on this system with the full implementation of the MWRRS by the year 2025.See Ibid. The MWRRS Plan elements include the following:
Use of 3,000 miles of existing rail right-of-way that is largely owned by private freight railroads and to a much smaller extent by Amtrak and Metra.
Operation of a hub-and-spoke
passenger rail system with
Introduction of modern, high-speed trains operating at speeds up to 110 mph.
Provision of multimodal connections to improve system access.See Transportation Economics & Management Systems, Inc. (TEMS), Midwest Regional Rail System: A Transportation Network for the 21st Century: Executive Report (September 2004), 5, http://www.dot.state.wi.us/projects/state/docs/railmidwest.pdf #search=%22midwest%20regional%20rail%20system%3A%20a%20%22 (accessed 12/1/06).
The overarching goals of the MWRRS plan are to increase connectivity, reduce trip times between major Midwestern cities, and provide "multimodal connections to improve system access."See Ibid. The plan proposes to achieve the goals through a network of 110 mph high-speed rail lines connecting major Midwestern cities. Additional networks of 90 mph and 79 mph lines and feeder bus routes would link passengers to the 110 mph lines and improve system access. See Map of Proposed Midwest Regional Rail System shows a map of the Midwest Regional Rail System with the rail lines and bus feeder routes proposed in the MWRRS plan.
The first of the series of business plans for MWRRS was published in 1998. Since then the plan has been updated twice--in 2000 and 2004--with additional work done each time to fine tune the plan elements and estimate its economic benefits. The latest report in this series is due in 2007. A major component of the 2007 report will be the assessment of economic benefits at the micro (community) level. The report will identify the monetary value of the economic benefits to each community served by the system. According to the Approved Project Briefing,
The Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) Steering Committee has requested and received FRA planning funds in response to a $250,000 earmark in the FY 2004 Transportation Appropriation. These funds require a 50/50 state/federal match and generate $500,000 in effort. The funds will provide consultant support for MWRRI planning, public involvement, engineering, and environmental work during a three-year period from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2008. The project costs under this Approved Project Briefing will fund and support the work of the MWRRI Steering Committee as it pursues additional funding and the implementation of the plan at the state and federal level. In addition to the $250,000 FRA funds, each of the eight participating states has agreed to contribute $31,250 over three years.See The Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT), "Approved Project Briefing: Midwest Regional Rail Initiative Phase VI," http://www.dot.state.oh.us/ohiorail/Project%20Briefings/May%202005/State%20of%20Wisc%20-%20MWRRI%20 Briefing.htm (accessed 9/20/05).
Map of Proposed Midwest
Regional Rail System
Source:
Executive Report, 2004, p. 6.
The majority of the lines identified in the MWRRS plan are part of the federally designated Chicago Hub. However, there are several key differences as follows:
The Chicago Hub only
includes federally designated high-speed lines, while the MWRRS, apart from
including all the high-speed lines of the Chicago Hub (except for the
Cincinnati-Columbus-Cleveland line) also proposes other rail lines with speeds
ranging from 79 mph to 110 mph. The additional lines in the MWRRS include:
The MWRRS plan is multimodal in nature. It seeks to link the HSR network with the bus system through the feeder bus routes (See Map of Proposed Midwest Regional Rail System).
The 2004 MWRRS plan, titled "Midwest Regional Rail System: A Transportation Network for the 21st Century," aims to achieve substantial travel-times savings, as shown in See MWRRS Plan: Train Travel Times.
MWRRS Plan: Train Travel
Times
|
|||
City Pairs
|
MWRRS
|
Current Service
|
Time Reduction
|
Chicago-Detroit
|
|||
Chicago-Cleveland
|
|||
Chicago-Cincinnati
|
|||
Chicago-Carbondale
|
|||
Chicago-St. Louis
|
|||
St. Louis-Kansas City
|
|||
Chicago-Omaha
|
|||
Chicago-St. Paul
|
|||
Chicago-Milwaukee
|
|||
|
Source: |
|||
The plan projects the system as a whole to be financially sustainable at the operating level (see See MWRRS Plan: Operating Revenues, Costs, and Operating Ratio for projected operating revenues, costs, and operating ratio) and calls for a mix of funding sources for financing the capital costs. The plan calls for an 80/20 share of the federal and state funds to finance the capital costs. The other funds include those generated from the system-related economic activities.
The plan has identified two major components of the capital costs--infrastructure and train equipment. The total capital investment is estimated to be $7.7 billion (in 2002 dollars), of which $1.1 billion will be for train equipment and the remaining $6.6 billion for infrastructure. The total cost is projected to be phased over a 10-year period. The "major capital improvements include track replacement and upgrades, additional sidings, signal and communication systems, and highway-railroad grade-crossing improvements as necessary to support intercity passenger speeds of up to 110 mph as well as concurrent freight and commuter rail operations."See TEMS, Midwest Regional Rail System, p. 15. See MWRRS Plan: Capital Investment by Corridor identifies the capital investment by corridor.
MWRRS Plan: Operating Revenues, Costs, and Operating Ratio
|
||||||
MWRRS
Summary Financial Statistics
|
Operating
Revenue (Millions of 2002 $)
|
Operating
and Maintenance Cost (Millions of 2002 $)
|
Operating
Ratio1
|
|||
|
|
||||||
|
||||||
Chicago-Cleveland
|
||||||
Chicago-Cincinnati
|
||||||
Chicago-Carbondale
|
||||||
Chicago-St. Louis
|
||||||
St. Louis-Kansas City
|
||||||
Chicago-Quincy/Omaha
|
||||||
|
||||||
|
||||||
|
Source:
|
||||||
MWRRS Plan: Capital Investment by Corridor
|
|||
Corridor
|
Infrastructure
|
Train
Equipment
|
Total
|
|
|||
Chicago-Cleveland
|
|||
Chicago-Cincinnati
|
|||
Chicago-Carbondale
|
|||
Chicago-St. Louis
|
|||
St. Louis-Kansas City
|
$8932 |
||
Chicago-Quincy/Omaha
|
|||
|
|||
|
|||
TOTAL
|
|||
|
Source:
|
|||
The MWRRS plan calls for a phased implementation and identifies this as a reason for flexible management and institutional structures. It identifies several potential models for the institutional structure that would be ultimately needed for the multistate coordination. These models include ad hoc multistate committees, committees established by multistate agreement, or a joint-powers authority established through legislative action. The plan also calls for forging cooperative relationships with the private railroad companies (they own most of the rail rights-of-way) and the commuter railroads. Lastly, it exhorts the participating states to be "funding ready." The activities that the states may perform include the conduct of environmental impact assessments and preliminary engineering studies; advocacy for the 80/20 federal/state share; and gaining federal funding to conduct systemwide environmental review to satisfy National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and to "position the MWRRS project for receipt of federal grant funds and Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) loans."See Ibid., p. 24.
The
MWRRS plan is a notable achievement in that it is a collaborative effort of the
Midwestern state DOTs to plan for HSR in the absence of significant federal
support. The plan outlines the contours of HSR in the
Apart
from the regional-level efforts through the MIPRC and the MWRRS plan, the
Midwestern states, either individually or in groups, are also engaged in
planning and developing HSR. The next section documents the state-level efforts
to develop HSR in the
HSR Efforts within the States
At
present, nine Midwestern states, through participation in the planning process
and/or conduct of physical improvements, are working toward the development of
HSR in the
Illinois , Michigan , and Wisconsin
Illinois
Several
of the proposed high-speed lines (speeds up to 110 mph) pass through
Lastly,
the Chicago-St. Louis line, for the first forty miles out of
This track work is complete and involved several track-related improvements such as installation of ties, turnouts and concrete highway crossing surfaces, and construction of quad gates where train speeds are projected to exceed 90 mph. The gate construction was done as per the Illinois Commerce Commission's guidelines. The Commission paid approximately $18 million for the construction of gates. Vehicle detection loops were also installed. On this same corridor, IDOT, the FRA, and the Association of American Railroads are jointly developing and implementing a Positive Train Control (PTC) system. This technologically advanced system utilizes global positioning satellites to accurately determine train location. Advanced Train Control systems are a requirement mandated by the FRA whenever passenger service speed is in excess of 79 mph. The PTC system will allow safe operation at high-speeds and prevent a train from exceeding the authorized speed. The original contract for this project was $60 million, and the state's share was $12 million spread over several years.See John Schwalbauch, Chief, Bureau of Railroads, Illinois DOT, personal communication, 11/10/05. The entire state share has been obligated. The FRA contributed to this project through its "Next Generation HSR Program" for $48 million, and the nation's major freight railroads contributed $20 million.See Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06. The work on the PTC project is still going on. The existing maximum speed on this line is 79 mph.See U.S. DOT, FRA, Chicago-St. Louis HSR Project, pp. 1-3.
Parallel
with HSR-related improvements are the efforts of the consortium comprised of
the City of
The plan calls for the creation of 5 rail corridors, including one primarily for passenger trains; 25 new grade separations to eliminate many commuter delays; and the opening for commercial development of a key corridor in downtown Chicago.See Association of American Railroads, "Chicago Project/Create," http://www.aar.org/Create/Create_main.asp (accessed 4/3/06).
The
passenger line will also have a footprint for HSR.See
Travis, personal communication, 3/31/06. However, the plan has faced initial
financial hurdles with only $100 million authorized by the federal government
under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU).See
MIPRC, "Midwest SAFETEA-LU Rail Projects/Authorizations,"
http://www.miprc.org/portal/uploads/lkliewer/Midwest_SAFETEA_projects.doc
(accessed 4/6/06). Furthermore, CN, fearing that the project may never get
completed, has insisted on accelerating its portion of the program.See
"Fresh Blow to Rail Plan: Push to Relieve Local Freight Bottlenecks Loses
Canadian Nat'l," Crain's Chicago Business (January 16, 2006)
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=12ba94b7092a5c64287b719a388b92a8&_docnum=
1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkVA&_md5=028ceef560971ae32ffb7073425b2da8 (accessed
2/4/06). Successful implementation of this plan may
augur well for the future of railway operations, including HSR, in the
Michigan
The
Chicago-Kalamazoo-Detroit line, part of the Chicago Hub, is the only federally
designated high-speed line to pass through
Wisconsin
Two
proposed HSR lines--Chicago-Milwaukee-Madison-Minneapolis/St. Paul and
Wisconsin
DOT has projected the volume of freight on the private owned railroad line in
By 2020, 1,550 miles of
All
the proposed high-speed corridors, except for the Watertown-Madison and
Other
improvements include the purchase of the Milwaukee Amtrak Station for $1.4
million. A public-private sector venture to rehabilitate and improve the
Milwaukee Station is underway. The project is being funded with $2.6 million
from the Federal Transit Administration, state matching funds, and $1.4 million
in equity from Milwaukee Intermodal Partners LLC (MIP), a private developer. A
$2.9 million Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ)
grant has also been obtained to "rehabilitate the platforms and train
shed."See MIPRC, "Midwest Regional Rail
Initiative Update September 2004." The station, apart from the transportation
facilities, will also include retail and food service, and office space. As per
the contract signed between Wisconsin DOT and MIP, MIP will remodel, redevelop,
and manage the station.See
WisDOT, "Milwaukee Intermodal Terminal Renovation--Phase 1,"
http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/projects/state/amtrak-phase1.htm (accessed
3/30/06). The project is scheduled for a 2007
completion and is a "centerpiece of a downtown development program."See
Transportation Research Board (TRB), "Wisconsin's Passenger Rail
Development Program," Current Research and Development in Intercity Rail
Passenger Systems 11 (Fall 2005): 5,
http://trb.org/publications/irps/irps_11.pdf (accessed 04/01/06). Construction work was completed for the
$6.5 million passenger rail station project at the
Some
additional HSR-related studies have been conducted. A study of alternate routes
from
Furthermore,
Ohio
Several
portions of the federally-designated Chicago Hub run through the state of
Chicago-Indianapolis-Cincinnati
Cleveland-Columbus-Cincinnati (not included as part of the MWRRI plan)
Each of these lines has a proposed train speed of up to 110 mph. CSX owns and operates the Chicago-Indianapolis-Cincinnati line and the Chicago-Gary leg of the Chicago-Toledo-Cleveland line. NS owns the leg between Gary and Cleveland. On the Chicago-Indianapolis-Cincinnati line, there is heavy freight traffic (more than 50 million gross ton miles per mile) on the CSX-owned portion and very light freight traffic (less than 5 million gross ton miles per mile) on the rest of the line.See Indiana Department of Transportation, Indiana Rail Plan, http://www.in.gov/dot/div/multimodal/railroad/chapter_2.pdf (accessed 4/2/06). Amtrak operates the passenger rail service on both these corridors, with two daily trains on the Chicago-Cleveland line and one on the Chicago-Cincinnati line.See TEMS, Midwest Regional Rail System, p. 106.
The
State of
In part it is a consequence of the high cost associated with the development of high-speed passenger rail systems, which has led many policy makers to conclude that this business can best be handled by the private sector. Other explanations can be found in public doubts about the ability of intercity rapid rail systems to attract choosy travelers. And for some, the notion of fast trains and improved railbeds is little more than choochoo nostalgia.See TEMS and HNTB, Inc., The Ohio & Lake Erie Regional Rail Ohio Hub Study: Executive Summary, Prepared for the Ohio Rail Development Commission (ORDC) and the DOTs of Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania (October 2004), http://www.dot.state.oh.us/ohiorail/Ohio%20Hub/Website/ordc/OhioHubExecutiveSummary.pdf (accessed 12/6/2005).
Ohio
In
addition to being part of the Chicago Hub and MWRRI,
Ohio
Source: ENGAGE
Communications,
August 2005, p. 18.
The
feasibility study, The Ohio & Lake Erie Regional Rail Ohio Hub Study,
prepared by TEMS, Inc., and HNTB, Inc., proposes an 860-mile system consisting
of four intercity rail corridors that would serve 22 million people in the four
states of
Cleveland-Columbus-Dayton-Cincinnati (included in the Chicago Hub)
Cleveland-Toledo-Detroit (the Toledo-Detroit portion is included in the Chicago Hub and MWRRI)
Cleveland-Buffalo-Niagara Falls-Toronto (See Ohio Rail Hub Lines)
The study assumes a 20/80 state and federal financing share and notes that the "implementation is contingent upon establishing a national program with funding for federal funding for freight and passenger rail improvement projects."See Ibid., p. 4. The total cost of the project is approximately $3.2 billion.See Nicholson, personal communication, 5/19/06.
The Ohio Hub Plan has not yet been officially recognized by the U.S. DOT. That will not happen until the Tier 1 Programmatic Environmental Impact Study is prepared. ORDC hopes to begin that study later in 2006 or early in 2007.See Nicholson, personal communication, 11/7/05.
By
connecting the Chicago Hub/MWRRI with the Empire, Keystone Corridor, and Northeast
Corridors, the Ohio Hub has the potential to realize the dream of interregional
HSR in the
Ohio
Source:
Transportation Economics & Management Systems, Inc. and HNTB, Inc., The Ohio & Lake
Erie Regional Rail--
Indiana , Missouri , and Minnesota
The states of
Indiana
Three proposed HSR lines pass through
In 2003 the state legislature passed legislation supporting HSR specific environmental impact assessment.See MIPRC, "Midwest Regional Rail Initiative Update September 2004." The state is currently seeking funding for it.See FRA, "Chicago Hub Network," (accessed 1/4/06).
Missouri
The proposed
The
Other improvements made by the State
of
Missouri DOT is active in the MWRRI and the States for Passenger Rail Coalition. Some of the state legislators are involved in the Midwest High Speed Rail Association. In sum, the state is involved in high-speed-related initiatives because it does not want to be left out as other neighboring states move toward a better passenger rail system. The state would also want to be "in the know" of any new developments in state-supported passenger rail.See Massman, personal communication, 3/13/06.
Minnesota
HSR-related efforts in
Station area
planning efforts are taking place in the cities of
Assessment of the Case
As defined in this report, the
The Goals
The overarching goals of the Midwestern states are to increase connectivity, reduce trip times between major Midwestern cities, and provide multimodal connections to improve system access. The states have done a good job of conducting planning-related studies so that several of the Midwestern rail lines have succeeded in becoming part of the Chicago Hub. As a result, they are now recognized as lines of national significance and are eligible to obtain further federal grants. As several of the lines pass through multiple states, the Midwestern states have moved toward a more regional framework to plan for HSR. These efforts are reflected in the MWRRS and the Ohio Hub plans. The vision and the cooperation at the regional level can help in obtaining broad-based support for HSR. The support, in turn, can help in attracting national attention. However, the critics point out a couple of shortcomings of this vision, including the following:
High project cost--the present cost of funding the MWRRS plan is $7.7 billion (year 2002 estimates). Similarly, the estimated cost of the Ohio Hub plan is $3.2 billion. The high-cost result of the regional-level vision is a big stumbling block in obtaining funding for these plans.See John Bennett, AECOM Consult, personal communication, 10/5/05.
Difficulty buying
into the whole plan--some of the lines identified in the plans (for example,
Chicago-St. Louis) are logical choices as high-speed lines. However, as Drew
Galloway and Merrill Travis suggest, several other lines included in the Hub
may not be good candidates for HSR, since they are unlikely to achieve the
projected ridership. They propose that instead of pushing forward with the
entire regional HSR plan, the Midwestern states would be better served by
identifying the most promising city-pairs and demonstrating the feasibility of
HSR by actually running high-speed trains on these corridors.See Drew Galloway, Chief of Transportation
Planning Analysis, Amtrak, personal communication, 12/16/05; Travis, personal
communication, 12/8/05.
This demonstration, they believe, will help in garnering support for HSR in the
Measures of
Success
Apart from the revenue generated by proposed high-speed train service, Midwest HSR-related feasibility studies also typically point to such benefits as increased transportation alternatives, mobility, jobs, and real-estate values for the users. However, even proponents of Midwest HSR disagree on which of these benefits will accrue from HSR, which makes it difficult to effectively advocate for the high-speed rail system.See Schwalbach, personal communication, 11/10/05; Nicholson, personal communication, 11/7/05. Moreover, disagreement on the key benefits may affect the kind of funding the consortium can pursue and could lead to the public and elected officials questioning the success of the project before it has had a chance to prove itself.
An important issue related to the benefits of HSR is credibility. Critics like John Bennett and Joby Berman point out that the HSR-related feasibility studies often exaggerate the benefits while underestimating the costs.See Bennett, personal communication, 10/5/05; Joby Berman, Deputy Chief of Engineering, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, personal communication, 11/8/05. They note that the estimated ridership of several of the HSR lines is also suspect.See Ibid.
Funding
Sources and Strategies
In addition to affecting the actual implementation of the project, the kind of funding also affects the measures of success. For example, if funding from the "Job Access and Reverse Commute Program" is sought, then the number of jobs the rail system provides access to would determine the potential of success in getting the funding. There are several aspects to funding--federal funding, state and local funding, and private funding. This section reviews how the Midwestern states have fared in obtaining them.
Federal
Funding
Until now the federal government has
primarily funded HSR efforts in the
Importantly, most of the states have not shown the political will to move ahead and fund HSR without federal support. Further, the MWRRS plan is based on the assumption of an 80/20 federal/state match, even though this is unlikely to occur.See Emil Frankel, Senior Vice President, Parsons Brinckerhoff, personal communication, 11/7/05. Finally, it is also important to note that Midwest HSR will require operating subsidies during the initial "ramp-up period." Those opposed to the federal government providing operating subsidies point to the fact that the federal government does not provide operating subsidies to other modes like air and highway (although this excludes the Federal Aviation Administration, with its 100,000-plus employees, providing the nation's air traffic control system for free to the airlines).See Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06.
Another recent source of federal funding for transit, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), represents a case of missed opportunity for rail funding. SAFETEA-LU, which authorizes federal transit and highway programs through FY 2009, was signed into law by President Bush on August 10, 2005.See American Public Transportation Association, SAFETEA-LU: Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy for Users: A Guide To Transit-Related Provisions (Washington DC: APTA, September 2005), http://www.apta.com/government_affairs/safetea_lu/documents/brochure.pdf (accessed on 9/15/05). The four aspects of the act important to HSR include the following:
Provides a record level of federal transit investment: $52.6 billion over six years, an increase of 46 percent over the amount guaranteed in TEA 21
Increases annual guaranteed transit funding from a level of $7.2 billion in FY 2003 (the last year of TEA 21) to $10.3 billion in FY 2009
Retains annual funding guarantees to ensure long-term funding stability
Improves program deliverySee Ibid.
Thus, "even though funds are
present, they are not dedicated to passenger rail and there is no mention in
the bill about a state rail plan."See David Hunt, "State Rail
Plans--Legislative Update & Implications for SCORT," presented to
AASHTO Standing Committee on Rail Transportation (August 29, 2005).
The interviews conducted with state department of transportation representatives
show that almost none of the SAFETEA-LU money will be spent on the HSR lines in
the
State Funding
As per the 80/20 federal and state share advocated by the MWRRS and Ohio Hub plans, the funding from the states makes up 20 percent of the project cost. The ability and willingness of the states to come up with their share is important, because in its absence, the possibility of obtaining federal funding is bleak. Getting together their share of the 20 percent is not going to be an easy task for some states that may have to face significant opposition from other organizations within the state and convince an unsupportive legislature.See Tompkins, personal communication, 12/8/05, notes that at this point there is no political support for Nebraska's participation in the MWRRS. Some states are waiting for the federal money, which they hope will create incentive for obtaining local funding.See Ibid. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the MWRRS and the Ohio Hub plans are primarily technical documents prepared for the state DOTs. Hence, they do not necessarily reflect the states' political leadership's commitment to contribute the 20 percent states' share.
Private
Funding
In a few cases, public-private
partnerships have been forged to obtain local private funds for HSR-related
improvements. A public-private sector venture to rehabilitate and improve the
Milwaukee Station is underway. The project is being funded with $2.6 million in
Federal Transit Administration and state matching funds along with $1.4 million
in equity from Milwaukee Intermodal Partners, a private developer. Another
example of private funding and collaboration is the joint contributions of over
$20 million by Michigan DOT, Amtrak, and Harmon Industry to share costs of the
train control tests on the "Amtrak-owned portion of the corridor between
Stakeholders
There are two types of
stakeholders--internal and external. Internal stakeholders are the groups and
people directly involved in the project. In the case of HSR in the
Internal
Stakeholders
A number of internal stakeholders are involved in the Chicago Hub and MWRRI. The following paragraphs describe them and their roles.
Federal
Government
The federal government is a key
player. A relevant example is the Northeast corridor, in which Amtrak took the
lead and acted as the representative of the federal government. The federal
government has two major roles in the provision of HSR in the
Amtrak
Amtrak is a federally subsidized
railway company that owns some of the rail right-of-way and runs almost the
entire passenger rail service in the
Public opinion of
HSR--For a large proportion of people, Amtrak is synonymous with intercity
rail. Thus, public perception of Amtrak affects how people perceive HSR in
general. Several Midwestern states have had a lukewarm relationship with
Amtrak. In several cases, for reasons right or wrong, the public has a low
opinion of Amtrak. This low public opinion, in turn, hinders the case of HSR in
the
Advocate/partner/stakeholder--In
the initial stages of HSR in the
Operator of
HSR--Amtrak owns all the maintenance facilities and the ROW on 96 miles in
States and
Local Governments
States will play a major role in the
implementation of HSR in the
Partnership
potential--This is the measure used by the FRA to designate a project as a
Federal HSR Corridor. The partnership potential takes into account the kind of
agreements between the private ROW owners and the state department of
transportation. It also accounts for the ability of these entities to sustain
the project without further subsidy and to achieve a benefit-cost ratio of more
than one. The
Role of each state
and its level of interest and gain from the project--As mentioned earlier, in
the
Agreements among
the states--Several concrete agreements have to be reached amongst the
participating states for successful implementation of HSR in the
Private
Railroad Companies
Private railroad companies such as UP
own or lease almost all the rail lines on which HSR is proposed. These lines
are currently used to carry freight and several of them are already congested.
Addition of more frequent and high-speed passenger traffic will increase
congestion on these rail lines. Furthermore, the freight rail industry is in a
growth phase. In the early 1980s, the freight rail industry was deregulated so
the onerous fee and rate structure was gone. Globalization of the economy saw
the manufacturing industry shift to
The states would need to enter into detailed agreements with the
private railroad companies to address the issue of congestion, and sharing of
capital, maintenance, and operating costs. Several of the private railroad
companies are wary of the Midwestern states' HSR efforts. Merrill Travis notes
that the private railroad companies' reaction to the designation of federal
high-speed corridors was a mix of skepticism and concern.See Travis, personal communication, 3/31/06. NS
was concerned about the liability and sharing of the tracks. CSX had seen
enormous expansion of commuter rail on its tracks in
Moreover, private railroad companies
compete for rail-related funding. Historically, passenger rail was not funded
and most of the limited rail funding went to freight rails. This trend is still
seen in the way federal funds are allocated. In
External Stakeholders
In addition to the internal stakeholders, there are also several external stakeholders in the process.
Public and
Citizens Groups
Public and citizens groups are among
the most powerful stakeholders. They can influence the design of the project by
requesting more stations or they can try to change the station design or
location. For example, one of the stops on the Chicago-Milwaukee-Madison-Minneapolis/St.
Paul corridor is the
Some of the Midwestern states like
Elected officials
HSR in the
The role of the elected officials is also important as they have
the potential to negatively impact the performance of the system. The low
average speed of Amtrak trains is frequently attributed to its politically
driven route scheduling. "Most senators treat Amtrak as a low-grade
entitlement program," notes one congressional staff member.See Northeast Midwest Institute, "High
Speed Rail: Trop Peu, Trop Tard, Trop Amtrak,"
http://www.nemw.org/highspeedrail.htm (accessed 10/14/05). In
the case of HSR in the Midwest, if a train would stop multiple times between
Special Interest Groups
Rail passengers and environmental
groups are two influential special interest groups. Rail passengers are playing
a vital role as advocates of the system. They have been responsible for wooing
the elected officials and conducting outreach. A notable example of their work
is the outreach done by the Wisconsin Association of Rail Passengers (WISARP)
in
Environmental groups also are
important stakeholders in HSR projects.
the bullet-train proposal and particularly the California HSR Authority have been embroiled in controversy. When CHRSA released its Draft Environmental Impact Report and Environmental Impact Statement in January, 2004, it was immediately criticized for deficiencies and inaccuracies. Critics claimed that CHRSA had paid foreign environmental consultants for supporting opinions of various recommendations included within the report. Accusations of other possible conflicts of interest have brought CHRSA under scrutiny and further complicated the bullet-train proposal.See Ibid.
In the case of the
Media
The CHSRA example illustrates the importance of using the media.
The CHSRA devised a plan for public outreach. In addition to conducting surveys
and running focus groups and town hall meetings, the CHSRA has a website and
publishes quarterly updates. These efforts have increased public awareness and
support for HSR in
Airline Industry
HSR is a potential threat to the airports and airline companies. Over medium distances of 300 to 600 miles, HSR and air travel times may be comparable. The ticket prices can be lower in the case of rail and a train also may offer a more sociable and comfortable environment compared to an aircraft. The chances of a working HSR system are higher if both the modes are compatible and the relationship between them symbiotic. However, such a relationship rarely exists. The French TGV is a classic example of how ridership in trains increased and the air-passenger-traffic volume decreased upon the introduction of HSR (although, at the time of implementing the first French HSR project from Paris to Lyons, the French government was able to order the then state-owned airline to reduce its available seat-miles by 40 percent, which is not an alternative in today's deregulated environment).See Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06.
Similar fears from Southwest Airlines halted the HSR effort in
Bus Companies and Automobile Lobby
HSR-related efforts in the
The automobile lobby has always very forcefully represented the interests of its constituents. This lobby will stand against investing large sums of money in transit, especially if the funds come at the expense of highways. There has been no visible opposition from this lobby so far. However, this silence does not mean acceptance of HSR by the automobile lobby, but rather is an indication that the automobile lobby, at the moment, does not consider HSR a serious threat.See Harnish, personal communication, November 10, 2005.
Other Local
Transit Agencies
One of the main transit agencies is the Metra, the commuter rail
that operates in the six-county
Possible
Issues and Next Steps
Looking forward, two areas stand out in which issues probably will arise and next steps need to be addressed. These are the areas of (1) liability and eminent domain and (2) the impact of the design and number of stations on train speed.
Liability and
Eminent Domain
Since the HSR lines in the
Station
Planning and Train Speed
The design and number of stations has a significant impact on train speed. HSR works best if the end-communities are 300 to 600 miles apart. However, communities that will not be served by HSR or where the train may not stop are likely to oppose it. States could potentially address this issue with more public outreach and education aimed at illustrating the negative effects of frequent stoppages and the positive effects of augmented connections to stations.
The Keystone Corridor
In terms of the definition utilized in
this report, the Keystone Corridor provides a successful example of the
development of incremental high-speed rail (HSR) in the
First designated by the U.S.
Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) as a federal HSR corridor in December
1998, the Keystone Corridor serves as a central connector between the
The Keystone Corridor, Philadelphia to Harrisburg
Source:
Railroad Corridor
, volume 2 (
An extension of the federal
designation to
The Keystone Corridor, Philadelphia to Pittsburgh
Note that the
current maximum mph on the section between Philadelphia
and Harrisburg
Source: Parsons
Brinckerhoff/Gannett Fleming,
Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985), p. 4.
The Context
Current high-speed efforts are focused
on the 104 miles of track between
Between
By an agreement between SEPTA and
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), revenue service is
prohibited west of Parkesburg and actual commuter rail service runs between
Along the section beginning at
Philadelphia and ending at Thorndale, Amtrak makes stops at 5
stations--Philadelphia, 30th Street, Ardmore, Paoli, Exton, and Downington.
SEPTA makes stops at 23 stations, which are leased by Amtrak. In fact, Amtrak
owns all the stations along the entire Keystone Corridor between and including
Two freight railroads also have
operating rights on all or part of the corridor: Norfolk Southern (NS), which
owns the nonelectrified portion of the corridor from
Though NS freight traffic is variable,
there are between 5 and 12 train movements daily over parts of the corridor
between
History and
Development of the Corridor
The Keystone Corridor traces its roots
to the early 1800s and was initially envisioned as a means for competing with
The First
Attempt at HSR
In the mid-1960s, in response to the
Federal High Speed Ground Transportation Act, the
The commonwealth agreed to provide $2 million, while the PRR would provide the remaining $2.5 million for the purchase of the coaches. While awaiting the new coaches (the Metroliner became available on the Northeast Corridor in 1969), the PRR would utilize electrified commuter cars from SEPTA. The latter part of the agreement was instituted, but before the coaches could be delivered, the PRR merged with the New York Central Railroad, becoming Penn Central. When Penn Central declared bankruptcy on June 21, 1970, the agreement fell apart and the Capitaliner coaches came to be used as part of the Metroliner service on the NEC. Ironically, though the SEPTA commuter cars remained in usage for several more years, they were eventually replaced by the original Metroliners as upgrades were made on the NEC.See PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, p. 1-3.
On April 1, 1976, the Philadelphia-Harrisburg portion of the Keystone Corridor was conveyed by the Penn Central Transportation Company to Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) by the U.S. Railway Administration. One month later, it was transferred to Amtrak as a branch line of the NEC. In the initial years following the transfer, Amtrak spent roughly $30 million on improvements which allowed the maximum authorized speed to be raised to 90 mph on sections of the line.See Ibid. Nevertheless, overall service on the corridor remained poor and ridership dropped significantly between FY 1980 and FY 1990, from 1,024,700 to 334,963.See R.L. Banks & Associates, Delta Development Group, Gannett Fleming, and Urban Engineers, Keystone Corridor Assessment and Business Plan: Technical Report--Task IV, Business Plan, Submitted to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, December 23, 1997 [hereafter, KC Business Plan: TR--Task IV], Appendix, p. 3.
Though most of this decrease in
ridership occurred before 1988, ridership fell further as a result of Amtrak's
decision that year to substitute diesel locomotives on most of its
Philadelphia-Harrisburg trains, because it was experiencing a shortage of electric-powered
locomotives. The change necessitated a shift in the end-point of the line
within
As Amtrak ridership plunged, expenses
on the corridor continued to outpace revenues. According to a U.S. General
Accounting Office (U.S. GAO) fact sheet developed for Senators Arlen Specter
and John Heinz, in FY 1985, based on fully allocated costs (including
depreciation, overhead, corporate costs, and retirement), the
Philadelphia-Harrisburg line lost $26.8 million.See U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO),
"Amtrak: Cost of Amtrak Railroad Operations," Fact Sheet for the
Honorable Arlen Specter and the Honorable John Heinz, US Senate,
GAO/RCED-86-127SF (Washington DC: GAO, March 1986), p. 1,
http://archive.gao.gov/d13t3/129743.pdf (accessed 2/1/06). It
is no surprise that by the late 1980s, Amtrak was considering ending its
intercity service between
A Second
Attempt at High-Speed Rail
While Amtrak was deciding what to do
with its service on the corridor, the
Pursuant to the discussions with the other compact members, State Representatives Rick Geist (R, 1979- ) and Joseph Kolter (D, 1969-1982) sponsored legislation to establish a Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (PHSIRPC) as a means for fulfilling the commonwealth's obligations to the Compact. The legislation, which was adopted unanimously and signed into law (Act 144) by Governor Dick Thornburgh (R, 1979-1987) on December 22, 1981, stipulated that the commission would have "overall responsibility, power and duty to investigate, study and make recommendations concerning the need for and establishment and operation of a high-speed intercity rail passenger system in the commonwealth." It further noted that the commission, "without limiting its authority to study related subjects," would address the following issues:
Need and demand
for high-speed intercity rail in
Level of HSR service required to meet that demand
System, equipment, roadbed, ROW, and other technical and technological options
Location and extent of specific routes
Financing, ownership, and operating options
Impact and interaction of HSR on existing freight rail and existing or proposed passenger rail systems
Present or
proposed operation of similar systems in the
Issues and problems relating to local and commuter rail service, including fundingSee 55 P.S. hub-and-spoke 684 (2005).
Two years later, the PHSIRPC began its work when Robert J. Casey became the Executive Director on February 14, 1983. With $4.2 million in state, federal, and international funding, the commission issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) on April 23, 1983, for a general engineering consultant to perform a feasibility study that would address need, demand, levels of service, system equipment and ROW requirements, cost, economic impacts, and financing. On June 28, 1983, Parsons Brinckerhoff/Gannett Fleming (PBGF) was selected to do the study, with the contract formally executed two months later. In addition, the commission also hired STV Engineers, Inc., to serve as an oversight consultant to assess PBGF's findings.See Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (PHSIRPC), Final Report: Executive Summary (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, January 1990), 3; also see PBGF, "Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report," pp. 1-4 and 1-5.
The feasibility study was split into three phases that would take place over roughly three years. Phase 1 would provide a broad framework and assess the feasibility of various HSR options. Phase 2 would develop a detailed market survey, along with cost estimates and technical requirements based on a more detailed evaluation of the ROW and technology options presented in Phase 1. Phase 3 would focus on implementation, with a financial package, an assessment of the resulting economic development that could be spurred by HSR in the corridor, and recommendations related to ownership, operations, and coordination with other agencies.See PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, Phase I, Prepared for Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985), 2-1; also see PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Executive Summary, Phase 1, Prepared for the Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985), p. 1.
The Phase 1 report was released in February 1985. It presented the results of an examination of five alternatives, identified as Alternatives A through E. Alternative A was the baseline, "do nothing" alternative and was used only as a reference point for the others. Alternative B described the best service that could be achieved with minor improvements on the existing ROW without dedicated high-speed passenger tracks. This alternative was eventually dropped because it fell short of the commission's goals. Alternatives C, D, and E all described various types of HSR service on different alignments as shown in See Attributes Related to HSR Alternatives C, D, and E.
Attributes
Related to HSR Alternatives C, D, and E
|
|||
Feature
|
C: Best
Service on Existing ROW
|
D: Best
Service on New ROW w/ Steel-Wheel on Steel-Rail Technologies
|
E: Best
Service on New ROW with Maglev
|
|
Electromagnetic suspension ( |
|||
|
Canadian LRC (tilt-body) --diesel |
French TGV |
||
|
Trip Time-- |
|||
|
5.1 million/11.7 million |
5.9 million/12.7 million |
||
|
Capital Cost--Target Estimates4 |
$1.85B-$2.20B (depending upon diesel or electric option) |
||
|
Source: PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, Phase 1, prepared for the Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985). |
|||
Alternative
D was assessed both with and without a stop at
The preliminary financial analysis provided in the Phase 1 report suggested that Alternative C, with the diesel option, would provide a 9 percent risk-free rate of return.See PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, p. 11-5. Alternative C with the electric-powered option was slightly less but still acceptable. However, Alternatives D and E had much higher risk and much lower rates of return associated with them. As the Executive Summary of the report suggested, "...with their greater total public benefits but only somewhat greater cash revenues, [Alternatives D and E] are more suitable to a public financing viewpoint."See PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Executive Summary, p. 13. Alternative C, on the other hand, had the potential for a public-private partnership that could leverage available public support and tax benefits to woo private investment. Thus, Phase 1 scoped out a preliminary financing strategy for Alternative C.
The Phase 1 report suggested that a private enterprise would construct, own, and operate the HSR service under Alternative C. The commonwealth could provide a $350 million loan, with an interest rate of 7 percent over 38 years. Other institutions, which were not identified, would provide loans of $1.1 billion, with interest rates of 13 percent over 38 years. The private enterprise would make an equity investment equal to the loan provided by the commonwealth, assuming base demand, with another $40 million needed to meet the high demand projections. Funding for new and/or enhanced stations along the route would be derived from real estate developers and/or local governments.See PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, pp. 12-6 to 12-7.
Seventeen months after the Phase 1 report was issued, PBGF presented their report, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Market Demand, supplemented by Market Demand: Technical Memorandums, as part of the work being conducted under Phase 2. The analysis followed the "Standard Guidelines for Revenue and Ridership Forecasting" that were concurrently being developed by the High Speed Rail Association (and were approved in September 1986) in response to the varied quality and comprehensiveness of earlier HSR revenue and ridership forecasts.See For the approved guidelines, see High Speed Rail Association, "Standard Guidelines for Revenue and Ridership Forecasting," (September 25, 1986), copy of the document provided by Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.
The market demand analysis reviewed the different market segments, including trips made for the purposes of commuting, business, tourism, schools, or other types of trips. It assessed travel behavior and the likelihood of new HSR being able to change that behavior. Two items stand out from this report:
First, the estimated ridership for these alternatives was modified after this additional analysis. New projections for base demand in the year 2000 increased, while projections for high demand decreased. The new projections for HSR (Alternative D in Phase 1) were 5.5 million (up from 5.1) for base demand and 7.8 million (down from 11.7) for high demand; for Maglev (Alternative E in Phase 1), the revised projections were 6.2 million (up from 5.9) and 8.8 million (down from 12.7), respectively.See PBGF, "Market Demand" in Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Executive Summary, Prepared for the Pennsylvania high Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (July 1986), executive summary final page.
Second, and more interesting in terms of the broader dynamics involved with HSR planning in the commonwealth, though the earlier Phase 1 report suggested that Alternative C was the only one conducive to private investment given the rates of return and levels of risk, the market demand report focuses on Alternatives D and E (though they are not labeled as such), further noting that "it was assumed that public and private support will be necessary to actually implement a major transportation improvement...."See Ibid., 1.
Why there is an apparent disconnect between the Phase 1 initial analysis and the discussion in the market demand study is unclear. Market Demand was only part of Phase 2, which was never fully completed, so there may have been other information that was not included in the document. More likely, however, this apparent disconnect reflected different views and priorities within the commission, and a shift in the perceived prospects for financing that occurred after the drafting of the Phase 1 Report.
Some evidence for this latter conjecture is apparent in the commission's final report. As one of its last official acts, the PHSIRPC voted for Maglev as its first choice; however, it recognized that "a substantial minority" of the commission's members believed the commonwealth should consider alternatives strategies if financial assistance was not forthcoming. Among the findings, the report notes "a modest upgrading of Amtrak service would offer significant travel-time improvements and may be least expensive, but it provides the least economic benefit among the options studied."See PHSIRPC, Final Report, p. 4. This reveals the different goals and objectives, which likely were prioritized in differing orders by the various commission members. Finally, the Chairman's report provided at the beginning of the final report noted that "speed sells," while later discussion regarding financing suggested that there had been overtures made by the West German magnetic levitation consortium, Transrapid International. The commission recommended that the commonwealth authorize negotiations with Transrapid on financial assistance.See Ibid., 1.
Regardless, the recommendations were "dropped" even before they were formally announced in the commission's final report. The final report was published two years after Governor Robert Patrick Casey (D, 1987-1995) entered office and terminated the commission's staff, in effect halting the work on the HSR study. Interestingly, the Governor felt the need to take this action four months before the commission's mandated expiration date of December 31, 1987.See 55 P.S. § 691 (2005); also see PHSIRPC, Final Report, p. 4, and the Chairman's Report. No reason was publicly stated; there was speculation that airline interests may have been involved, but this was always denied.See Harry Stoffer, "US Air Invests in Maglev Rail Project," Pittsburgh-Post Gazette (April 2, 1993), LexisNexis (retrieved 4/4/06).
The actual reason behind
the governor's decision to close down the project may never be known. However,
it is clear that the combined presence of the leadership, the means, and the
authority to implement HSR was missing in
The Most
Recent Attempt--Incremental Rail
By the early 1990s, the situation had improved somewhat in terms of overall losses, but operating ratios for Philadelphia-Harrisburg in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 were still as high as 4.23 and 5.76, respectively.See U.S. GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: Financial Performance of Amtrak's Routes, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO/RCED-98-151 (Washington DC: GAO, May 1998), p. 32. Operating ratio is defined as expenses divided by revenues. Thus a ratio less than 1 means a line was profitable and more than 1 means a line lost money. In the case of the Philadelphia-Harrisburg line, Amtrak's expenses were over four times more than revenues in FY 1994 and over five times higher in FY 1995. During those same years, Amtrak's direct operating costs outpaced revenues by $8.4 million (FY 1994) and $8.6 million (FY 1995).See Ibid, p. 34. Further, as a result of deferred maintenance (in excess of $170 million by the mid- to late-1990s), the infrastructure continued to deteriorate. Maximum authorized speeds dropped as low as 70 mph in several locations along the line, with actual speeds significantly lower.See FRA, Technical Monograph, 1:ES-2. The deferred maintenance figure comes from R.L. Banks & Associates, Delta Development Group, Gannett Fleming, and Urban Engineers, Keystone Corridor Assessment and Business Plan: Executive Summary, Submitted to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, December 23, 1997 [hereafter, KC Business Plan: ES], p. 19.
In 1995, believing the corridor to be strategically important to the state's overall transportation system, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania entered into an agreement with Amtrak to increase the state's operating assistance on the Keystone Corridor. Pursuant to the agreement, PennDOT increased its operating subsidies to $2.6 million per year primarily to increase frequency of service on the Keystone Corridor and to make capital improvements.See U.S. GAO, Surface Infrastructure: High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States, Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-99-44 (Washington DC: GAO, January 1999), 49, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99044.pdf (accessed 2/1/06). (The agreement is now updated on an annual basis.) Even with the subsidies from PennDOT, the operating ratio for Philadelphia-Harrisburg in FY 1997 was 2.15, with a $22 loss per passenger ($41 without the subsidy).See U.S. GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: Financial Performance of Amtrak's Routes, pp. 6 and 40.
During this same period, PennDOT began to develop a vision for incremental improvements on the corridor, believing that the Keystone Corridor was a "diamond in the rough." PennDOT undertook several surveys to determine what passengers on the line wanted and found that new equipment would be most welcome. They also contracted with R. L. Banks & Associates to conduct a study on the corridor that would provide additional background and assessment on what needed to be done and what could be done.See Richard Peltz, Alternate Federal Co-Chair, Appalachian Regional Commission, personal communication, 4/4/06. Peltz was formerly Deputy Secretary for Local & Area Transportation at PennDOT (1995-2002).
In 1997, R.L. Banks
& Associates, et al. submitted to the
The
report described the corridor's state of disrepair, noting that scheduled trip
times between
The resulting business plan was premised on four potential scenarios that included frequencies and service levels rather than just speed. The plan reviewed SOGR with 10 daily round-trips and SOGR plus improvements to allow 110 mph service, with 10 daily round-trips (4 express); 12 daily round-trips (5 express); or 14 daily round-trips (6 express) (See Service Alternatives under SOGR).
Organizationally,
the business plan suggested that the
Revenues and financing for the capital improvements would come from several sources. First, ridership was expected to increase over the next decade, and with the proposed changes, it was expected that it would range anywhere from just below 400,000 to just over 845,000 by 2005, depending upon whether improvements included SOGR only or 110 mph service, and whether the low estimate, best estimate, or high estimate was used.See Ibid., and Appendix A, pp. 27-28. Capital projects would be financed with 30-year bonds, and federal and state government grants were also expected. Additional revenue sources would derive from the parking facilities at a number of the stations on which it was expected that a fee would be levied, from utility occupations of the railroad ROW, and from advertising and concessions. See Ibid., pp. 42-59. See Costs of SOGR and High-Speed Service (millions of 1996 $) shows the estimated costs to bring the Keystone Corridor to SOGR and then potentially add high-speed rail service.
Costs of SOGR and High-Speed
Service (millions of 1996 $)5
|
|||
Component
|
SOGR
|
110 mph Service (incremental cost)
|
125 mph Service (incremental cost)
|
Track
|
|||
Structure
|
|||
Stations
|
|||
Signals/Communications
|
|||
Power
Supply/Distribution
|
|||
Engineering
(7%)
|
|||
Contingency
(10%)
|
|||
Total
|
|||
|
Source: R.L. Banks &
Associates, et al., Keystone
Corridor Assessment and Business Plan: Executive Summary ,
Submitted to the |
|||
Service Alternatives under
SOGR
|
||||
|
|
SOGR
|
110 mph
|
110 mph
|
110 mph
|
Frequency
(round-trips/day)
|
||||
Trip time
savings (minutes)
|
||||
Ridership,
Best Estimate 2005 (trips)
|
||||
Annual Fare
Revenues, Best Estimate 2005 ($ millions)6
|
||||
Annual
Operating Expenses, 2002 ($ millions)a
|
||||
|
Source: R.L. Banks & Associates, et al., Keystone Corridor Assessment and Business Plan: Task IV Business Plan. |
||||
With respect to the final recommendations of the business plan, the general feeling within PennDOT at the time was that unless Amtrak was going to stop their services or end in some fashion, the state would prefer to work with Amtrak on the corridor and resulting services, rather than taking them over. Thus, while utilizing some of the information from the business plan and strengthening its focus on more modest improvements to enhance overall service, PennDOT entered into formal discussions with Amtrak regarding the future of the corridor.
Keystone
Corridor Improvement Plan--Memoranda of Agreement
In
December 1998 the Keystone Corridor received designation by U.S. DOT as a
federal HSR corridor, providing the possibility of reinvigorating the line. In
September 1999 the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) allocated $500,000 to
begin preliminary designs to eliminate the three remaining at-grade public
crossings on the corridor between
Based
on the MOA, Amtrak and the
of
At the time, the Keystone Corridor and other HSR efforts around the country were viewed by Amtrak as supporting its five key business strategies, which were the following:
Building a market-based network
Delivering consistent quality service
Leveraging public-private partnershipsSee TrainWeb, "Highlights of Amtrak's FY1999-2002 Strategic Business Plan: Maximizing Amtrak's Potential in the Marketplace," http://www.trainweb.com/amplan/hilites.html (accessed 12/8/05).
Work on the track improvements was to begin in 2000, with the first AEM-7 locomotive trainsets placed in service by the end of the year. However, it quickly became clear that Amtrak might have difficulty upholding its part of the Agreement, given its worsening financial crisis and the possibility of a shut-down of Amtrak service. In fact, on January 13, 2000, PennDOT provided close to $3 million in emergency funding to finance Amtrak's internal costs in administering the planned work.See "Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and National Railroad Passenger Corporation for The Keystone Corridor Improvement Program" [hereafter, "KCIP Agreement 2002"], April 4, 2002, p. 2.
Keystone Corridor within PennDOT's Statewide Planning
During this same period, PennDOT was reviewing its overall statewide transportation planning process, with a view toward developing an integrated multimodal plan involving highways, rail, aviation, waterways, and freight and passenger services. In January 2000, PennDOT issued PennPlan Moves! Pennsylvania Statewide Long-range Transportation Plan, 2000-2025 , which identified ten statewide goals:
Promote the safety of the transportation system.
Retain jobs and expand economic opportunities.
Make transportation decisions that support land-use planning objectives.
Maintain, upgrade, and improve the transportation system.
Inform and involve the public, and improve customer service.
Advance regional and corridor-based planning.
Develop transportation alternatives and manage demand.
Promote smooth, easy connections between transportation alternatives.
Ensure accessibility and reliability of the system for everyone.See Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), PennPlan Moves! Pennsylvania Statewide Long-range Transportation Plan, 2000-2025 (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: PennDOT, January 2000), 48, http://www.dot.state.pa.us/internet/web.nsf/infoPennPlanMoves?OpenForum (accessed 2/2/06).
The plan identified a number of specific objectives and potential projects tied to these goals. Among them were several directly related to the Keystone Corridor:
Objective 14--Improve physical and service upgrades on the Keystone Corridor
Objective 19--Eliminate grade crossings
Objective 20--Develop a passenger rail needs assessment
Of note, the improvement of the physical and service upgrades on the corridor was believed to serve all the above goals except for number six.See Ibid., p. 51.
In December 2001, the Pennsylvania Statewide Passenger Rail Needs Assessment (Objective 20) was formally issued. Its purpose was to provide a broad evaluation of the need for statewide intercity passenger rail in key transportation corridors. The plan prioritized the corridors; developed a baseline comparison across the corridors; developed profiles for those with high potential; and identified needs and opportunities, as well as future policy considerations for intercity passenger rail service within the commonwealth.See Pennsylvania State Transportation Advisory Committee (TAC), Pennsylvania Statewide Passenger Rail Needs Assessment: Technical Report" (Harrisburg: TAC, December 2001), p. 6.
After reviewing existing intercity rail services within the commonwealth--Keystone Corridor (Harrisburg-Philadelphia); the Northeast Corridor (Boston-NYC-Philadelphia-Washington DC); the Capitol Limited Corridor (Chicago-Pittsburgh-Washington DC); the Lake Shore Limited Corridor (Chicago-Toledo-Erie-Buffalo-Albany-NYC/Boston); and the Pennsylvanian-Three Rivers Corridor (Chicago-Pittsburgh-Harrisburg-Philadelphia-NYC)--the assessment evaluated existing, proposed, and potential intercity rail corridors. It established five criteria with varying weights for comparing corridor potential. In descending order of import, the five criteria included the following:
Infrastructure and ROW availability
Major destinations and trip generators
System continuity and connectivity
Market size, population, employment trends
Transportation patterns and conditionsSee Ibid., p. 38.
The
Philadelphia-Harrisburg Keystone Corridor was given a high rating on all five
factors. It was already heavily used by intercity and commuter rail,
particularly between
Of note, the report gave mixed marks for the Harrisburg-Pittsburgh port