MTI Report 06-03
HIGH-SPEED RAIL PROJECTS
IN THE UNITED STATES:
IDENTIFYING THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS
PART 2
November 2006
Allison L. C.
de Cerreño, Ph.D.
Shishir Mathur, Ph.D.
a report cosponsored by the
a publication of the
Mineta Transportation Institute
Created by Congress in 1991
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many individuals from around the
country aided the authors in the creation of this report. Some provided their
time for interviews and reviews of the different drafts, while others helped to
find written documentation of historical and current facts. In particular,
Allison C. de Cerreño would like to thank the following individuals for their
contributions to the Northeast Corridor and Keystone Corridor cases: Charlie
Banks, R.L. Banks & Associates; John Bennett, Amtrak; James Boice,
Connecticut Department of Transportation; Eric Bugaile; Peter Cannito, MTA
Metro-North; David Carol, Charlotte Area Transit System; Calvin Cassidy,
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation; Mortimer Downey, PB Consult, Inc.;
Toby Fauver, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation; David Gunn; Emmanuel
"Bruce" Horowitz, ESH Consult; David Matsuda, Office of Senator
Lautenberg; Richard Peltz, Appalachian Regional Commission; Catherine
Popp-McDonough, SEPTA; Michael Saunders, Federal Highway Administration; Bill
Schafer, Norfolk Southern Corporation; Peter Stangl; Brian Sterman, FTA; Louis
Thompson, Thompson, Galenson and Associates, LLC; and Thomas Till, Discovery
Institute. She also thanks Dan Leavitt, California High-Speed Rail Authority
for his time in updating her on the current status of high-speed rail efforts
in
Special thanks are extended to George Haikalis, who provided a number of historical documents no longer easily found, including the summary report that Dr. de Cerreño in search of the Keystone Corridor's earlier attempts at high-speed rail which were all but forgotten, and Steven Greenfield of Parsons Brinckerhoff, who managed to track down the full preliminary report on the feasibility of high-speed rail in the Keystone Corridor. And, finally to members of Amtrak's Planning and Analysis and Government Affairs Departments who provided several documents and the speed restriction tables for the NEC, spent time with the author showing her how to interpret them, and arranged for additional discussions on numerous technical questions.
Shishir Mathur would like to thank the following individuals for their contributions to the Chicago Hub case: John Bennett, Amtrak; David Carol, Charlotte Area Transit System; Emmanuel "Bruce" Horowitz, ESH Consult; Merrill Travis, Lower Cost Solutions, Inc,; John Schwalbauch, Illinois Department of Transportation; Ethan Johnson, Wisconsin Department of Transportation; Stuart Nicholson, the Ohio Rail Development Commission; John Hey, Iowa Department of Transportation; Ellis Tompkins, Nebraska Department of Roads; Rodney Massman, Missouri Department of Transportation; Mike Bedore, Michigan Department of Transportation; Drew Galloway, Amtrak; Joby Berman, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority; Emil Frankel, Parsons Brinckerhoff; Rick Harnish, Midwest High Speed Rail Coalition; and Rick Tidwell, Metra.
Finally, both authors extend their thanks to Howard Permut, MTA Metro-North, for his thoughtful comments and suggestions during numerous rounds of the report. Thanks are offered also to MTI staff, including Research Director Trixie Johnson, Research and Publications Assistant Sonya Cardenas, Webmaster Barney Murray, and Graphic Artist Shun Nelson. Editing and publication services were provided by Catherine Frazier and Project Solutions Network, Inc.
Table
of Contents
Key Findings and Lessons Learned 2
Goals, Definitions, and Methodology 9
Update on Earlier Cases and HSR Initiatives 10
Challenges in Implementing HSR in the States 14
The Chicago Hub and Midwest Regional Rail Initiative 17
History of HSR in the Midwest 17
HSR Efforts within the States 28
Possible Issues and Next Steps 50
History and Development of the Corridor 56
History and Development of the Corridor 92
Findings, Lessons, and Themes 139
Key Findings and Lessons Learned 139
List of Figures
Map of Proposed Midwest Regional Rail System 24
The Keystone Corridor, Philadelphia to Harrisburg 53
The Keystone Corridor, Philadelphia to Pittsburgh 54
Bypass of 30th Street Station 77
Ownership of and Operations on the NEC 89
NEC Weekday Revenue Passenger Train Movement, 2006 91
Recommended Time Line from Redirection Study 105
List of Tables
Lines Comprising the Chicago Hub 21
MWRRS Plan: Train Travel Times 25
MWRRS Plan: Operating Revenues, Costs, and Operating Ratio 26
MWRRS Plan: Capital Investment by Corridor 27
Attributes Related to HSR Alternatives C, D, and E 60
Costs of SOGR and High-Speed Service (millions of 1996 $) 65
Service Alternatives under SOGR 65
Funding Share of KCIP Program Elements ($ millions) 69
Funding Schedule ($ millions) 70
KCIP Program Element Costs, 2002 vs. 2004 ($ millions) 73
Revised Funding Schedule ($ millions) 74
Program Elements: Total Expenditures per Time Period ($ millions) 74
December 2004 Revised Funding Schedule ($ millions) 75
Planned Work on the Keystone Corridor in FY 2005 75
NEC Ridership: DC-NYC, 1968-1976 (thousands) 94
Cost of Program Elements by State ($ millions) 100
PEIS and Redirection Study Program Elements and Costs ($ millions) 104
NECIP Budget Revisions, 04/79-01/82 ($ millions) 108
Redirection Study/FPEIS Recommendations vs. Actual Improvements 110
Estimated Cost of Trip-Time-Related Improvements ($ millions) 117
Funds Obligated under NECIP, FY 1976-1995 ($ thousands) 120
NEC Goals for and Current Status of Trip Times and Frequencies 133
Executive Summary
In August 2005, the Mineta
Transportation Institute issued the report, High-Speed Rail Projects in the
This report is, in essence, volume 2 of the previous study. Like the first study, this report also used a comparative case study approach based on an extensive literature review as well as interviews with primary and secondary sources. Sources in the literature review were drawn from historical, governmental, and legal documents, as well as business plans, feasibility studies, and related media articles.
This effort adds to the earlier work
with three additional cases--the Chicago Hub consisting of eight lines in eight
states; the Keystone Corridor between
Some of the key findings and lessons learned from the previous study are bolstered by these three cases. Furthermore, this study provides several additional themes for consideration, the following in particular:
The Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridor experiences call into question whether they can be replicated in areas where Amtrak (National Railroad Passenger Corporation) does not own the line.
The cases in the report help highlight the tension between needing to keep costs low and finding the needed funds so that goals can be met.
Finally, together with the
examples from the first study, the cases in this study suggest that an
important discussion needs to occur about whether efforts aimed at incremental
HSR (that is, rail that uses existing technologies and rights-of-way [ROW], but
undergoes improvements to allow for speeds up to 150 mph) are more likely to
meet with success in the current political climate than are those aimed at new
HSR (rail requiring new ROW and technologies imported from Europe or Asia that
typically allow for speeds in excess of 200 mph). The answer to this question
could change the course of both policies and funding aimed at instituting HSR
in the
Key Findings and Lessons
Learned
While each case summary provides a discussion of key findings and lessons specific to that corridor, the cases presented in this report, along with those of the first report, provide several broader findings and lessons. This section highlights these findings, along with lessons that will prove important for HSR initiatives around the country.
Leadership, Means, and
Authority
Leadership coupled with means and
authority are required to implement change. HSR projects are expensive, take
many years to complete, and require coordination among and between a number of
key actors and stakeholders. The case studies of this report and its
predecessor, which included
In the Keystone Corridor, this set of
factors has been the most important in contributing to its current success. In
earlier attempts at HSR in
Given the need for the combination of these three factors to be present for successful HSR outcomes, the Chicago Hub faces several obstacles. First, despite the support of several state legislators and state department of transportation (DOT) officials, as a whole, the Hub has lacked strong and consistent leadership. Second, funding for the Hub has not been secured (though two small segments have funding for certain improvements). Third, no formal authority or structural process that would make HSR-specific improvements has been identified. The end result is that while some coordination exists, specific roles and responsibilities are unclear, and overall, the states and other stakeholders are not moving in concert with each other to implement HSR.
Who Should
Play These Roles?
The actors providing the leadership, the means, and the authority to implement change may vary according to specific circumstances and factors. On the NEC, the federal government and Amtrak played the central roles, while on the Keystone Corridor, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT); and Amtrak, under the leadership of David Gunn, played these critical roles. In both cases, Amtrak could provide authority since it owned the lines, or in the case of the NEC, most of the line. On the Keystone Corridor, because the costs associated with the modifications were not extensive, the state government and Amtrak could include them in their annual budgets, thus providing the means and avoiding the need for political campaigns to build support.
On the NEC, the costs were more
significant as were the challenges faced by multiple owners, multiple states,
and many more operators. Thus, the involvement of the federal government was
more important. On the Chicago Hub, progress has been piecemeal, with only two
relatively small segments progressing forward at this point--one between
Need for a
Federal Vision
The Keystone Corridor demonstrates the potential for HSR improvements without major federal support. Nevertheless, given the experience on the Northeast Corridor and the overall lack of progress on HSR in the United States over the past four decades, there is good reason to believe that a federal vision for HSR is needed along with a national network strategy for rail that combines passenger, freight, non-HSR intercity, and HSR rail, and addresses how each also links to nonrail modes of transportation. Along with this, federal funding is also important, especially for the larger and multistate projects. Indeed, as the experience of the NEC demonstrates, without the public funding provided by the federal government, even the successes that have been realized would not have occurred.
Reiterating the findings in the first
study, without a broad vision, or at least guidance and standards, states will
continue to fill the void with multiple types of models--constitutional
amendments and legislation (like Florida and California), multistate compacts
(like the Chicago Hub), public-private partnerships (like what was envisioned
during the 1980s in Pennsylvania)--without a sense of what is most likely to
succeed. Worse, without a national network strategy for rail, the
Clear Identification of Goals
and Benefits
The goals for any major capital investment project are rarely unidimensional. However, in the case of HSR, the goals are not only multidimensional but also sometimes conflicting. While some focus on the need for the highest speeds, others argue that accessibility, frequency, and on-time performance are more important (basically, more efficient and reliable intercity rail). These different goals lead to very different markets, technologies, funding sources, and overall outcomes, with those focusing on speeds proposing new HSR and those focusing on other attributes looking toward incremental HSR.
Developing clear and consistent goals around which to build a consensus is important for successful outcomes in HSR. On the Keystone Corridor, the unsuccessful effort in the 1980s that resulted in a recommendation for magnetic levitation (Maglev) had multiple goals--economic development, higher rail share of travel, travel-time savings--with no clear prioritization among them. Indeed, a substantial minority of those involved in the effort did not fully support the final recommendation, believing that lower cost alternatives should be considered. In contrast, the most recent effort on the Keystone Corridor stressed two much more straightforward goals--bringing the line up to a state of good repair and improving trip times.
Equally important, all the key
stakeholders (in this case, operators) along the Keystone Corridor see some
benefit accruing from the goals and related projects entailed in the current
effort. Amtrak will increase and enhance its service, with corresponding ridership
and revenue increases. PennDOT will be able to fulfill several objectives
related to its broader transportation goals for the corridor.
The NEC's experience has been somewhat mixed in terms of goals and benefits. The earliest goals were identified in terms of reducing trip times, but they were negotiated based on political need rather than objective criteria or analysis, and whether they were fully agreed upon by all the stakeholders involved is not clear. In terms of benefits, as early as 1978, the Federal Railroad Administration and Amtrak came under criticism for not addressing the concerns and needs of the various stakeholders along the corridor, notably the commuter and freight railroad operators. Under the later electrification project on the north-end of the corridor, similar concerns were raised as well as additional concerns by other nonoperating stakeholders along the NEC, and as was seen, finding operational support and funding for those improvements that do not clearly benefit certain stakeholders has proven difficult.
To date, the overarching goals of the Midwestern states are to increase connectivity, reduce trip times between major Midwestern cities, and provide multimodal connections to improve system access. These goals have meant that the Midwestern states have moved toward a more regional framework to plan for HSR, which, critics point out, has meant inclusion of corridors that have little potential to attract ridership, and an estimated project cost that, in light of limited funding, is almost impossible to finance. Further, the matrix of benefits in the Chicago Hub remains very much unclear. For the Chicago Hub to have any opportunity for success, it is critical that the private railroad companies that own the majority of the ROW, Metra (the commuter rail), and the environmental groups be included in the planning process so they can work together to develop and prioritize goals and identify benefits.
Themes for Consideration
In addition to the findings and lessons learned, some important themes for consideration bear mentioning.
Private ROW Ownership and
Success
Can the
NEC and the Keystone Corridor be replicated without ownership of the ROW by a
single passenger rail entity?
On both the NEC and the Keystone Corridor, ownership of the ROW by Amtrak proved critical. Ownership of the ROW allowed Amtrak the authority to more easily deal with capital investment decisions, signaling, dispatching, power distribution, and maintenance decisions to implement HSR. It also reduced costs since there was no need to purchase new ROW and, in the case of the Keystone Corridor Improvement Program (KCIP), allowed the avoidance of certain environmental requirements because most of the improvements occurred in the current ROW and did not reflect a new service in themselves.
In contrast, except for one relatively
small segment, the Chicago Hub is not owned by Amtrak, and unlike the NEC on
which the other owners were public entities, the Chicago Hub's spokes are
primarily owned by various private railroad companies. The result is similar to
what is seen on the western portion of the Keystone Corridor, between
Harrisburg and Pittsburgh--there is no clear authority for implementing HSR,
and the costs to do so will be much more significant since in many cases
separate tracks will be required for passenger trains operating at higher
speeds. In fact, the only section of the Chicago Hub that has been upgraded in
speed in recent years (95 mph) is the Amtrak-owned segment from just outside of
The Cost of Keeping Costs Lower
Keeping costs lower helps,
but there are costs to "doing it on the cheap."
Among the key findings on the Keystone Corridor was that because the costs to implement change in the most recent effort were reasonable, they were more easily accepted and achieved. This was also seen on the two segments of the Chicago Hub where track improvements have been made to eventually allow for 110 mph service; associated costs were relatively low and could be budgeted within an already existing program. However, as the experience on the NEC demonstrates, trying to reduce costs too much can lead to the situation where the goals are left unmet. From the earliest years of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP) through the later electrification project on the north-end, there was a reluctance to commit the necessary funding to fully complete the project. The end result of this lack of commitment was difficulty in meeting many of the goals that were set. Worse, without the necessary funding, the plans had to be redrawn and revised numerous times, leading to delayed implementation and higher costs in the long term. Finally, making decisions based on the trip-time savings and costs of each project individually ignored the possibility of reaping greater savings by combining the projects.
Moving Beyond U.S.
Is the United States
The first study suggested that there
were opportunities for both incremental and new HSR in the
Should the
focus be on incremental HSR?
Perhaps the most resounding theme for
consideration is that in the
Nevertheless, this is a point worth
serious consideration, given the costs of new HSR; current political apathy
(and in some cases outright antipathy) surrounding rail more broadly and new
HSR more specifically; the perceived risks associated with "unproven"
HSR technologies in the United States; and the fact that the few places where
success has occurred (even if modest in many respects) have implemented
incremental HSR. While incremental rail may be viewed by some as
"settling" for the second-best choice, without stronger and
consistent financial and political commitment on both the part of the federal
government and the states, it may be the only means for having any HSR in the
Introduction
In August 2005, the Mineta Transportation Institute issued the report, High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States: Identifying the Elements for Success . The report noted that since the 1960s, high-speed ground transportation (HSGT) has "held the promise of fast, convenient, and environmentally sound travel for distances between 40 and 600 miles."See C. de Cerreño, et. al., High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States., p. 1. After briefly discussing the difference in experiences with HSGT between the United States and its Asian and European counterparts, the report proceeded to review three U.S. cases--Florida, California, and the Pacific Northwest--as a means for identifying lessons learned for successfully implementing high-speed rail (HSR) in the United States.
This report follows and adds to the earlier study, also using a comparative case study approach, with three additional cases--the Chicago Hub, the Keystone Corridor, and the Northeast Corridor. While some of the lessons learned and themes for consideration from the previous study are bolstered by these three cases, additional lessons are more apparent, particularly as one looks to the two cases--the Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridor--in which higher speeds have been achieved.
Goals, Definitions, and
Methodology
As with the earlier report, the goal of
this study is to identify lessons learned for successfully implementing HSR in
the
Given the early stages of most of these projects, "success" is defined by whether a given HSR project is still actively pursuing development or funding. However, in the case of the Northeast Corridor, a fuller discussion of success is provided, since HSR has been implemented on that corridor for some time now.
With respect to other definitions, HSR
in the
Incremental HSR--uses existing
technologies and rights-of-way (ROW) but makes improvements to allow for speeds
up to 150 mph (though most projects in the
New HSR--requires new ROW
and technologies imported from Europe or
Additionally, some efforts have been
aimed at implementing an entirely new type of technology--magnetic levitation
(Maglev)--now in revenue service in
Update on Earlier Cases and HSR
Initiatives
Since the publication of the first
report, there has been little movement on HSR in the
At the time the work was being
conducted on the first report, the situations in
Florida
In 2006 the Florida High Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA) issued its report to the governor and legislature. The report noted that although the amendment had been repealed, the FHSRA continued negotiations with Fluor-Bombardier, which had provided the first-ranked proposal responding to FHSRA's 2002 Request for Proposals. The negotiations have centered on certain potential changes to the proposal that would incorporate several attributes of the second-ranked proposal, including the addition of a second track in certain locations. At the same time, FHSRA has remained in discussions with Global Rail Consortium, which submitted the second-ranked proposal and has solicited additional information from them, specifically related to the levels of private participation in the project.See Florida High Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA), 2006 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, http://www.floridahighspeedrail.org/uploaddocuments/p25 2006_Report_to_the_Governor_and_the_Legislature.pdf (accessed 6/9/06), 2; also see C. de Cerreño, et.al., High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States, pp. 27-43.
In addition to continuing negotiations
and discussions with Fluor-Bombardier and Global Rail Consortium, the FHSRA
also changed its preferred route option for the new HSR, which would connect
No new recommendations were offered by the FHSRA to the governor and legislature, though the Authority reiterated the 2005 recommendation to complete the two key memoranda of agreement--one with Florida Department of Transportation and one with the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority--which are needed before the Record of Decision can be finalized. FHSRA believes that these steps need to be taken to preserve the ability to locate a new HSR system in the existing public right-of-way along a key section of the corridor, even if HSR is not pursued at this time.See FHSRA, 2006 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, pp. 3-4.
Nevertheless, given that funding for
HSR was cut by Governor Jeb Bush in fiscal year (FY) 2004 and has not been
reintroduced, and that the Governor's office remains not only unsupportive but
also actively opposed to HSR, at the moment the situation appears rather bleak,
at least for new HSR in
California
In some ways
In November 2005, the California High Speed Rail Authority
(CHSRA) unanimously approved the certification of the final Environmental
Impact Statement. This was followed by the Federal Railroad Administration's
issuance of a Record of Decision. Yet, after more than a decade of working
toward the implementation of a 700-mile, new HSR system in
In January 2006, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger announced a $222 billion, 10-year public works bond, which while mentioning HSR, did not include any funding for it. As a result, members of the Legislature began discussing postponing a $9.95 billion HSR bond measure from November 2006 to November 2008 (it had already been postponed from the November 2004 ballot).See California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA), "What's New," http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/wahts_new/default.asp (accessed 6/1/06). On June 29, 2006, the legislature voted unanimously to postpone the vote again.See "Lawmakers Vote to Axe High-Speed Rail Bond From November Ballot," Associated Press, http://www.sacbee.com/state_wire/story/14271924p-15082433c.html (accessed 6/29/06).
According to Dan Leavitt, Deputy
Director of the CHSRA, postponing the ballot has serious consequences for HSR
in
The Current Cases
The three cases together in this report provide some interesting comparisons to each other and to the earlier cases as well. While the Chicago Hub remains in the planning stages (and significantly behind California and Florida), the Keystone Corridor is in the midst of incremental improvements to increase speeds up to 110 mph (with potential additional increases over time), and the Northeast Corridor (NEC) is the closest the United States comes to true HSR, with speeds of up to 150 mph in certain locations.
Like
Unlike
The Chicago Hub (2,313 miles) is significantly larger than either the NEC (456 miles) or the Keystone Corridor (104 miles). There are two segments of the Chicago Hub that are roughly the same length as the Keystone Corridor (118 miles and 80 miles) and on which some improvements are being made. However, each of these segments is significantly smaller than the full Hub, each represents only a portion of two different spokes of the Hub, and unlike the Keystone Corridor, they do not connect the end-point cities.
The costs associated with change on the full extent of the Chicago Hub are significantly higher than with the most recent efforts on the Keystone Corridor (though on the segments mentioned above, the costs are comparable).
The ROW is largely owned by private freight operators on the Chicago Hub; on the Keystone Corridor, Amtrak (National Railroad Passenger Corporation) owns the portion of the corridor on which incremental improvements are being made; and on the NEC, Amtrak owns the majority of the line, with public agencies owning the remainder.
There is no clear overall authority or dominant player on the Chicago Hub, while on the Keystone Corridor, Amtrak and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation clearly played the lead role.
Owing in part to its multistate nature, there is no formal institutional framework on the Chicago Hub as one sees on the Keystone Corridor or even on the NEC.
Who benefits and by how much is less clear with the Chicago Hub than with the Keystone Corridor or the NEC. Worse, while on the Keystone Corridor all the stakeholders see some benefit, on the Chicago Hub some stakeholders may see a negative impact if HSR is implemented.
As will be seen after reviewing the experiences on the Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridors, all of these points call into question the ability of the Chicago Hub to move from early planning to full implementation of HSR.
Challenges in Implementing HSR
in the States
In an October 1994 article by Louis
Thompson, "High-Speed Rail (HSR) in the
HSR carries large volumes of people using limited space.
HSR consumes less energy and emits less pollution than automobiles and airplanes under certain conditions.
HSR can operate directly in and out of city centers, unlike airplanes.
HSR's marginal operating cost per person is small once the infrastructure is built, so that if volumes are high enough, this mode can provide the lowest-cost travel.See Louis S. Thompson, "High-Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States--Why Isn't There More?" Japan Railway & Transport Review (October 1994): pp. 34-35.
On the other hand, Thompson also notes several disadvantages:
HSR can be extremely expensive to build (particularly for new HSR).
HSR is limited in coverage, since it can only go where there are tracks (and finding those tracks and ROW today is increasingly difficult).
HSR is not a proven mode in
the
Additional challenges for HSR in the
To date, in most attempts to implement
HSR in the
Outline of the Report
The subsequent pages of this report
explore the cases in depth, tracing historical efforts aimed at implementing
high-speed rail as well as the most recent challenges and status of each of the
corridors. The next section of this report covers the Chicago Hub and Midwest
Regional Rail Initiative, describing the initiatives being taken by each state
to move HSR forward in the region and providing an assessment of the various
stakeholder interests that will need to be taken into account as the effort
progresses. The fourth section explores the Keystone Corridor, tracing several
unsuccessful attempts aimed at implementing HSR in the
The Chicago Hub and Midwest
Regional Rail Initiative
The Midwest, with
The
Nevertheless, the Chicago Hub and Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) together serve as a counterpoint to the experiences of the Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridor. The Chicago Hub and MWRRI demonstrate the difficulty in moving HSR initiatives forward without the combined presence of leadership, means, and authority. They also demonstrate the difficulty in trying to implement an HSR network that crosses multiple states in the absence of significant political and financial support from the federal government.
History of HSR in the Midwest
Historically, the motivation to plan for HSR in the
However, development of HSR in the
The Early Attempts
One of the first attempts to examine the feasibility of HSR in
the
All of these studies were conducted in
parallel with and sometimes as a result of regional-level efforts to develop
HSR in the
Because the beneficial service of and profitability of a high speed intercity rail passenger system would be enhanced by establishing such a system which would operate across state lines it is the policy of the states party to this compact to cooperate and share jointly the administrative and financial responsibilities of preparing a feasibility study concerning the operation of such a system connecting major cities in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri, and any other State which subsequently becomes a participant through enactment of the compact.See Missouri Revised Statutes, Transportation Services, § 680.175 (August 1997), "Interstate High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Network Compact," http://ssl.csg.org/compactlaws/intercityhighspeedrail.html (accessed 4/3/06).
The compact further noted that:
The states of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri and all other states which subsequently enter into this compact, hereinafter referred to as "participating states," agree to, upon adoption of this compact by the respective states, jointly conduct and participate in a high speed intercity rail passenger feasibility study by providing such information and data as is available and may be requested by a participating state or any consulting firms representing a participating state or the compact. It is mutually understood by the participating states that such information shall not include matters not of public record or of a nature considered to be privileged and confidential unless the state providing such information agrees to waive the confidentiality.See Ibid.
Although the compact did not result in actual development of regional HSR, and was ultimately repealed by many of the participating states, it represented the first formal attempt by a group of Midwestern and Eastern states to study the feasibility of developing a regional HSR system.
Interest in HSR in the Midwest received
a boost in 1990 when a group of high-level public and government officials
toured
The purpose of the report was, "to
investigate the economic and financial potential for constructing and operating
a HSR system in one of two corridors...between Chicago and Minneapolis-St. Paul."
The corridors examined were a southern corridor linking
Similar interest in exploring the
potential for HSR in the Chicago-Detroit line led the DOTs of Illinois,
Federal Action--Chicago
In 1991 the federal government, under
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) called for
selection of not more than five corridors to be designated as HSR corridors.
These included the
While the earlier regionwide effort--through the Interstate High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Network Compact--was unsuccessful, renewed regional efforts were made in the form of the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission (MIPRC) and the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI).
Renewed
Regional Efforts--MIPRC and MWRRI
Under the auspices of the Midwestern
Legislative Conference (MLC), the pro-HSR legislators of several Midwestern
states formed a task force in December 1996. A regional association of state
legislatures representing 11 Midwestern states (
Over the next four years, the task
force decided to create the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission
(MIPRC) through the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Compact drafted by the
task force. The states of
While the legislators were garnering
political support for HSR, the state DOT officials joined efforts to prepare a
regional plan for HSR. This effort gave rise to a loose consortium of state DOT
officials called the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI), of which the
MIPRC is supportive. The MWRRI "began in 1996 under the auspices of the
Mississippi Valley Conference--a regional division of the American Association
of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)."See Indiana High Speed Rail Association, "A
History of the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative,"
http://www.indianahighspeedrail.org/history.htm (accessed 12/1/05). The
representatives of the state DOTs of Indiana,
The MWRRS Plan
The MWRRS plan, as per its latest version prepared in 2004, envisions trains carrying passengers between the region's big cities at speeds up to 110 mph. This speed was picked as the upper limit, because the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) dictated that no at-grade crossings would be allowed at speeds at or over 125 mph, and that "some positive barrier device" would be required for train speeds from 110-125 mph. No such barrier system was found to be practical.See Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06. An estimated 13.6 million passengers are expected to annually travel on this system with the full implementation of the MWRRS by the year 2025.See Ibid. The MWRRS Plan elements include the following:
Use of 3,000 miles of existing rail right-of-way that is largely owned by private freight railroads and to a much smaller extent by Amtrak and Metra.
Operation of a hub-and-spoke
passenger rail system with
Introduction of modern, high-speed trains operating at speeds up to 110 mph.
Provision of multimodal connections to improve system access.See Transportation Economics & Management Systems, Inc. (TEMS), Midwest Regional Rail System: A Transportation Network for the 21st Century: Executive Report (September 2004), 5, http://www.dot.state.wi.us/projects/state/docs/railmidwest.pdf #search=%22midwest%20regional%20rail%20system%3A%20a%20%22 (accessed 12/1/06).
The overarching goals of the MWRRS plan are to increase connectivity, reduce trip times between major Midwestern cities, and provide "multimodal connections to improve system access."See Ibid. The plan proposes to achieve the goals through a network of 110 mph high-speed rail lines connecting major Midwestern cities. Additional networks of 90 mph and 79 mph lines and feeder bus routes would link passengers to the 110 mph lines and improve system access. See Map of Proposed Midwest Regional Rail System shows a map of the Midwest Regional Rail System with the rail lines and bus feeder routes proposed in the MWRRS plan.
The first of the series of business plans for MWRRS was published in 1998. Since then the plan has been updated twice--in 2000 and 2004--with additional work done each time to fine tune the plan elements and estimate its economic benefits. The latest report in this series is due in 2007. A major component of the 2007 report will be the assessment of economic benefits at the micro (community) level. The report will identify the monetary value of the economic benefits to each community served by the system. According to the Approved Project Briefing,
The Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) Steering Committee has requested and received FRA planning funds in response to a $250,000 earmark in the FY 2004 Transportation Appropriation. These funds require a 50/50 state/federal match and generate $500,000 in effort. The funds will provide consultant support for MWRRI planning, public involvement, engineering, and environmental work during a three-year period from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2008. The project costs under this Approved Project Briefing will fund and support the work of the MWRRI Steering Committee as it pursues additional funding and the implementation of the plan at the state and federal level. In addition to the $250,000 FRA funds, each of the eight participating states has agreed to contribute $31,250 over three years.See The Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT), "Approved Project Briefing: Midwest Regional Rail Initiative Phase VI," http://www.dot.state.oh.us/ohiorail/Project%20Briefings/May%202005/State%20of%20Wisc%20-%20MWRRI%20 Briefing.htm (accessed 9/20/05).
Map of Proposed Midwest
Regional Rail System
Source:
Executive Report, 2004, p. 6.
The majority of the lines identified in the MWRRS plan are part of the federally designated Chicago Hub. However, there are several key differences as follows:
The Chicago Hub only
includes federally designated high-speed lines, while the MWRRS, apart from
including all the high-speed lines of the Chicago Hub (except for the
Cincinnati-Columbus-Cleveland line) also proposes other rail lines with speeds
ranging from 79 mph to 110 mph. The additional lines in the MWRRS include:
The MWRRS plan is multimodal in nature. It seeks to link the HSR network with the bus system through the feeder bus routes (See Map of Proposed Midwest Regional Rail System).
The 2004 MWRRS plan, titled "Midwest Regional Rail System: A Transportation Network for the 21st Century," aims to achieve substantial travel-times savings, as shown in See MWRRS Plan: Train Travel Times.
MWRRS Plan: Train Travel
Times
|
|||
City Pairs
|
MWRRS
|
Current Service
|
Time Reduction
|
Chicago-Detroit
|
|||
Chicago-Cleveland
|
|||
Chicago-Cincinnati
|
|||
Chicago-Carbondale
|
|||
Chicago-St. Louis
|
|||
St. Louis-Kansas City
|
|||
Chicago-Omaha
|
|||
Chicago-St. Paul
|
|||
Chicago-Milwaukee
|
|||
|
Source: |
|||
The plan projects the system as a whole to be financially sustainable at the operating level (see See MWRRS Plan: Operating Revenues, Costs, and Operating Ratio for projected operating revenues, costs, and operating ratio) and calls for a mix of funding sources for financing the capital costs. The plan calls for an 80/20 share of the federal and state funds to finance the capital costs. The other funds include those generated from the system-related economic activities.
The plan has identified two major components of the capital costs--infrastructure and train equipment. The total capital investment is estimated to be $7.7 billion (in 2002 dollars), of which $1.1 billion will be for train equipment and the remaining $6.6 billion for infrastructure. The total cost is projected to be phased over a 10-year period. The "major capital improvements include track replacement and upgrades, additional sidings, signal and communication systems, and highway-railroad grade-crossing improvements as necessary to support intercity passenger speeds of up to 110 mph as well as concurrent freight and commuter rail operations."See TEMS, Midwest Regional Rail System, p. 15. See MWRRS Plan: Capital Investment by Corridor identifies the capital investment by corridor.
MWRRS Plan: Operating Revenues, Costs, and Operating Ratio
|
||||||
MWRRS
Summary Financial Statistics
|
Operating
Revenue (Millions of 2002 $)
|
Operating
and Maintenance Cost (Millions of 2002 $)
|
Operating
Ratio1
|
|||
|
|
||||||
|
||||||
Chicago-Cleveland
|
||||||
Chicago-Cincinnati
|
||||||
Chicago-Carbondale
|
||||||
Chicago-St. Louis
|
||||||
St. Louis-Kansas City
|
||||||
Chicago-Quincy/Omaha
|
||||||
|
||||||
|
||||||
|
Source:
|
||||||
MWRRS Plan: Capital Investment by Corridor
|
|||
Corridor
|
Infrastructure
|
Train
Equipment
|
Total
|
|
|||
Chicago-Cleveland
|
|||
Chicago-Cincinnati
|
|||
Chicago-Carbondale
|
|||
Chicago-St. Louis
|
|||
St. Louis-Kansas City
|
$8932 |
||
Chicago-Quincy/Omaha
|
|||
|
|||
|
|||
TOTAL
|
|||
|
Source:
|
|||
The MWRRS plan calls for a phased implementation and identifies this as a reason for flexible management and institutional structures. It identifies several potential models for the institutional structure that would be ultimately needed for the multistate coordination. These models include ad hoc multistate committees, committees established by multistate agreement, or a joint-powers authority established through legislative action. The plan also calls for forging cooperative relationships with the private railroad companies (they own most of the rail rights-of-way) and the commuter railroads. Lastly, it exhorts the participating states to be "funding ready." The activities that the states may perform include the conduct of environmental impact assessments and preliminary engineering studies; advocacy for the 80/20 federal/state share; and gaining federal funding to conduct systemwide environmental review to satisfy National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and to "position the MWRRS project for receipt of federal grant funds and Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) loans."See Ibid., p. 24.
The
MWRRS plan is a notable achievement in that it is a collaborative effort of the
Midwestern state DOTs to plan for HSR in the absence of significant federal
support. The plan outlines the contours of HSR in the
Apart
from the regional-level efforts through the MIPRC and the MWRRS plan, the
Midwestern states, either individually or in groups, are also engaged in
planning and developing HSR. The next section documents the state-level efforts
to develop HSR in the
HSR Efforts within the States
At
present, nine Midwestern states, through participation in the planning process
and/or conduct of physical improvements, are working toward the development of
HSR in the
Illinois , Michigan , and Wisconsin
Illinois
Several
of the proposed high-speed lines (speeds up to 110 mph) pass through
Lastly,
the Chicago-St. Louis line, for the first forty miles out of
This track work is complete and involved several track-related improvements such as installation of ties, turnouts and concrete highway crossing surfaces, and construction of quad gates where train speeds are projected to exceed 90 mph. The gate construction was done as per the Illinois Commerce Commission's guidelines. The Commission paid approximately $18 million for the construction of gates. Vehicle detection loops were also installed. On this same corridor, IDOT, the FRA, and the Association of American Railroads are jointly developing and implementing a Positive Train Control (PTC) system. This technologically advanced system utilizes global positioning satellites to accurately determine train location. Advanced Train Control systems are a requirement mandated by the FRA whenever passenger service speed is in excess of 79 mph. The PTC system will allow safe operation at high-speeds and prevent a train from exceeding the authorized speed. The original contract for this project was $60 million, and the state's share was $12 million spread over several years.See John Schwalbauch, Chief, Bureau of Railroads, Illinois DOT, personal communication, 11/10/05. The entire state share has been obligated. The FRA contributed to this project through its "Next Generation HSR Program" for $48 million, and the nation's major freight railroads contributed $20 million.See Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06. The work on the PTC project is still going on. The existing maximum speed on this line is 79 mph.See U.S. DOT, FRA, Chicago-St. Louis HSR Project, pp. 1-3.
Parallel
with HSR-related improvements are the efforts of the consortium comprised of
the City of
The plan calls for the creation of 5 rail corridors, including one primarily for passenger trains; 25 new grade separations to eliminate many commuter delays; and the opening for commercial development of a key corridor in downtown Chicago.See Association of American Railroads, "Chicago Project/Create," http://www.aar.org/Create/Create_main.asp (accessed 4/3/06).
The
passenger line will also have a footprint for HSR.See
Travis, personal communication, 3/31/06. However, the plan has faced initial
financial hurdles with only $100 million authorized by the federal government
under the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A
Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU).See
MIPRC, "Midwest SAFETEA-LU Rail Projects/Authorizations,"
http://www.miprc.org/portal/uploads/lkliewer/Midwest_SAFETEA_projects.doc
(accessed 4/6/06). Furthermore, CN, fearing that the project may never get
completed, has insisted on accelerating its portion of the program.See
"Fresh Blow to Rail Plan: Push to Relieve Local Freight Bottlenecks Loses
Canadian Nat'l," Crain's Chicago Business (January 16, 2006)
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=12ba94b7092a5c64287b719a388b92a8&_docnum=
1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkVA&_md5=028ceef560971ae32ffb7073425b2da8 (accessed
2/4/06). Successful implementation of this plan may
augur well for the future of railway operations, including HSR, in the
Michigan
The
Chicago-Kalamazoo-Detroit line, part of the Chicago Hub, is the only federally
designated high-speed line to pass through
Wisconsin
Two
proposed HSR lines--Chicago-Milwaukee-Madison-Minneapolis/St. Paul and
Wisconsin
DOT has projected the volume of freight on the private owned railroad line in
By 2020, 1,550 miles of
All
the proposed high-speed corridors, except for the Watertown-Madison and
Other
improvements include the purchase of the Milwaukee Amtrak Station for $1.4
million. A public-private sector venture to rehabilitate and improve the
Milwaukee Station is underway. The project is being funded with $2.6 million
from the Federal Transit Administration, state matching funds, and $1.4 million
in equity from Milwaukee Intermodal Partners LLC (MIP), a private developer. A
$2.9 million Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ)
grant has also been obtained to "rehabilitate the platforms and train
shed."See MIPRC, "Midwest Regional Rail
Initiative Update September 2004." The station, apart from the transportation
facilities, will also include retail and food service, and office space. As per
the contract signed between Wisconsin DOT and MIP, MIP will remodel, redevelop,
and manage the station.See
WisDOT, "Milwaukee Intermodal Terminal Renovation--Phase 1,"
http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/projects/state/amtrak-phase1.htm (accessed
3/30/06). The project is scheduled for a 2007
completion and is a "centerpiece of a downtown development program."See
Transportation Research Board (TRB), "Wisconsin's Passenger Rail
Development Program," Current Research and Development in Intercity Rail
Passenger Systems 11 (Fall 2005): 5,
http://trb.org/publications/irps/irps_11.pdf (accessed 04/01/06). Construction work was completed for the
$6.5 million passenger rail station project at the
Some
additional HSR-related studies have been conducted. A study of alternate routes
from
Furthermore,
Ohio
Several
portions of the federally-designated Chicago Hub run through the state of
Chicago-Indianapolis-Cincinnati
Cleveland-Columbus-Cincinnati (not included as part of the MWRRI plan)
Each of these lines has a proposed train speed of up to 110 mph. CSX owns and operates the Chicago-Indianapolis-Cincinnati line and the Chicago-Gary leg of the Chicago-Toledo-Cleveland line. NS owns the leg between Gary and Cleveland. On the Chicago-Indianapolis-Cincinnati line, there is heavy freight traffic (more than 50 million gross ton miles per mile) on the CSX-owned portion and very light freight traffic (less than 5 million gross ton miles per mile) on the rest of the line.See Indiana Department of Transportation, Indiana Rail Plan, http://www.in.gov/dot/div/multimodal/railroad/chapter_2.pdf (accessed 4/2/06). Amtrak operates the passenger rail service on both these corridors, with two daily trains on the Chicago-Cleveland line and one on the Chicago-Cincinnati line.See TEMS, Midwest Regional Rail System, p. 106.
The
State of
In part it is a consequence of the high cost associated with the development of high-speed passenger rail systems, which has led many policy makers to conclude that this business can best be handled by the private sector. Other explanations can be found in public doubts about the ability of intercity rapid rail systems to attract choosy travelers. And for some, the notion of fast trains and improved railbeds is little more than choochoo nostalgia.See TEMS and HNTB, Inc., The Ohio & Lake Erie Regional Rail Ohio Hub Study: Executive Summary, Prepared for the Ohio Rail Development Commission (ORDC) and the DOTs of Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania (October 2004), http://www.dot.state.oh.us/ohiorail/Ohio%20Hub/Website/ordc/OhioHubExecutiveSummary.pdf (accessed 12/6/2005).
Ohio
In
addition to being part of the Chicago Hub and MWRRI,
Ohio
Source: ENGAGE
Communications,
August 2005, p. 18.
The
feasibility study, The Ohio & Lake Erie Regional Rail Ohio Hub Study,
prepared by TEMS, Inc., and HNTB, Inc., proposes an 860-mile system consisting
of four intercity rail corridors that would serve 22 million people in the four
states of
Cleveland-Columbus-Dayton-Cincinnati (included in the Chicago Hub)
Cleveland-Toledo-Detroit (the Toledo-Detroit portion is included in the Chicago Hub and MWRRI)
Cleveland-Buffalo-Niagara Falls-Toronto (See Ohio Rail Hub Lines)
The study assumes a 20/80 state and federal financing share and notes that the "implementation is contingent upon establishing a national program with funding for federal funding for freight and passenger rail improvement projects."See Ibid., p. 4. The total cost of the project is approximately $3.2 billion.See Nicholson, personal communication, 5/19/06.
The Ohio Hub Plan has not yet been officially recognized by the U.S. DOT. That will not happen until the Tier 1 Programmatic Environmental Impact Study is prepared. ORDC hopes to begin that study later in 2006 or early in 2007.See Nicholson, personal communication, 11/7/05.
By
connecting the Chicago Hub/MWRRI with the Empire, Keystone Corridor, and Northeast
Corridors, the Ohio Hub has the potential to realize the dream of interregional
HSR in the
Ohio
Source:
Transportation Economics & Management Systems, Inc. and HNTB, Inc., The Ohio & Lake
Erie Regional Rail--
Indiana , Missouri , and Minnesota
The states of
Indiana
Three proposed HSR lines pass through
In 2003 the state legislature passed legislation supporting HSR specific environmental impact assessment.See MIPRC, "Midwest Regional Rail Initiative Update September 2004." The state is currently seeking funding for it.See FRA, "Chicago Hub Network," (accessed 1/4/06).
Missouri
The proposed
The
Other improvements made by the State
of
Missouri DOT is active in the MWRRI and the States for Passenger Rail Coalition. Some of the state legislators are involved in the Midwest High Speed Rail Association. In sum, the state is involved in high-speed-related initiatives because it does not want to be left out as other neighboring states move toward a better passenger rail system. The state would also want to be "in the know" of any new developments in state-supported passenger rail.See Massman, personal communication, 3/13/06.
Minnesota
HSR-related efforts in
Station area
planning efforts are taking place in the cities of
Assessment of the Case
As defined in this report, the
The Goals
The overarching goals of the Midwestern states are to increase connectivity, reduce trip times between major Midwestern cities, and provide multimodal connections to improve system access. The states have done a good job of conducting planning-related studies so that several of the Midwestern rail lines have succeeded in becoming part of the Chicago Hub. As a result, they are now recognized as lines of national significance and are eligible to obtain further federal grants. As several of the lines pass through multiple states, the Midwestern states have moved toward a more regional framework to plan for HSR. These efforts are reflected in the MWRRS and the Ohio Hub plans. The vision and the cooperation at the regional level can help in obtaining broad-based support for HSR. The support, in turn, can help in attracting national attention. However, the critics point out a couple of shortcomings of this vision, including the following:
High project cost--the present cost of funding the MWRRS plan is $7.7 billion (year 2002 estimates). Similarly, the estimated cost of the Ohio Hub plan is $3.2 billion. The high-cost result of the regional-level vision is a big stumbling block in obtaining funding for these plans.See John Bennett, AECOM Consult, personal communication, 10/5/05.
Difficulty buying
into the whole plan--some of the lines identified in the plans (for example,
Chicago-St. Louis) are logical choices as high-speed lines. However, as Drew
Galloway and Merrill Travis suggest, several other lines included in the Hub
may not be good candidates for HSR, since they are unlikely to achieve the
projected ridership. They propose that instead of pushing forward with the
entire regional HSR plan, the Midwestern states would be better served by
identifying the most promising city-pairs and demonstrating the feasibility of
HSR by actually running high-speed trains on these corridors.See Drew Galloway, Chief of Transportation
Planning Analysis, Amtrak, personal communication, 12/16/05; Travis, personal
communication, 12/8/05.
This demonstration, they believe, will help in garnering support for HSR in the
Measures of
Success
Apart from the revenue generated by proposed high-speed train service, Midwest HSR-related feasibility studies also typically point to such benefits as increased transportation alternatives, mobility, jobs, and real-estate values for the users. However, even proponents of Midwest HSR disagree on which of these benefits will accrue from HSR, which makes it difficult to effectively advocate for the high-speed rail system.See Schwalbach, personal communication, 11/10/05; Nicholson, personal communication, 11/7/05. Moreover, disagreement on the key benefits may affect the kind of funding the consortium can pursue and could lead to the public and elected officials questioning the success of the project before it has had a chance to prove itself.
An important issue related to the benefits of HSR is credibility. Critics like John Bennett and Joby Berman point out that the HSR-related feasibility studies often exaggerate the benefits while underestimating the costs.See Bennett, personal communication, 10/5/05; Joby Berman, Deputy Chief of Engineering, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, personal communication, 11/8/05. They note that the estimated ridership of several of the HSR lines is also suspect.See Ibid.
Funding
Sources and Strategies
In addition to affecting the actual implementation of the project, the kind of funding also affects the measures of success. For example, if funding from the "Job Access and Reverse Commute Program" is sought, then the number of jobs the rail system provides access to would determine the potential of success in getting the funding. There are several aspects to funding--federal funding, state and local funding, and private funding. This section reviews how the Midwestern states have fared in obtaining them.
Federal
Funding
Until now the federal government has
primarily funded HSR efforts in the
Importantly, most of the states have not shown the political will to move ahead and fund HSR without federal support. Further, the MWRRS plan is based on the assumption of an 80/20 federal/state match, even though this is unlikely to occur.See Emil Frankel, Senior Vice President, Parsons Brinckerhoff, personal communication, 11/7/05. Finally, it is also important to note that Midwest HSR will require operating subsidies during the initial "ramp-up period." Those opposed to the federal government providing operating subsidies point to the fact that the federal government does not provide operating subsidies to other modes like air and highway (although this excludes the Federal Aviation Administration, with its 100,000-plus employees, providing the nation's air traffic control system for free to the airlines).See Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06.
Another recent source of federal funding for transit, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), represents a case of missed opportunity for rail funding. SAFETEA-LU, which authorizes federal transit and highway programs through FY 2009, was signed into law by President Bush on August 10, 2005.See American Public Transportation Association, SAFETEA-LU: Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy for Users: A Guide To Transit-Related Provisions (Washington DC: APTA, September 2005), http://www.apta.com/government_affairs/safetea_lu/documents/brochure.pdf (accessed on 9/15/05). The four aspects of the act important to HSR include the following:
Provides a record level of federal transit investment: $52.6 billion over six years, an increase of 46 percent over the amount guaranteed in TEA 21
Increases annual guaranteed transit funding from a level of $7.2 billion in FY 2003 (the last year of TEA 21) to $10.3 billion in FY 2009
Retains annual funding guarantees to ensure long-term funding stability
Improves program deliverySee Ibid.
Thus, "even though funds are
present, they are not dedicated to passenger rail and there is no mention in
the bill about a state rail plan."See David Hunt, "State Rail
Plans--Legislative Update & Implications for SCORT," presented to
AASHTO Standing Committee on Rail Transportation (August 29, 2005).
The interviews conducted with state department of transportation representatives
show that almost none of the SAFETEA-LU money will be spent on the HSR lines in
the
State Funding
As per the 80/20 federal and state share advocated by the MWRRS and Ohio Hub plans, the funding from the states makes up 20 percent of the project cost. The ability and willingness of the states to come up with their share is important, because in its absence, the possibility of obtaining federal funding is bleak. Getting together their share of the 20 percent is not going to be an easy task for some states that may have to face significant opposition from other organizations within the state and convince an unsupportive legislature.See Tompkins, personal communication, 12/8/05, notes that at this point there is no political support for Nebraska's participation in the MWRRS. Some states are waiting for the federal money, which they hope will create incentive for obtaining local funding.See Ibid. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the MWRRS and the Ohio Hub plans are primarily technical documents prepared for the state DOTs. Hence, they do not necessarily reflect the states' political leadership's commitment to contribute the 20 percent states' share.
Private
Funding
In a few cases, public-private
partnerships have been forged to obtain local private funds for HSR-related
improvements. A public-private sector venture to rehabilitate and improve the
Milwaukee Station is underway. The project is being funded with $2.6 million in
Federal Transit Administration and state matching funds along with $1.4 million
in equity from Milwaukee Intermodal Partners, a private developer. Another
example of private funding and collaboration is the joint contributions of over
$20 million by Michigan DOT, Amtrak, and Harmon Industry to share costs of the
train control tests on the "Amtrak-owned portion of the corridor between
Stakeholders
There are two types of
stakeholders--internal and external. Internal stakeholders are the groups and
people directly involved in the project. In the case of HSR in the
Internal
Stakeholders
A number of internal stakeholders are involved in the Chicago Hub and MWRRI. The following paragraphs describe them and their roles.
Federal
Government
The federal government is a key
player. A relevant example is the Northeast corridor, in which Amtrak took the
lead and acted as the representative of the federal government. The federal
government has two major roles in the provision of HSR in the
Amtrak
Amtrak is a federally subsidized
railway company that owns some of the rail right-of-way and runs almost the
entire passenger rail service in the
Public opinion of
HSR--For a large proportion of people, Amtrak is synonymous with intercity
rail. Thus, public perception of Amtrak affects how people perceive HSR in
general. Several Midwestern states have had a lukewarm relationship with
Amtrak. In several cases, for reasons right or wrong, the public has a low
opinion of Amtrak. This low public opinion, in turn, hinders the case of HSR in
the
Advocate/partner/stakeholder--In
the initial stages of HSR in the
Operator of
HSR--Amtrak owns all the maintenance facilities and the ROW on 96 miles in
States and
Local Governments
States will play a major role in the
implementation of HSR in the
Partnership
potential--This is the measure used by the FRA to designate a project as a
Federal HSR Corridor. The partnership potential takes into account the kind of
agreements between the private ROW owners and the state department of
transportation. It also accounts for the ability of these entities to sustain
the project without further subsidy and to achieve a benefit-cost ratio of more
than one. The
Role of each state
and its level of interest and gain from the project--As mentioned earlier, in
the
Agreements among
the states--Several concrete agreements have to be reached amongst the
participating states for successful implementation of HSR in the
Private
Railroad Companies
Private railroad companies such as UP
own or lease almost all the rail lines on which HSR is proposed. These lines
are currently used to carry freight and several of them are already congested.
Addition of more frequent and high-speed passenger traffic will increase
congestion on these rail lines. Furthermore, the freight rail industry is in a
growth phase. In the early 1980s, the freight rail industry was deregulated so
the onerous fee and rate structure was gone. Globalization of the economy saw
the manufacturing industry shift to
The states would need to enter into detailed agreements with the
private railroad companies to address the issue of congestion, and sharing of
capital, maintenance, and operating costs. Several of the private railroad
companies are wary of the Midwestern states' HSR efforts. Merrill Travis notes
that the private railroad companies' reaction to the designation of federal
high-speed corridors was a mix of skepticism and concern.See Travis, personal communication, 3/31/06. NS
was concerned about the liability and sharing of the tracks. CSX had seen
enormous expansion of commuter rail on its tracks in
Moreover, private railroad companies
compete for rail-related funding. Historically, passenger rail was not funded
and most of the limited rail funding went to freight rails. This trend is still
seen in the way federal funds are allocated. In
External Stakeholders
In addition to the internal stakeholders, there are also several external stakeholders in the process.
Public and
Citizens Groups
Public and citizens groups are among
the most powerful stakeholders. They can influence the design of the project by
requesting more stations or they can try to change the station design or
location. For example, one of the stops on the Chicago-Milwaukee-Madison-Minneapolis/St.
Paul corridor is the
Some of the Midwestern states like
Elected officials
HSR in the
The role of the elected officials is also important as they have
the potential to negatively impact the performance of the system. The low
average speed of Amtrak trains is frequently attributed to its politically
driven route scheduling. "Most senators treat Amtrak as a low-grade
entitlement program," notes one congressional staff member.See Northeast Midwest Institute, "High
Speed Rail: Trop Peu, Trop Tard, Trop Amtrak,"
http://www.nemw.org/highspeedrail.htm (accessed 10/14/05). In
the case of HSR in the Midwest, if a train would stop multiple times between
Special Interest Groups
Rail passengers and environmental
groups are two influential special interest groups. Rail passengers are playing
a vital role as advocates of the system. They have been responsible for wooing
the elected officials and conducting outreach. A notable example of their work
is the outreach done by the Wisconsin Association of Rail Passengers (WISARP)
in
Environmental groups also are
important stakeholders in HSR projects.
the bullet-train proposal and particularly the California HSR Authority have been embroiled in controversy. When CHRSA released its Draft Environmental Impact Report and Environmental Impact Statement in January, 2004, it was immediately criticized for deficiencies and inaccuracies. Critics claimed that CHRSA had paid foreign environmental consultants for supporting opinions of various recommendations included within the report. Accusations of other possible conflicts of interest have brought CHRSA under scrutiny and further complicated the bullet-train proposal.See Ibid.
In the case of the
Media
The CHSRA example illustrates the importance of using the media.
The CHSRA devised a plan for public outreach. In addition to conducting surveys
and running focus groups and town hall meetings, the CHSRA has a website and
publishes quarterly updates. These efforts have increased public awareness and
support for HSR in
Airline Industry
HSR is a potential threat to the airports and airline companies. Over medium distances of 300 to 600 miles, HSR and air travel times may be comparable. The ticket prices can be lower in the case of rail and a train also may offer a more sociable and comfortable environment compared to an aircraft. The chances of a working HSR system are higher if both the modes are compatible and the relationship between them symbiotic. However, such a relationship rarely exists. The French TGV is a classic example of how ridership in trains increased and the air-passenger-traffic volume decreased upon the introduction of HSR (although, at the time of implementing the first French HSR project from Paris to Lyons, the French government was able to order the then state-owned airline to reduce its available seat-miles by 40 percent, which is not an alternative in today's deregulated environment).See Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06.
Similar fears from Southwest Airlines halted the HSR effort in
Bus Companies and Automobile Lobby
HSR-related efforts in the
The automobile lobby has always very forcefully represented the interests of its constituents. This lobby will stand against investing large sums of money in transit, especially if the funds come at the expense of highways. There has been no visible opposition from this lobby so far. However, this silence does not mean acceptance of HSR by the automobile lobby, but rather is an indication that the automobile lobby, at the moment, does not consider HSR a serious threat.See Harnish, personal communication, November 10, 2005.
Other Local
Transit Agencies
One of the main transit agencies is the Metra, the commuter rail
that operates in the six-county
Possible
Issues and Next Steps
Looking forward, two areas stand out in which issues probably will arise and next steps need to be addressed. These are the areas of (1) liability and eminent domain and (2) the impact of the design and number of stations on train speed.
Liability and
Eminent Domain
Since the HSR lines in the
Station
Planning and Train Speed
The design and number of stations has a significant impact on train speed. HSR works best if the end-communities are 300 to 600 miles apart. However, communities that will not be served by HSR or where the train may not stop are likely to oppose it. States could potentially address this issue with more public outreach and education aimed at illustrating the negative effects of frequent stoppages and the positive effects of augmented connections to stations.
The Keystone Corridor
In terms of the definition utilized in
this report, the Keystone Corridor provides a successful example of the
development of incremental high-speed rail (HSR) in the
First designated by the U.S.
Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) as a federal HSR corridor in December
1998, the Keystone Corridor serves as a central connector between the
The Keystone Corridor, Philadelphia to Harrisburg
Source:
Railroad Corridor
, volume 2 (
An extension of the federal
designation to
The Keystone Corridor, Philadelphia to Pittsburgh
Note that the
current maximum mph on the section between Philadelphia
and Harrisburg
Source: Parsons
Brinckerhoff/Gannett Fleming,
Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985), p. 4.
The Context
Current high-speed efforts are focused
on the 104 miles of track between
Between
By an agreement between SEPTA and
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), revenue service is
prohibited west of Parkesburg and actual commuter rail service runs between
Along the section beginning at
Philadelphia and ending at Thorndale, Amtrak makes stops at 5
stations--Philadelphia, 30th Street, Ardmore, Paoli, Exton, and Downington.
SEPTA makes stops at 23 stations, which are leased by Amtrak. In fact, Amtrak
owns all the stations along the entire Keystone Corridor between and including
Two freight railroads also have
operating rights on all or part of the corridor: Norfolk Southern (NS), which
owns the nonelectrified portion of the corridor from
Though NS freight traffic is variable,
there are between 5 and 12 train movements daily over parts of the corridor
between
History and
Development of the Corridor
The Keystone Corridor traces its roots
to the early 1800s and was initially envisioned as a means for competing with
The First
Attempt at HSR
In the mid-1960s, in response to the
Federal High Speed Ground Transportation Act, the
The commonwealth agreed to provide $2 million, while the PRR would provide the remaining $2.5 million for the purchase of the coaches. While awaiting the new coaches (the Metroliner became available on the Northeast Corridor in 1969), the PRR would utilize electrified commuter cars from SEPTA. The latter part of the agreement was instituted, but before the coaches could be delivered, the PRR merged with the New York Central Railroad, becoming Penn Central. When Penn Central declared bankruptcy on June 21, 1970, the agreement fell apart and the Capitaliner coaches came to be used as part of the Metroliner service on the NEC. Ironically, though the SEPTA commuter cars remained in usage for several more years, they were eventually replaced by the original Metroliners as upgrades were made on the NEC.See PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, p. 1-3.
On April 1, 1976, the Philadelphia-Harrisburg portion of the Keystone Corridor was conveyed by the Penn Central Transportation Company to Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) by the U.S. Railway Administration. One month later, it was transferred to Amtrak as a branch line of the NEC. In the initial years following the transfer, Amtrak spent roughly $30 million on improvements which allowed the maximum authorized speed to be raised to 90 mph on sections of the line.See Ibid. Nevertheless, overall service on the corridor remained poor and ridership dropped significantly between FY 1980 and FY 1990, from 1,024,700 to 334,963.See R.L. Banks & Associates, Delta Development Group, Gannett Fleming, and Urban Engineers, Keystone Corridor Assessment and Business Plan: Technical Report--Task IV, Business Plan, Submitted to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, December 23, 1997 [hereafter, KC Business Plan: TR--Task IV], Appendix, p. 3.
Though most of this decrease in
ridership occurred before 1988, ridership fell further as a result of Amtrak's
decision that year to substitute diesel locomotives on most of its
Philadelphia-Harrisburg trains, because it was experiencing a shortage of electric-powered
locomotives. The change necessitated a shift in the end-point of the line
within
As Amtrak ridership plunged, expenses
on the corridor continued to outpace revenues. According to a U.S. General
Accounting Office (U.S. GAO) fact sheet developed for Senators Arlen Specter
and John Heinz, in FY 1985, based on fully allocated costs (including
depreciation, overhead, corporate costs, and retirement), the
Philadelphia-Harrisburg line lost $26.8 million.See U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO),
"Amtrak: Cost of Amtrak Railroad Operations," Fact Sheet for the
Honorable Arlen Specter and the Honorable John Heinz, US Senate,
GAO/RCED-86-127SF (Washington DC: GAO, March 1986), p. 1,
http://archive.gao.gov/d13t3/129743.pdf (accessed 2/1/06). It
is no surprise that by the late 1980s, Amtrak was considering ending its
intercity service between
A Second
Attempt at High-Speed Rail
While Amtrak was deciding what to do
with its service on the corridor, the
Pursuant to the discussions with the other compact members, State Representatives Rick Geist (R, 1979- ) and Joseph Kolter (D, 1969-1982) sponsored legislation to establish a Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (PHSIRPC) as a means for fulfilling the commonwealth's obligations to the Compact. The legislation, which was adopted unanimously and signed into law (Act 144) by Governor Dick Thornburgh (R, 1979-1987) on December 22, 1981, stipulated that the commission would have "overall responsibility, power and duty to investigate, study and make recommendations concerning the need for and establishment and operation of a high-speed intercity rail passenger system in the commonwealth." It further noted that the commission, "without limiting its authority to study related subjects," would address the following issues:
Need and demand
for high-speed intercity rail in
Level of HSR service required to meet that demand
System, equipment, roadbed, ROW, and other technical and technological options
Location and extent of specific routes
Financing, ownership, and operating options
Impact and interaction of HSR on existing freight rail and existing or proposed passenger rail systems
Present or
proposed operation of similar systems in the
Issues and problems relating to local and commuter rail service, including fundingSee 55 P.S. hub-and-spoke 684 (2005).
Two years later, the PHSIRPC began its work when Robert J. Casey became the Executive Director on February 14, 1983. With $4.2 million in state, federal, and international funding, the commission issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) on April 23, 1983, for a general engineering consultant to perform a feasibility study that would address need, demand, levels of service, system equipment and ROW requirements, cost, economic impacts, and financing. On June 28, 1983, Parsons Brinckerhoff/Gannett Fleming (PBGF) was selected to do the study, with the contract formally executed two months later. In addition, the commission also hired STV Engineers, Inc., to serve as an oversight consultant to assess PBGF's findings.See Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (PHSIRPC), Final Report: Executive Summary (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, January 1990), 3; also see PBGF, "Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report," pp. 1-4 and 1-5.
The feasibility study was split into three phases that would take place over roughly three years. Phase 1 would provide a broad framework and assess the feasibility of various HSR options. Phase 2 would develop a detailed market survey, along with cost estimates and technical requirements based on a more detailed evaluation of the ROW and technology options presented in Phase 1. Phase 3 would focus on implementation, with a financial package, an assessment of the resulting economic development that could be spurred by HSR in the corridor, and recommendations related to ownership, operations, and coordination with other agencies.See PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, Phase I, Prepared for Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985), 2-1; also see PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Executive Summary, Phase 1, Prepared for the Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985), p. 1.
The Phase 1 report was released in February 1985. It presented the results of an examination of five alternatives, identified as Alternatives A through E. Alternative A was the baseline, "do nothing" alternative and was used only as a reference point for the others. Alternative B described the best service that could be achieved with minor improvements on the existing ROW without dedicated high-speed passenger tracks. This alternative was eventually dropped because it fell short of the commission's goals. Alternatives C, D, and E all described various types of HSR service on different alignments as shown in See Attributes Related to HSR Alternatives C, D, and E.
Attributes
Related to HSR Alternatives C, D, and E
|
|||
Feature
|
C: Best
Service on Existing ROW
|
D: Best
Service on New ROW w/ Steel-Wheel on Steel-Rail Technologies
|
E: Best
Service on New ROW with Maglev
|
|
Electromagnetic suspension ( |
|||
|
Canadian LRC (tilt-body) --diesel |
French TGV |
||
|
Trip Time-- |
|||
|
5.1 million/11.7 million |
5.9 million/12.7 million |
||
|
Capital Cost--Target Estimates4 |
$1.85B-$2.20B (depending upon diesel or electric option) |
||
|
Source: PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, Phase 1, prepared for the Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985). |
|||
Alternative
D was assessed both with and without a stop at
The preliminary financial analysis provided in the Phase 1 report suggested that Alternative C, with the diesel option, would provide a 9 percent risk-free rate of return.See PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, p. 11-5. Alternative C with the electric-powered option was slightly less but still acceptable. However, Alternatives D and E had much higher risk and much lower rates of return associated with them. As the Executive Summary of the report suggested, "...with their greater total public benefits but only somewhat greater cash revenues, [Alternatives D and E] are more suitable to a public financing viewpoint."See PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Executive Summary, p. 13. Alternative C, on the other hand, had the potential for a public-private partnership that could leverage available public support and tax benefits to woo private investment. Thus, Phase 1 scoped out a preliminary financing strategy for Alternative C.
The Phase 1 report suggested that a private enterprise would construct, own, and operate the HSR service under Alternative C. The commonwealth could provide a $350 million loan, with an interest rate of 7 percent over 38 years. Other institutions, which were not identified, would provide loans of $1.1 billion, with interest rates of 13 percent over 38 years. The private enterprise would make an equity investment equal to the loan provided by the commonwealth, assuming base demand, with another $40 million needed to meet the high demand projections. Funding for new and/or enhanced stations along the route would be derived from real estate developers and/or local governments.See PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, pp. 12-6 to 12-7.
Seventeen months after the Phase 1 report was issued, PBGF presented their report, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Market Demand, supplemented by Market Demand: Technical Memorandums, as part of the work being conducted under Phase 2. The analysis followed the "Standard Guidelines for Revenue and Ridership Forecasting" that were concurrently being developed by the High Speed Rail Association (and were approved in September 1986) in response to the varied quality and comprehensiveness of earlier HSR revenue and ridership forecasts.See For the approved guidelines, see High Speed Rail Association, "Standard Guidelines for Revenue and Ridership Forecasting," (September 25, 1986), copy of the document provided by Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.
The market demand analysis reviewed the different market segments, including trips made for the purposes of commuting, business, tourism, schools, or other types of trips. It assessed travel behavior and the likelihood of new HSR being able to change that behavior. Two items stand out from this report:
First, the estimated ridership for these alternatives was modified after this additional analysis. New projections for base demand in the year 2000 increased, while projections for high demand decreased. The new projections for HSR (Alternative D in Phase 1) were 5.5 million (up from 5.1) for base demand and 7.8 million (down from 11.7) for high demand; for Maglev (Alternative E in Phase 1), the revised projections were 6.2 million (up from 5.9) and 8.8 million (down from 12.7), respectively.See PBGF, "Market Demand" in Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Executive Summary, Prepared for the Pennsylvania high Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (July 1986), executive summary final page.
Second, and more interesting in terms of the broader dynamics involved with HSR planning in the commonwealth, though the earlier Phase 1 report suggested that Alternative C was the only one conducive to private investment given the rates of return and levels of risk, the market demand report focuses on Alternatives D and E (though they are not labeled as such), further noting that "it was assumed that public and private support will be necessary to actually implement a major transportation improvement...."See Ibid., 1.
Why there is an apparent disconnect between the Phase 1 initial analysis and the discussion in the market demand study is unclear. Market Demand was only part of Phase 2, which was never fully completed, so there may have been other information that was not included in the document. More likely, however, this apparent disconnect reflected different views and priorities within the commission, and a shift in the perceived prospects for financing that occurred after the drafting of the Phase 1 Report.
Some evidence for this latter conjecture is apparent in the commission's final report. As one of its last official acts, the PHSIRPC voted for Maglev as its first choice; however, it recognized that "a substantial minority" of the commission's members believed the commonwealth should consider alternatives strategies if financial assistance was not forthcoming. Among the findings, the report notes "a modest upgrading of Amtrak service would offer significant travel-time improvements and may be least expensive, but it provides the least economic benefit among the options studied."See PHSIRPC, Final Report, p. 4. This reveals the different goals and objectives, which likely were prioritized in differing orders by the various commission members. Finally, the Chairman's report provided at the beginning of the final report noted that "speed sells," while later discussion regarding financing suggested that there had been overtures made by the West German magnetic levitation consortium, Transrapid International. The commission recommended that the commonwealth authorize negotiations with Transrapid on financial assistance.See Ibid., 1.
Regardless, the recommendations were "dropped" even before they were formally announced in the commission's final report. The final report was published two years after Governor Robert Patrick Casey (D, 1987-1995) entered office and terminated the commission's staff, in effect halting the work on the HSR study. Interestingly, the Governor felt the need to take this action four months before the commission's mandated expiration date of December 31, 1987.See 55 P.S. § 691 (2005); also see PHSIRPC, Final Report, p. 4, and the Chairman's Report. No reason was publicly stated; there was speculation that airline interests may have been involved, but this was always denied.See Harry Stoffer, "US Air Invests in Maglev Rail Project," Pittsburgh-Post Gazette (April 2, 1993), LexisNexis (retrieved 4/4/06).
The actual reason behind
the governor's decision to close down the project may never be known. However,
it is clear that the combined presence of the leadership, the means, and the
authority to implement HSR was missing in
The Most
Recent Attempt--Incremental Rail
By the early 1990s, the situation had improved somewhat in terms of overall losses, but operating ratios for Philadelphia-Harrisburg in fiscal years 1994 and 1995 were still as high as 4.23 and 5.76, respectively.See U.S. GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: Financial Performance of Amtrak's Routes, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO/RCED-98-151 (Washington DC: GAO, May 1998), p. 32. Operating ratio is defined as expenses divided by revenues. Thus a ratio less than 1 means a line was profitable and more than 1 means a line lost money. In the case of the Philadelphia-Harrisburg line, Amtrak's expenses were over four times more than revenues in FY 1994 and over five times higher in FY 1995. During those same years, Amtrak's direct operating costs outpaced revenues by $8.4 million (FY 1994) and $8.6 million (FY 1995).See Ibid, p. 34. Further, as a result of deferred maintenance (in excess of $170 million by the mid- to late-1990s), the infrastructure continued to deteriorate. Maximum authorized speeds dropped as low as 70 mph in several locations along the line, with actual speeds significantly lower.See FRA, Technical Monograph, 1:ES-2. The deferred maintenance figure comes from R.L. Banks & Associates, Delta Development Group, Gannett Fleming, and Urban Engineers, Keystone Corridor Assessment and Business Plan: Executive Summary, Submitted to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, December 23, 1997 [hereafter, KC Business Plan: ES], p. 19.
In 1995, believing the corridor to be strategically important to the state's overall transportation system, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania entered into an agreement with Amtrak to increase the state's operating assistance on the Keystone Corridor. Pursuant to the agreement, PennDOT increased its operating subsidies to $2.6 million per year primarily to increase frequency of service on the Keystone Corridor and to make capital improvements.See U.S. GAO, Surface Infrastructure: High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States, Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-99-44 (Washington DC: GAO, January 1999), 49, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99044.pdf (accessed 2/1/06). (The agreement is now updated on an annual basis.) Even with the subsidies from PennDOT, the operating ratio for Philadelphia-Harrisburg in FY 1997 was 2.15, with a $22 loss per passenger ($41 without the subsidy).See U.S. GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: Financial Performance of Amtrak's Routes, pp. 6 and 40.
During this same period, PennDOT began to develop a vision for incremental improvements on the corridor, believing that the Keystone Corridor was a "diamond in the rough." PennDOT undertook several surveys to determine what passengers on the line wanted and found that new equipment would be most welcome. They also contracted with R. L. Banks & Associates to conduct a study on the corridor that would provide additional background and assessment on what needed to be done and what could be done.See Richard Peltz, Alternate Federal Co-Chair, Appalachian Regional Commission, personal communication, 4/4/06. Peltz was formerly Deputy Secretary for Local & Area Transportation at PennDOT (1995-2002).
In 1997, R.L. Banks
& Associates, et al. submitted to the
The
report described the corridor's state of disrepair, noting that scheduled trip
times between
The resulting business plan was premised on four potential scenarios that included frequencies and service levels rather than just speed. The plan reviewed SOGR with 10 daily round-trips and SOGR plus improvements to allow 110 mph service, with 10 daily round-trips (4 express); 12 daily round-trips (5 express); or 14 daily round-trips (6 express) (See Service Alternatives under SOGR).
Organizationally,
the business plan suggested that the
Revenues and financing for the capital improvements would come from several sources. First, ridership was expected to increase over the next decade, and with the proposed changes, it was expected that it would range anywhere from just below 400,000 to just over 845,000 by 2005, depending upon whether improvements included SOGR only or 110 mph service, and whether the low estimate, best estimate, or high estimate was used.See Ibid., and Appendix A, pp. 27-28. Capital projects would be financed with 30-year bonds, and federal and state government grants were also expected. Additional revenue sources would derive from the parking facilities at a number of the stations on which it was expected that a fee would be levied, from utility occupations of the railroad ROW, and from advertising and concessions. See Ibid., pp. 42-59. See Costs of SOGR and High-Speed Service (millions of 1996 $) shows the estimated costs to bring the Keystone Corridor to SOGR and then potentially add high-speed rail service.
Costs of SOGR and High-Speed
Service (millions of 1996 $)5
|
|||
Component
|
SOGR
|
110 mph Service (incremental cost)
|
125 mph Service (incremental cost)
|
Track
|
|||
Structure
|
|||
Stations
|
|||
Signals/Communications
|
|||
Power
Supply/Distribution
|
|||
Engineering
(7%)
|
|||
Contingency
(10%)
|
|||
Total
|
|||
|
Source: R.L. Banks &
Associates, et al., Keystone
Corridor Assessment and Business Plan: Executive Summary ,
Submitted to the |
|||
Service Alternatives under
SOGR
|
||||
|
|
SOGR
|
110 mph
|
110 mph
|
110 mph
|
Frequency
(round-trips/day)
|
||||
Trip time
savings (minutes)
|
||||
Ridership,
Best Estimate 2005 (trips)
|
||||
Annual Fare
Revenues, Best Estimate 2005 ($ millions)6
|
||||
Annual
Operating Expenses, 2002 ($ millions)a
|
||||
|
Source: R.L. Banks & Associates, et al., Keystone Corridor Assessment and Business Plan: Task IV Business Plan. |
||||
With respect to the final recommendations of the business plan, the general feeling within PennDOT at the time was that unless Amtrak was going to stop their services or end in some fashion, the state would prefer to work with Amtrak on the corridor and resulting services, rather than taking them over. Thus, while utilizing some of the information from the business plan and strengthening its focus on more modest improvements to enhance overall service, PennDOT entered into formal discussions with Amtrak regarding the future of the corridor.
Keystone
Corridor Improvement Plan--Memoranda of Agreement
In
December 1998 the Keystone Corridor received designation by U.S. DOT as a
federal HSR corridor, providing the possibility of reinvigorating the line. In
September 1999 the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) allocated $500,000 to
begin preliminary designs to eliminate the three remaining at-grade public
crossings on the corridor between
Based
on the MOA, Amtrak and the
of
At the time, the Keystone Corridor and other HSR efforts around the country were viewed by Amtrak as supporting its five key business strategies, which were the following:
Building a market-based network
Delivering consistent quality service
Leveraging public-private partnershipsSee TrainWeb, "Highlights of Amtrak's FY1999-2002 Strategic Business Plan: Maximizing Amtrak's Potential in the Marketplace," http://www.trainweb.com/amplan/hilites.html (accessed 12/8/05).
Work on the track improvements was to begin in 2000, with the first AEM-7 locomotive trainsets placed in service by the end of the year. However, it quickly became clear that Amtrak might have difficulty upholding its part of the Agreement, given its worsening financial crisis and the possibility of a shut-down of Amtrak service. In fact, on January 13, 2000, PennDOT provided close to $3 million in emergency funding to finance Amtrak's internal costs in administering the planned work.See "Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and National Railroad Passenger Corporation for The Keystone Corridor Improvement Program" [hereafter, "KCIP Agreement 2002"], April 4, 2002, p. 2.
Keystone Corridor within PennDOT's Statewide Planning
During this same period, PennDOT was reviewing its overall statewide transportation planning process, with a view toward developing an integrated multimodal plan involving highways, rail, aviation, waterways, and freight and passenger services. In January 2000, PennDOT issued PennPlan Moves! Pennsylvania Statewide Long-range Transportation Plan, 2000-2025 , which identified ten statewide goals:
Promote the safety of the transportation system.
Retain jobs and expand economic opportunities.
Make transportation decisions that support land-use planning objectives.
Maintain, upgrade, and improve the transportation system.
Inform and involve the public, and improve customer service.
Advance regional and corridor-based planning.
Develop transportation alternatives and manage demand.
Promote smooth, easy connections between transportation alternatives.
Ensure accessibility and reliability of the system for everyone.See Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), PennPlan Moves! Pennsylvania Statewide Long-range Transportation Plan, 2000-2025 (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: PennDOT, January 2000), 48, http://www.dot.state.pa.us/internet/web.nsf/infoPennPlanMoves?OpenForum (accessed 2/2/06).
The plan identified a number of specific objectives and potential projects tied to these goals. Among them were several directly related to the Keystone Corridor:
Objective 14--Improve physical and service upgrades on the Keystone Corridor
Objective 19--Eliminate grade crossings
Objective 20--Develop a passenger rail needs assessment
Of note, the improvement of the physical and service upgrades on the corridor was believed to serve all the above goals except for number six.See Ibid., p. 51.
In December 2001, the Pennsylvania Statewide Passenger Rail Needs Assessment (Objective 20) was formally issued. Its purpose was to provide a broad evaluation of the need for statewide intercity passenger rail in key transportation corridors. The plan prioritized the corridors; developed a baseline comparison across the corridors; developed profiles for those with high potential; and identified needs and opportunities, as well as future policy considerations for intercity passenger rail service within the commonwealth.See Pennsylvania State Transportation Advisory Committee (TAC), Pennsylvania Statewide Passenger Rail Needs Assessment: Technical Report" (Harrisburg: TAC, December 2001), p. 6.
After reviewing existing intercity rail services within the commonwealth--Keystone Corridor (Harrisburg-Philadelphia); the Northeast Corridor (Boston-NYC-Philadelphia-Washington DC); the Capitol Limited Corridor (Chicago-Pittsburgh-Washington DC); the Lake Shore Limited Corridor (Chicago-Toledo-Erie-Buffalo-Albany-NYC/Boston); and the Pennsylvanian-Three Rivers Corridor (Chicago-Pittsburgh-Harrisburg-Philadelphia-NYC)--the assessment evaluated existing, proposed, and potential intercity rail corridors. It established five criteria with varying weights for comparing corridor potential. In descending order of import, the five criteria included the following:
Infrastructure and ROW availability
Major destinations and trip generators
System continuity and connectivity
Market size, population, employment trends
Transportation patterns and conditionsSee Ibid., p. 38.
The
Philadelphia-Harrisburg Keystone Corridor was given a high rating on all five
factors. It was already heavily used by intercity and commuter rail,
particularly between
Of
note, the report gave mixed marks for the Harrisburg-Pittsburgh portion of the
Keystone Corridor, scoring it high on ROW, system continuity, and
transportation patterns, but medium on major destinations and market size,
noting that the line primarily served through passengers traveling between
Several
months after the report was issued, in April 2002, the
Funding
PennDOT and Amtrak would jointly fund the KCIP, with specific program elements identified. ( See Funding Share of KCIP Program Elements ($ millions) shows the funding share ; See Funding Schedule ($ millions) shows the funding schedule .)
That station construction, reconstruction, renovation, and rehabilitation would be dealt with under a separate agreement, though the total contributions were delineated in the agreement.See "KCIP Agreement 2002," pp. 5-7.
Funding Share of KCIP Program
Elements ($ millions)
|
|||
Program Element
|
Amtrak
|
PennDOT
|
Total
|
Equipment
|
|||
Stations
|
|||
Infrastructure
|
|||
Track7
|
|||
Communication
& Signals (C&S)
|
|||
Electric
Traction (ET)
|
|||
Buildings
& Bridges (B&B)
|
|||
Program
Management
|
|||
Contingencies
|
|||
Program
Total
|
|||
|
Source: "Agreement
Between the |
|||
Responsibilities
Amtrak would be responsible for managing the implementation of the program and all related construction work.
Amtrak would be responsible for performing all project work associated with the program elements identified.
Amtrak would provide necessary labor and materials.
An annual capital plan, specifying the sources of program funding and the specific elements, would be agreed upon for each 12-month period, beginning October 1 of each year.See Ibid., pp. 9-11.
Funding Schedule ($ millions)
|
||||||
|
|
3/18/02-9/30/02
|
10/1/02-9/30/03
|
10/1/03-9/30/04
|
10/1/04-9/30/05
|
10/1/05-9/30/06
|
Total
|
Amtrak
|
||||||
PennDOT
|
$70 |
|||||
Total
|
||||||
|
Source: " Agreement Between
the |
||||||
Program Design and Implementation
Amtrak would develop the overall KCIP and would define program element parameters and goals in consultation with PennDOT, the freight railroads, SEPTA, FTA, and FRA.
Amtrak would be responsible for providing or coordinating the planning and design of the program, with PennDOT actively facilitating or obtaining required governmental approvals on behalf of Amtrak.
Certain provisions allowed Amtrak to make changes to program elements or projects either unilaterally or in consultation with PennDOT, depending upon increased costs.See Ibid., pp. 11-15.
Marketing,
Advertising, and Publicity
PennDOT and Amtrak agreed to cooperate in planning and designing signage and other informational materials needed to disseminate information about the project and partnership. Related costs would be allocable to each party's share of funding.
While Amtrak would consult with PennDOT on marketing strategies for the Keystone Corridor service, Amtrak would be responsible for "advertising, marketing, pricing, and promoting" the service to maximize revenue, "including marketing the service under the Acela brand."
Amtrak would have full control over the interior design and passenger amenities, as well as exterior design of the equipment.See Ibid., pp. 25-26.
Amtrak approved a $20
million capital plan and, as per the agreement, developed a separate agreement
to close the three remaining public highway-grade crossings by 2006. (There are
still three private crossings and one pedestrian crossing.) The
Much Perseverance, Some Serendipity, and the Real Work Begins
By September 2003 only $21.38 million had been spent of the $60 million that had been scheduled, $14.14 million by PennDOT and $7.24 million by Amtrak. According to David Gunn, former CEO and president of Amtrak, the key reasons for this delay stemmed from the lack of a firm managerial commitment to the KCIP on the part of Amtrak, as evidenced in part by the vague timetable in the Agreement which did not clearly and firmly outline timetables for specific projects within the overall program.See David Gunn, former CEO and President of Amtrak, personal communication, 3/21/06. In other words, the combined presence of leadership, authority, and means were still lacking.
The delay in this program exacerbated PennDOT's already existing frustration with the project, which stemmed from an earlier set of discussions in which PennDOT had approached Amtrak about upgrading the catenary system on the corridor so it could place electric-powered locomotives back in service. Amtrak responded with cost estimates that were significantly higher than those provided by several independent contractors and refused to modify their figures. As a result, PennDOT decided to forego the upgrade to the catenary and issued an RFP for new diesel units, only to have Amtrak come back to them several years later with a revised and lower-cost proposal that would make use of Amtrak's cars and locomotives.See Peltz, personal communication, 4/4/06.
Recognizing
the continued importance of the corridor and the need for improvements
regardless of Amtrak's ability and/or willingness to move forward, Governor
Edward Rendell (D, 2003- ) announced in October 2003 that another $3 million
would be directed to passenger rail service between
PennDOT
remained committed to improvements on the Keystone Corridor while Gunn was
focused on bringing all of Amtrak up to an "adequate level of maintenance
and service" across the entire system. In the early months after taking
over at Amtrak, Gunn took a trip to
Upon
returning to
In July 2004 a joint announcement was made by Governor Rendell and Gunn of an amended $145.5 million plan under which costs would be split equally between Amtrak and PennDOT.See "Pennsylvania Governor Rendell, Amtrak President Gunn Announce Keystone Corridor Improvement Plan; Philadelphia-Harrisburg Trip Will be Shorter; Safety to be Improved," PR Newswire 7/20/04, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m4PRN/is_2004_July_20/ai_n6115256 (accessed 1/24/05). As with the original agreement, the key goals of the project were to reduce local trip times from 2 hours to 1 hour and 45 minutes (now by fall 2006); introduce ninety-minute express service; and increase the number of Amtrak trains from nine to thirteen.See "Keystone Corridor to Be Upgraded," International Railway Journal (September 2004), online, http://www.findarticles.com/articles/mi_inOBQQ/is_9_44/ai_n6239858 (accessed 1/24/05).
The amendment provided a formal set of production goals and objectives and added a new section for additional planned improvements as follows:
Amtrak and PennDOT would work with SEPTA to "develop an interim stabilization program of short-term improvements to Tracks 1 and 4" (the outside local tracks) of the corridor between Paoli and Philadelphia's 30th Street Station, to be performed during FY 2005 and FY 2006. Thereafter, the three agencies would develop a long-term program to ensure the reliability of the infrastructure in SEPTA territory.
Amtrak and PennDOT would work with Norfolk Southern
Railroad to "develop policies and a program of short-term improvements to
the Keystone Corridor which would enable increased utilization of the corridor
by
Amtrak and PennDOT would work together to develop a long-term plan of capital improvements for the corridor.See "Amendment No. 1 to the Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and National Railroad Passenger Corporation for the Keystone Corridor Improvement Plan" [hereafter, "Amendment 1"], July 19, 2004, 5-6.
The total funding for program elements, as well as the funding schedule, shifted under the Amendment (See KCIP Program Element Costs, 2002 vs. 2004 ($ millions) and See Revised Funding Schedule ($ millions)). Given the tremendous needs in infrastructure, it was decided that the monies previously identified for other purposes would be reprogrammed under Track; Communication and Signals; Electric Traction; and Structures (formerly Buildings and Bridges). Equipment and station improvements would be dealt with through separate agreements, and likely separate funding sources. Moreover, beyond FY 2004, though Amtrak remained responsible for overall program management, it no longer budgeted monies out of the $145.5 million for this, again reallocating these funds to other needs while absorbing the related costs.
KCIP Program Element Costs,
2002 vs. 2004 ($ millions)
|
||
Program Element
|
2002 Agreement
|
2004 Amendment
|
Equipment
|
||
Stations
|
||
Infrastructure
|
||
Track8
|
||
Communication
and Signals (C&S)
|
||
Electric
Traction (ET)
|
||
Buildings
and Bridges (B&B) (2002)/
|
||
Program
Management
|
||
Contingencies
|
||
Program
Total
|
||
|
Source: "Amendment
No. 1 to the Agreement Between the |
||
More
importantly, specific projects within each of the program elements were also
identified, along with clear time lines for each and expenditures tied to them
(See
Program Elements: Total Expenditures per Time Period ($ millions)). For example, replacement of jointed rail
with continuously welded rail (CWR) along key stretches of the line was planned
primarily for FY 2004 and FY 2005, while final track installations at the
With this commitment from the highest levels of Amtrak and PennDOT, the program began to move more swiftly, and in December 2004, based on a financial analysis of planned and actual expenditures, the funding schedule was again revised (See December 2004 Revised Funding Schedule ($ millions)). This time, a number of expenditures were moved ahead and the time line for project completion looked like it would not only be met, but would likely finish ahead of schedule for at least some elements.
Planned improvements summarized under the $62.85 million budgeted by Amtrak for work in FY 2005 are summarized in See Planned Work on the Keystone Corridor in FY 2005.
A Federal Review of the Keystone
While
Amtrak and PennDOT moved forward on the KCIP, a separate exercise was being
pursued at the FRA. The 1996 Appropriations Act mandated a comprehensive
transportation plan for the southern end of the NEC, between
The
final technical monograph was released in March 2004, while the current KCIP
was well underway. Nevertheless, some of the findings bear mentioning. Focusing
on the Keystone Corridor as a branch of the NEC, and recognizing that a number
of trains already connect from
Many of the corridor-wide improvements--track geometry; track structure; highway/railroad grade crossings; electrification; signaling and train control; support facilities; and stations--are being addressed under the current project, at least partially if not fully. However, several site-specific improvements were recommended that would further enhance HSR operations. Among them were the following:
Reactivation
and upgrading of the existing bypass ( See
Bypass of 30th Street Station ) of the 30th Street Station for
Harrisburg-New York City trains--The bypass, referred to as the New
York-Pittsburgh Subway was used as recently as 1994 by Amtrak, but has since
been abandoned. Reintroducing it would allow faster trip times between
Bypass of 30th Street
Source:
Upgrade
interlockings with high-speed crossovers--The goal would be to raise the speed
limits from 30 mph to 45 mph, reducing overall trip times for HSR and improving
reliability. The KCIP is addressing interlockings at
Track realignments--Between
Additional
changes would be needed at Paoli station, which is accessible only from the local
tracks, and immediately beyond which the center two express tracks from
The monograph ends by reaching several of the same conclusions that formed the basis for the KCIP already in progress. The monograph notes that "reliable, frequent 90-minute service... between Harrisburg and Philadelphia's Suburban Station would be feasible..." and that "establishment of high-speed intercity services would not degrade, and could in fact improve, existing or proposed Keystone Corridor commuter services...."See Ibid., 1:8-3. Interestingly, the report's final conclusion states the following, differing somewhat in focus from the current effort:
The proposed 90-minute Harrisburg-Philadelphia schedule, while an achievable goal, is not immediately essential to the implementation of meaningful Keystone Corridor service improvements. Intermediate upgrades--including, for example, higher-performance electric-powered equipment, direct through trains between Harrisburg and New York, and service to Center City Philadelphia--would represent tangible progress to the traveling public and might be achievable much sooner than a 90-minute timing.See Ibid., 1:8-6.
Unlike the KCIP, the federal report does not develop a formal plan for reaching these goals.
Current Status of the KCIP
On
September 12, 2006, Governor Rendell and Amtrak jointly announced the
completion of the major components of the Keystone Corridor upgrade. At that
time, 264,000 ties had been installed (roughly four-fifths concrete and the remaining
wood); roughly 200 miles of CWR had been installed; 14 miles of the catenary
had been renewed; and over 20 miles of new signal cable had been installed.See
"Keystone Corridor Improvements Yield Higher Speeds," Destination:
Freedom Newsletter 6, no. 48 (November 21, 2005), online, accessed 11/22/05;
"Governor Rendell, Amtrak Announce $145 Million Upgrade of Keystone
Passenger Rail Service" PR Newswire (September 12, 2006), LexisNexis
(retrieved 9/29/06). The interlocking at
While
initial progress had been somewhat slower than initially planned, as a result
of inadequate Amtrak cash flow and insufficient commitment, work during the
past few years has progressed more quickly. Not only are the upgrades
practically complete, but electric-powered trains will be placed in revenue
service and three additional trips will be added on October 30, 2006. Speeds
will be increased to 110 mph for much of the line, with corresponding trip
times of 90 minutes for express trains and 105 minutes for local trains between
In terms of the goals that were added under the amendment for additional improvements, a joint SEPTA/Amtrak Capital Program has been agreed to in principle, with an estimated cost of $380 million. A portion of the work that will complement work already programmed in the KCIP by Amtrak and PennDOT commenced in FY 2006, with a four-year time line for completion. SEPTA's share of the cost of this portion is $81 million (equal to what PennDOT and Amtrak are spending on their related KCIP programmatic component).See McDonough, e-mail communication, 2/9/06.
Amtrak and PennDOT have also been working with the freight railroads along the corridor to address their needs and concerns. Freight movements and freight rail movements continue to increase across the country and within the region. Moreover, more freight is now being moved with intermodal doublestack and truck trailers on flat cars (TOFC), which require higher and wider vertical clearances as well as greater weight allowances than previously. If these three areas are not sufficiently addressed, freight rail providers could see themselves "frozen out" of potential capacity expansion along the corridor.
This
is of particular concern for
Continued Challenges
Two key areas remain outstanding in terms of the agreement and PennPlan Moves! , and each poses some challenges for Amtrak, PennDOT, SEPTA, and the freight railroads. First, the remaining grade crossings still have not been closed. To address this issue and try to advance the plans and implementation process, Amtrak and PennDOT recently signed a separate MOA on the grade crossings that will allow Amtrak to work directly with PennDOT's engineering districts in the areas in which the grade crossings exist. PennDOT hopes that this will help move the project forward more quickly; its new goal is to have these grade crossings closed within the next two to three years.See Cassidy, personal communication, 2/2/06.
Second, the station enhancements are still being designed and debated. Several key concerns have arisen based on earlier designs, particularly related to horizontal clearances. At least two NS customers in the area require "dimensional" loads (that is, wider than the typical rail car, or in trucking parlance, "over-dimensional"): a steel mill in Coatesville that produces and ships plate steel, and Hyde Park Foundry, which is located east of Lancaster and receives dimensional steel shipments.
Currently, the three stations under review have ground-level boarding. Thus, there are no horizontal clearance limitations. However, because of requirements under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), newly built or refurbished train stations must now provide full-length high-level platforms to allow for access, as well as ADA-compliant means for reaching these platforms. Such platforms would limit horizontal clearances, and dimensional loads would not be able to pass these stations. To date, all the plans have these features.
There
are methods for accommodating
Example of
Gauntlet Tracks
Source: Transit Cooperative Research Program, Research Results, Digest 47 (March 2002), p. 18.
Also, according to the FRA's technical monograph on the Keystone Corridor, FRA policy on gauntlet tracks is as follows:
Only if the railroad has historically handled (typically in the last ten years) wide-load clearances and the wide loads must use a track adjacent to a high-level platform, need a gauntlet track be constructed; and in that case, only one gauntlet track is needed.See FRA, Technical Monograph, 1:6-10.
On September 1, 2005, the Federal Transit Administration issued disability law guidance, which included the following language:
In cases where there are concerns about accommodating freight trains (including over-dimensional loads) through commuter or intercity rail stations, commuter and intercity rail operators should employ solutions that accommodate both types of traffic in the presence of full-length high-level platforms, such as gauntlet or bypass tracks, unless doing so is technically or operationally infeasible.See U.S. DOT, Federal Transit Administration, "Department Of Transportation Disability Law Guidance: Full-Length, Level-Boarding Platforms In New Commuter And Intercity Rail Stations," http://www.fta.dot.gov/14531_17513_ENG_HTML.htm (accessed 4/5/06).
A less expensive alternative is the use of bridge plates, but it appears that these may not meet newly proposed federal requirements (February 2006) for intercity rail stations. Another potential solution is a hinged-edge platform (often combined with a mini-high platform: a small raised platform that allows individuals with disabilities to board the train at car level) whereby a several-inch width of the platform can be lifted up for passenger rail and then put down to provide additional width to accommodate freight rail.
How the new federal requirements plays out in terms of the three scheduled station enhancements and other stations in the future, and what the implications are for freight rail along the corridor, remain to be seen.
Assessment of the Case
As defined in this report, the Keystone Corridor is a success--plans for incremental HSR continue to move forward and steps are being taken to fully implement an HSR system along the line. While the initial goal is for 110 mph service, many of those involved suggest that once this service is fully running, there is potential to increase maximum authorized speeds to match those on the NEC, (up to 150 mph in places). Further, while it is still too early to determine whether all of the original program goals will be met, many of them have been met ahead of the final schedule or soon will be successfully addressed. It is worth nothing that in terms of service improvements, which is what all the other improvements ultimately support, the frequency of trains has already increased from nine to eleven, with two additional trains on schedule for service in fall 2006. Electric-powered trainsets are on schedule to be introduced at the end of October 2006 with 90-minute express service and 105-minute local service.
A number of factors have contributed to this success. However, before reviewing them, it is helpful to briefly discuss one additional attribute that, while not necessary or sufficient, may still have contributed to success in this particular case: the existence of the Keystone Corridor within one state.
From
the earlier Pennsylvanian experiences in the mid-1960s and again in the
mid-1980s, it is clear that the existence of the corridor in only one state was
not in itself sufficient for HSR to be successfully implemented along the
Keystone Corridor. This finding is borne out by the experiences of other
potential HSR Corridors contained within one state such as
Those factors that clearly contributed to the success of the Keystone Corridor and hold lessons for other HSR initiatives are explored in the following paragraphs.
Leadership, Means, and Authority
Leadership, coupled with the means and the authority to implement change, is perhaps the most important set of factors contributing to the current success of this HSR effort. Any one of them alone would have been insufficient to implement the program currently underway. Indeed, part of what makes the most recent experience with HSR in the Keystone Corridor different from earlier attempts in the 1960s and 1980s is that all three of these factors came into play at the same time. In the earlier years, there was some leadership, but either the means and/or the authority was lacking. In the 1960s, even the leadership was questionable, but certainly, as the various railroads declared bankruptcy, the authority and means were lacking. In the 1980s experiment, the commission was mandated to expire even as it was established, which called into question its authority and again, while it might have had the means to pursue incremental rail, it did not clearly have the means to pursue the recommended Maglev.
In
the most recent case, however, David Gunn at Amtrak, Richard Peltz at PennDOT,
and Governor Edward Rendell played key roles in galvanizing support and
demonstrating a serious commitment to HSR. The funding was available and the
authority was present. Amtrak owned the line and viewed the Keystone Corridor
improvements as fitting into its broader goals for the nationwide system. The
Clear Benefits and Roles for Operators
All of the key operators along the Keystone Corridor see some benefit accruing from the project, even though they maintain concerns. Among these benefits, Amtrak will be able to increase and enhance service on the corridor, with potential corresponding ridership and revenue increases. PennDOT will be able to realize several key objectives related to its broader transportation goals for the corridor and for the commonwealth. Norfolk Southern Corporation remains watchful of the vertical and horizontal clearance and weight restrictions, but recognizes that the signal, communications, and track improvements along the line will also aid their operations by making the entire corridor more efficient. Similarly, SEPTA remains concerned about overall capacity as the numbers of intercity trains also increase and the lack of incentives for on-time performance, but again, it recognizes the benefits to its own services as track, communication, and signal improvements are made.
With respect to roles, in the most recent effort, there has been a clear division of responsibilities in implementing the program and related elements. The KCIP, as ultimately developed, designated agency responsibilities, in terms of both payments and overall management of the project. The additional $2 million funding solicited from NS was tied specifically to work that would benefit the freight railroad by allowing for greater weights; the additional funding contributed by SEPTA has also been specifically tied to improvements that will help commuter rail.
ROW Prepared for High-Speed Service
The Keystone Corridor was already electrified and almost fully highway-grade separated. Though Amtrak had begun using diesel trains on the corridor in 1988, the catenary remained in place. As a result, the opportunity already existed, at a much lower cost than would otherwise have been the case. Further, according to the FRA, the corridor "does not represent a new service, and as the contemplated improvements lie mainly within the existing right-of-way, many of the potential betterments may ultimately prove to be exempt from environmental requirements."See FRA, Technical Monograph, 1:8-6. Avoiding such environmental requirements can reduce time and costs for implementation of additional improvements, while helping to reduce political and/or community opposition.
A
clear counterpoint for this is provided by the remainder of the corridor, from
Amtrak Owns the ROW
In
contrast, not owning the ROW has been a key difficulty for HSR in
The
western portion of the Keystone Corridor again provides a counterpoint.
No heavy-duty rail freight line has 110 mph passenger trains operating over it today. Where freight trains do operate over 110 mph track (Northeast and Empire Corridors, for example), the penalties imposed on freight trains are substantial. In a heavy-duty freight environment (Cleveland-Chicago is one example), high-speed passenger trains must operate over tracks dedicated to their use.See Norfolk Southern Corporation, Corporate Affairs, Letter to Planners of Passenger Train Projects, June 15, 2005.
Making such changes would significantly add to the cost of implementing HSR along this portion of the line and there are fewer incentives for doing so.
Reasonable Costs Budgeted
The costs to reach the 90-minute trip-time and 110 mph speed goals were considered reasonable. This, along with the factors previously discussed--Amtrak ownership of the ROW, electrification, and grade separation--and the decision to pursue modest changes resulting in incremental HSR rather than new HSR or Maglev, enabled both Amtrak and PennDOT to fit the costs of the program into their annual budgets. They thereby avoided the need for major political campaigns to raise financial support for the project. When it became clear that some of the infrastructure costs were greater than anticipated, they had the flexibility to allow a redistribution of the budget to cover these costs from other line items that would be dealt with in future years.
The Northeast Corridor
As
defined in this report, the Northeast Corridor (NEC) is clearly a successful
example of incremental high-speed rail in the
Because HSR has been running for some time along the NEC, the following discussion goes a step further than those of the other cases examined (in the current and previous studies) and examines whether the NEC is successful in terms of the full complement of HSR goals initially developed for it. On that score, it appears "success" is more mixed.
Indeed,
whether service on the NEC constitutes true HSR is still debated. While the
maximum authorized speed (MAS) is as high as 150 mph in three sections of the
corridor (a combined total of 33.9 miles in
Definitions and Context
Before
providing the geographic and operational context of the Northeast Corridor, it
is helpful to provide a brief background of the policy context in terms of what
the NEC means for HSR more broadly in the
Geographic and Operational Context
Legally,
the NEC is composed of three segments: the main line right-of-way (ROW) between
Washington DC and Boston, Massachusetts; the branch line referred to as the
"spine segment" between Philadelphia and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
(also referred to as the Keystone Corridor); and the branch line referred to as
the "nonspine segment" between New Haven, Connecticut, and
Springfield, Massachusetts. At times, the New York City-Albany,
Running
between
Amtrak
(National Railroad Passenger Corporation) service on the NEC connects with its
service on the Keystone Corridor (
Ownership of
and Operations on the NEC
Source:
In
common usage, the 231 miles between
On
the south-end of the corridor, Amtrak owns and has full operating control over
the line, including dispatching, transportation supervision, and maintenance of
way. Several other entities also operate along different sections of the
south-end, including four commuter rail operators (See
Ownership of and Operations on the NEC). Virginia Railway Express connects
On
the north-end of the NEC, as with the south-end, there are multiple commuter
passenger operators. However, the north-end of the corridor is also owned,
operated, and maintained by multiple agencies (See
Ownership of and Operations on the NEC). Amtrak owns 15.2 miles from New York Penn
Station to
See NEC Weekday Revenue Passenger Train Movement, 2006 provides a pictorial of the number of total weekday revenue-producing passenger-train movements on the NEC. (These figures do not include train movements to and from the yard, nor do they include freight train movements.)
While
intercity and passenger commuter service are by far the most extensive type of
rail service on the NEC, several Class I and Class II freight railroads operate
roughly 38 trains per day along segments of the corridor.See
U.S. GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: Congress Faces Critical Decisions in
Developing a National Policy, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Railroads,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives--Statement of JayEtta Hecker, Director of Physical
Infrastructure Issues, GAO-02-522T (Washington DC: GAO, April 11, 2002),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02522t.pdf (accessed 6/23/05), p. 3. On the north-end, the Class II Providence
& Worcester Railroad Company runs 4 local service freight trains daily
between
NEC Weekday
Revenue Passenger Train Movement, 2006
On
the south-end, Delaware & Hudson/CP Rail operates between Landover and
History and Development of the Corridor
The history and development of HSR on the NEC is, in some ways, a tale of two segments--the south-end and the north-end. Development of HSR on both the north-end and the south-end pre-dates the formation of Amtrak and has its roots in the High Speed Ground Transportation Act (HSGTA) of 1965. Introduced (and in part, written) by Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), the act authorized $90 million for high-speed demonstration projects, of which $51.8 million was allocated for the NEC.See U.S. GAO, Problems in the Northeast Corridor Railway Improvement Project, Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, CED-79-38 (Washington DC: GAO, 29 March 1979), p. 3. The Act also established the Office of High Speed Ground Transportation (OHSGT) within the Department of Commerce, directing them to plan, organize, fund, and evaluate demonstration projects to determine how high-speed ground transportation systems could contribute to more efficient and cost-efficient intercity rail. Pell understood the Northeast's unique mobility issues and had a vision in which the large cities were linked together to facilitate cooperative interaction rather than competition.See Anthony Perl, New Departures: Rethinking Rail Passenger Policy in the Twenty-First Century (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2002), p. 140. (Indeed, two years prior to the HSGTA, Congress had appropriated $625,000 for the Northeast Corridor Project to gather data and facts about travel needs and the condition of existing facilities in the Northeast.)
Mixed Experiences with Metroliner and TurboTrain
The south-end of the Northeast Corridor was quickly identified for a demonstration project. In his book examining passenger rail policy, Anthony Perl notes that the south-end had three advantages to other potential corridors:
The route between
The line between
Pennsylvania Railroad executives were willing to work together with the federal government on the initiative since they believed this would eventually help them in their bid for governmental approval for a merger with New York Central Railroad.See Ibid., pp. 141-142.
The OHSGT signed a contract with the Pennsylvania Railroad, initially committing $6.7 million (later increased to $11 million) to support the acquisition of new-generation, electric-powered, self-propelled passenger cars that could travel at speeds of up to 160 mph.See Ibid., p. 141. The trainsets were to be built by a consortium of three companies: General Electric (GE), Westinghouse, and Budd Company. Budd Company would supply the car bodies, and GE and Westinghouse would supply the propulsion systems. The total cost for the three companies would eventually reach $60 million.See Ibid., p. 142. Another $45 million was spent to make upgrades to the ROW that would be needed to run the new trains.See Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor, "The Northeast: Twenty Years of High Speed Rail," http://www.sehsr.org/reports/time2act/actchapter5.html (accessed 2/8/06).
Initial
service was delayed roughly 15 months from the planned start-up of fall 1967, but
the program still proceeded relatively quickly. The first Metroliner was placed
into service on January 16, 1969, just four years after the 1965 act. The new
service reduced by an hour the trip time between
However, by 1975 performance had again begun to suffer. The infrastructure on which the trains ran remained outdated and under-maintained. Initially, as Perl points out, even the overhead catenary system did not function well with the pantograph (current collector) on top of the cars so the trains repeatedly lost power as they moved along the track, causing difficulties with the trains' electrical systems.See Perl, New Departures, p. 143. Of greater import were the track deficiencies. The track was not up to high-speed standards and was increasingly deficient, even for conventional rail travel. In April 1976, because of safety concerns resulting from these deficiencies, new speed restrictions were introduced. Where the Metroliner had been able to run at speeds over 100 mph, it now was limited to 80 mph, which severely hampered operations with resulting decreases in performance and ridership. Indeed, by the end of 1976 only 25 percent of the Metroliner trains were arriving on time.See U.S. DOT, Two-Year Report on the Northeast Corridor, p. 6.
NEC
Ridership: DC-NYC, 1968-1976 (thousands)9
|
|||
Year
|
Metroliner
|
Conventional
|
Total DC-NYC
|
1968
|
|||
1969
|
|||
1970
|
|||
1971
|
288 |
||
1972
|
|||
1973
|
|||
1974
|
|||
1975
|
|||
1976
|
|||
|
Source: |
|||
With
the infrastructure deficiencies, the Metroliner service could not run at the
speeds it was designed to and could only reduce the travel time between
While
the Metroliner was introduced on the south-end of the NEC, a separate
demonstration project was being instituted on the north-end, involving the introduction
of the TurboTrain, a nonelectrified train (since the NYC-Boston ROW was not yet
electrified) developed by United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). UAC was awarded a
contract in January 1966 to build two TurboTrains that it would lease to the
Built
using technologies previously employed in the aviation industry, the TurboTrain
featured a "lighter, faster, quieter, smoother" ride than
conventional trains. With a pendular banking suspension system similar to the
Talgo trains utilized in
Introduced
into revenue service with one daily train on April 8, 1969, and operated by the
Penn Central Railroad, the TurboTrain reduced the travel time between
Originally to be placed into revenue service in the fall of 1966 under New Haven Railroad, the first cars arrived almost three years late due to various production problems. Once in service, on what was now owned by the Penn Central Railroad, the trains were beset with mechanical difficulties and broke down frequently; in fact, the first TurboTrain did not even appear for its scheduled inaugural run because of a mechanical failure.See Russell Garland, "Amtrak Plans New High-Speed Trains Despite Past Failures," Providence Journal-Bulletin (January 9, 2000), LexisNexis online (retrieved 2/9/06).
In 1970, the Rail Passenger Services Act was enacted, creating the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) to provide intercity passenger rail on a national basis. Amtrak began managing the national intercity passenger rail system on May 1, 1971 and took over responsibility for implementation of demonstration projects under the 1965 HSGTA.See For an excellent description of the politics in the years immediately preceding and following this act, see Perl, New Departures, pp. 91-100.
Upon
taking over TurboTrain operations, at least one of Amtrak's directors commented
that it was not "operating satisfactorily."See
Ibid., pp. 91-100. At the time, there was still one round-trip
train running daily. (In previous years, there had sometimes been two daily
round-trips.) Many of the mechanical problems were said to be fixed by 1971,
but problems remained. In July 1973, there was a fire in an engine of a
TurboTrain that caused power to be shut down for one hour on the line near
Pennsylvania Station, disrupting all trains utilizing the tracks (including the
LIRR).See
New York Times, Information Bank Abstract (July 9, 1973), LexisNexis online
(retrieved 2/9/06). On June 10, 1976, an engine "burst
into flames" in
The Metroliner and the TurboTrain had both demonstrated the potential for high-speed rail, but neither achieved the stated goals. The Metroliner was severely limited by ongoing infrastructure deficiencies, and the TurboTrain failed as a result of its mechanical difficulties as well as infrastructure problems.
While
the demonstrations were proceeding, the Secretary of Transportation released
"Recommendations for Northeast Corridor Transportation" (September
1971), which urged action in the corridor, pointing to the travel forecasts and
the overall lack of capacity in all modes. The report suggested that high-speed
rail was one of the best alternatives for both short- and long-term travel in
the corridor and urged implementation of HSR service with nonstop running times
of 2 hours between
Two years later, this report was followed by an updated and extended version, titled Improved High-Speed Rail for the Northeast Corridor . The report again pointed to current deficiencies and travel trends, and urged specific improvements as well as providing a financial plan for achieving them. The estimated cost was now substantially higher--$700 million ±10 percent, including new vehicles.See U.S. GAO, Problems in NEC Project, 5; and U.S. DOT, FRA, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement [hereafter, FPEIS], FRA-RNC-EIS-77-01-F (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, June 1978), 1:1-1. Also, U.S. DOT, FRA, Northeast Corridor: Achievement and Potential [hereafter, NEC: Achievement and Potential] (Washington DC: FRA, November 1986), p. 1-15. In that same year, Congress passed the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, primarily aimed at reorganizing the now bankrupt Penn Central Railroad and several other bankrupt freight railroads around the country. Though focused on freight rail, the act made specific note of the need for improved passenger service in the NEC and directed the secretary of transportation to begin engineering studies needed to implement improved rail service along the corridor. Moreover, the act established the U.S. Railway Association and, among other responsibilities, tasked it with designating for lease or acquisition by Amtrak those properties needed for improved NEC passenger service.
On
June 28, 1974, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) contracted with
Bechtel Incorporated to provide several tasks associated with a larger program
to develop detailed plans for improved high-speed rail service in the NEC. One
of these tasks was development of an improvement plan for the physical plant
between
Northeast Corridor Improvement Project-Phase 1
In
1976, Congress passed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (4R
Act) through which Amtrak became the primary owner of the NEC right-of-way by
purchasing it from Penn Central at the time the latter was being restructured
into Conrail. The Act also authorized the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project
(NECIP). With $1.6 billion authorized for improvements on the NEC spine (
The
main program objective laid out in the 4R Act was to have, by 1981, "the
establishment of regularly scheduled and dependable" intercity rail
passenger service of 3 hours, 40 minutes (3:40) between
The FRA contracted with DeLeuw, Cather/Parsons & Associates (DCP), its principal architect and engineering contractor, for management support, system engineering, design, cost estimates, construction supervision, and inspection.See U.S. GAO, Problems in NEC Project, p. 9. Additional contractors involved in the program included Bechtel Incorporated, which supported the FRA engineering and operations staff; Dynatrend, Inc., which, in turn, supported the FRA's project control division; and Arthur Andersen and Company, which worked with Amtrak in developing managing systems.See Ibid., p. 75.
Of note, the trip-time goals were debated within Congress and the FRA. In fact, additional wording was included in the 4R Act as follows:
Within 2 years after February 5, 1976, the submission by the Secretary to the Congress of a report...considering engineering and financial feasibility and market demand, of the establishment of regularly scheduled and dependable intercity rail passenger service between Boston, Massachusetts, and New York, New York, operating on a 3-hour schedule, including appropriate intermediate stops, and regularly scheduled and dependable intercity rail passenger service between New York, New York, and Washington, District of Columbia, operating on a 2 1/2-hour schedule, including appropriate intermediate stops.See 45 USC § 853.
According to a report issued in March 1978 on a larger study conducted by the National Academy of Public Administration, the trip-time goals were the result of negotiations between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. The Senate wanted trip times identified in earlier U.S. DOT reports of 2 hours nonstop and 2 hours, 30 minutes (2:30) with intermediate stops between Washington DC and New York City, and 2 hours, 45 minutes (2:45) nonstop and 3 hours with intermediate stops to Boston. However, because the total federal funding provided ($1.75 billion) was less than what was believed to be needed, an agreement was reached to add 10 minutes to the Washington DC-NYC trip and 40 minutes to the NYC-Boston trip.See National Academy of Public Administration, "The Great Railway Crisis," Cited in U.S. GAO, Problems in NEC Project, p. 8. In other words, the finally agreed-upon times were not based on any formal and objective analysis. Worse, it was questionable whether the longer trip times would be competitive with air and automobile, making it more difficult for any rail system to attract ridership away from the other modes.
The
NECIP Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS), circulated as
a draft for comment in September 1977 and released as final in June 1978,
identified several additional program goals. Of particular interest, among them
was mention of "minimum future service level improvements" to be
considered, specifically, trip times between
Of
additional importance, the Programmic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)
assessed the alternative routes on the north-end between
The
The Airline Route, linking Middletown, Connecticut; Willimantic, Connecticut; Woonsocket, Rhode Island; and Walpole, Massachusetts
The Shore Line realignment, between Old Saybrook, Connecticut, and Westerly, Rhode IslandSee U.S. DOT, FRA, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification New Haven, CT to Boston, MA: Record of Decision--Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report and 4(f) Statement, DOT-FRA-RDV-94-01-G [hereafter, Record of Decision] (Washington DC: FRA, May 1995), ROD-4.
The
ROW for the
Eleven program elements for the NECIP were identified in the PEIS, with the assumption that on the north-end the Shore Line realignment would be used: route realignments (including curve realignments; rail/rail grade separations; additional tracks; and increasing the center-to-center distance between tracks), track structures, bridges, electrical, signals, communications, fences, grade crossings, stations, service facilities, and tunnels. The expected cost breakdown by state in which the work would occur is shown in See Cost of Program Elements by State ($ millions).
U.S. DOT estimated that $647 million of the total $1.825 billion was directly associated with elimination of deferred maintenance.See U.S. DOT, FRA, FPEIS, pp. 1-9 and 1-11. Roughly 79 percent of this ($510.31 million) was directed at track structures and bridges. The remainder of the deferred maintenance costs was associated with signals and traffic control ($53.95 million); stations ($29.82 million); electrification ($29.29 million); tunnels ($22.29 million); and communications ($1.37 million).See Ibid., p. 1-11.
Cost of
Program Elements by State ($ millions)10
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Source: |
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Narrowing the Program
The proposed actions under the NECIP were developed during an iterative process, beginning with a baseline (unconstrained) plan that included all the possible program elements on the corridor. The total cost for all of these enhancements was $3.5 billion. Recognizing the limitations imposed by funding, an effort was made by the FRA to narrow the program to "arrive at the optimum program which would meet the intent of the 4R Act within the funding level authorized by Congress."See Ibid., p. 1-68. Several variables were developed to help prioritize projects within each program element:
Accomplishment of the goals of travel time and reliability designated by the 4R Act
Uniformity of the entire system
Compatibility with possible future expansion
Geographic distribution of facilities
Minimizing environmental impacts of the improvements
Minimizing impacts on other rail system users
Time necessary to complete the improvement
Determining how each project addressed these factors, resulted in a proposed action plan of roughly half the cost of the baseline plan. The changes of greatest significance were as follows:
Route realignments--In the baseline plan, 32 major curves, 291 minor curves, and 4 flyovers were identified at a cost of $432.2 million. The FPEIS proposed taking action on 76 minor curves at a cost of $43.5 million, a reduction of 90 percent of the baseline costs.
Track structures--The baseline plan suggested installing CWR and concrete ties on 900 miles of dedicated track and on 450 miles of nondedicated track, as well as installing 10 new interlockings and relocating or reconfiguring 19 others. The FPEIS proposed installing CWR on 513 miles of track and concrete ties on 400 miles, while replacing wood ties on 615 miles and reconfiguring 58 interlockings. The total cost of $609.9 million was roughly two-thirds the original baseline plan.
Bridges--Initially, the baseline plan recommended 34 bridges for replacement, 228 for major rehabilitation, 317 for minor rehabilitation, and 176 for minor repairs at a cost of $432.9 million. The FPEIS recommended 31 replacements, 107 upgrades, and 114 repairs at a cost of $215.2 million, roughly half.
Electrification--The baseline plan recommended
installation and upgrading of the system to provide a uniform 25 kV, 60 Hz
system for the entire corridor at a cost of $462.1 million. The FPEIS suggested
upgrading to 25 kV, 60 Hz between
Redirection Study--Changing Direction before It Began
While the FPEIS was not issued until June 1978, in January of that year, Secretary of Transportation Brock Adams initiated the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project: Redirection Study . Led by U.S. DOT, with input from Amtrak, commuter rail agencies, and Conrail, the redirection study aimed at a comprehensive review of the NECIP. In justifying his actions, which included changing the FRA's NECIP management, Secretary Adams voiced two concerns based on the August 1977 implementation plan, which had already been narrowed substantially from the earlier baseline plan and was circulated as part of the draft PEIS (DPEIS) in September 1977:
That service needs of commuter and freight operators had not received sufficient consideration along with intercity rail service
That the
project scope, schedule, and budget had deficienciesSee U.S. DOT,
Northeast Corridor Improvement Project: Redirection Study [hereafter,
Redirection Study] (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, January 1979), p. i.
Adams suggested further that the planning that had led to the implementation plan (estimated cost $1.82 billion) was "unrealistic and untenable," pointing to the compromises between Congress and the administration that led to the five-year program with $1.75 billion in funding, noting that such a short period required concurrent development, design, and construction.See Ibid., pp. 1-2.
A
number of comments received on the DPEIS reveal some basis for
Effect on commuter service of dedicated track in parts of the corridor--pointing to a statement in the DPEIS that noted "wherever possible, use of mainline tracks by other than intercity passenger trains will be minimized," the UMTA suggested that further clarification was needed since such exclusion of commuter access to express tracks would "adversely affect the quality of local commuter service in this region." Further, UMTA noted that the DPEIS made no attempt to quantify these adverse affects.
Commuter rail locomotive and car conversion--UMTA noted concern related to who would bear the costs of converting the commuter fleets so they could be used on the proposed 25 kV, 60 Hz electrical system.See U.S. DOT, FRA, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement--Comments and Responses [hereafter, FPEIS-3], FRA-RNC-EIS-77-01-F (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, June 1978), 3:5-7.
These
concerns were also echoed by Frederick Salvucci, Secretary of the Office of
Transportation for the
Led by the Northeast Corridor Project Office, the redirection study again examined various program elements and projects in light of their ability to address trip-time goals and other NEC needs. The study reached the following conclusions:
That the original $1.75 billion authorization would not enable development of the NEC as initially conceived;
That to come closer to the initial vision, an additional $654 million was needed, for a total federal authorization of $2.404 billion; and,
That a new schedule was needed that would that would spread the work over seven years, closer to the original schedule discussed prior to the final PEIS.See U.S. DOT, Redirection Study, pp. 6-9.
See PEIS and Redirection Study Program Elements and Costs ($ millions) shows the DPEIS implementation plan, the redirection study recommended program, and the FPEIS proposed action including state and local shares. See Recommended Time Line from Redirection Study shows the proposed time line from the redirection study.
Organizational
Problems Revealed
In March 1979, the Comptroller General
of the
Of greatest concern, the comptroller concluded three years into the five-year project, the NECIP was challenged organizationally, had wasted resources, and had still not completed the planning for the program.See Ibid., p. 54. In terms of planning, the report noted that the redirection study did not contain sufficient detail on scopes, schedules, and costs, and that the full scope of work continued to shift and be revised.
Recommended Time Line from Redirection
Study
Source:
Moreover, the planning and control element goals had all missed their original due dates (See Status of NECIP Planning and Control Elements, 01/79), and all individual projects were falling behind. Ninety-eight percent of the work elements were delayed relative to the August 1977 schedule, and even with a new time line in March 1978, roughly two-thirds (62 percent) remained delayed.See Ibid., p. 67. The U.S. GAO attributed the project delays to a cumbersome and time-consuming process of defining, delineating, negotiating, and approving work for Amtrak to undertake.See Ibid., p. 68.
Status of NECIP Planning and Control Elements,
01/79
Source:
According to the comptroller, the roles and responsibilities of the three key actors--Amtrak, the FRA, and DCP--remained unclear and several key issues (interactions with other corridor operators and indemnification of DCP against third-party liability, among them) remained unresolved. As a result of the insufficient clarity in roles and scope of work, as well as poor oversight regarding the multiple contractors, resources were being spent inefficiently or wasted. As a glaring example, the comptroller pointed to a $2 million purchase of hopper cars and a $3 million purchase of materials by Amtrak, which DCP later found might not be needed.See Ibid., p. 55.
The report argued that the NECIP project management was "not effective and has contributed to the project's problems," arguing that the three-party management structure (FRA, Amtrak, contractor) was ill-equipped to handle the program.See Ibid., p. iv. Moreover, the comptroller concluded that the problems faced by the NECIP would not be resolved until the management structure was simplified. To do this, the report suggested that full responsibility and authority for construction should reside with Amtrak, without FRA involvement. To the extent that the FRA might remain involved, the comptroller argued that its role should be "one confined to top-level funding and monitoring responsibilities."See Ibid., p. 83.
In the meantime, based on the redirection study, the FRA developed a draft corridor master plan (CMP) based on the $2.404 billion federal contribution, that it issued in March 1979. The NECIP Project Director then requested a revised estimate that resulted in a cost estimate of $2.869 million, based on changes in initial cost estimates, changes in the scope of work, and additional escalation.See U.S. DOT, FRA, NEC: Achievement and Potential, pp. A-5 to A-6. During the next two years, ongoing budget revisions (made at times by the FRA alone and, at other times by the FRA, Amtrak, and DCP) revealed an underlying tension as additions were made based on a combination of increases in cost estimates, changes in scope, and escalation, while reductions often followed to keep overall costs down and within the parameters specified by Congress. See NECIP Budget Revisions, 04/79-01/82 ($ millions) provides some highlights of the revisions from March 1979 through February 1982 to give a sense of the volatility of the work plan and related budget.
NECIP Budget Revisions,
04/79-01/82 ($ millions)13
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Program Element
|
Based on Redirection Study 3/79
|
Revised Budget 3/79
|
Final CMP 3/80
|
Revised Budget 11/80
|
Final Program as of 2/82
|
Section
Improvements
|
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Track
|
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Bridges
|
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Electrification
|
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Signals
|
|||||
Communications
|
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Fencing
|
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Grade
Crossings
|
|||||
Stations
|
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Service
Facilities
|
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Tunnels
|
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PM/SE
|
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Total
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Source: |
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In 1980 the Passenger Railroad
Rebuilding Act called for the managerial responsibility of the NECIP to be
transferred to Amtrak from the FRA by 1985. In that same year, Congress amended
the 4R Act, specifying September 30, 1985, as the new deadline for establishment
of "regularly scheduled and dependable service" between
The Results
In 1985 responsibility for managing the NECIP was formally transferred from the FRA to Amtrak as the 1977 comptroller's report had recommended. In November 1986, the FRA released the report Northeast Corridor: Achievement and Potential , noting that the work of the NECIP was "substantially complete by the end of calendar 1984." Remaining work to further reduce trip times would continue, according to the report, through 1986. The report further suggested that the project was completed at a cost beneath that authorized by Congress (this cost was based on the program as of February 1982).See U.S. DOT, FRA, NEC: Achievement and Potential, p. ES-3.
When comparing the achievements with several of the program elements specified in the FPEIS and redirection study, some major modifications become apparent. (See Redirection Study/FPEIS Recommendations vs. Actual Improvements compares the program elements recommended in the redirection study and FPEIS with the actual improvements made by 1984, as identified in the 1986 FRA report.) In particular, and as noted by the report, the largest rehabilitation items remaining were replacement of the existing power generation and supply system (i.e., the catenary system was not fully upgraded between Washington DC and New Rochelle, New York, nor was a new system installed between New Haven and Boston) and complete modernization of the signal system (i.e., centralized traffic control [CTC] and reverse [bidirectional] signaling was not yet installed on the entire system).
By 1986, progress had been made on
implementing high-speed rail on the NEC. Modifications to the system were
sufficient to meet the trip-time goals for
These difficulties were reflected in
continuous revisions of the scope and budget as well as the failure to realize
goals on the north-end of the corridor. While trip times had improved with the
introduction of Metroliner service between
Redirection Study/FPEIS
Recommendations vs. Actual Improvements14
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|
Selective repairs of
critical elements DC-Queens; |
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|
CTC DC-Wilmington and 100% reverse signaling on designated tracks and outside tracks south of NY |
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|
Track replacement and structural improvements on 1 tunnel in MD; Track rehabilitation in NYC tunnels |
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1982 (from 4 hours, 24 minutes [4:24] to 3 hours, 57 minutes [3:57]), they were still falling short of the 4R Act trip time goal (3 hours, 40 minutes [3:40]) by 1986.
Northeast Corridor Improvement
Project--Phase 2
The FRA's assessment that the bulk of
the work for the NECIP was complete by 1986 was reflected in the levels of
federal appropriations for the NECIP during FY 1985 through FY 1990 (See Appropriations for NECIP, FY 1976-1995).
However, the Coalition of Northeastern Governors (CONEG) continued to promote
the need for reduced trip times between
The study was released in October 1990 with the following key conclusions:
Three-hour travel by rail
between
Diversion of trips from air and roads to rail would help reduce fuel consumption and air pollution.
A high-speed rail project
would generate new regional activity throughout the Northeast and the rest of
the
The study stressed the importance of HSR for the overall transportation system in the region, noting that it would play an integral role in also freeing up air space. Specifically, the CONEG study predicted that 80 percent of the additional ridership wooed from alternative modes (total estimated at 2.82 million) would come from air, and primarily from shuttle traffic between Boston/Providence and New York City/Newark. The resulting decline in air travel would permit reducing daily shuttle trips by up to 50, freeing up eight to ten gates for longer flights.See Ibid., p. 3-4; see p. A-3 for the forecast of additional passengers wooed from air and roads.
Appropriations for NECIP, FY 1976-1995
Source:
During this same period, Senator Frank Lautenberg (D, NJ 1982-2000/2002- ) played a critical role in jump-starting renewed funding for the NEC by placing $100 million in the FY 1991 appropriations bill. Efforts were refocused on increasing speeds and decreasing north-end trip times, an endeavor referred to at times by Amtrak as the Northeast High-Speed Rail Improvement Project (NHRIP).
In FY 1991, Congress appropriated $25
million for engineering associated with electrification of the north-end
between
Of note, there was discussion at the
time about the needs along the section of the corridor between NYC and
In terms of electrification, however, changing the electrified system in Metro-North territory to the same voltage as the rest of the corridor would have required new commuter rail trainsets, which would have placed undue burden on the commuter rail system and likely would not have been acceptable to ConnDOT and MTA, the owners of the segment. The option of replacing the electrified system using its existing voltage in Metro-North territory was never explored since Amtrak did not feel it urgent to include these additional costs in the overall project. Thus, a decision was made to exclude this section of the line from the electrification project--instead, Amtrak would ensure that its new trainsets could also run on Metro-North's system.See Horowitz, personal communication, 5/10/06; and Thompson, personal communication, 5/15/06. Excluding the replacement of this critical segment from the overall planning and related financing for electrification has had lasting consequences in terms of the ability to meet the specified trip-time goals, frequency, and reliability.
Draft
Environmental Impact Statement/Report
Scoping for the project began in
September 1991 and in April 1992, the FRA issued its formal Scoping Document
for the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification between
Project as proposed--"To electrify the NEC main line between New Haven and Boston using an overhead 25,000 volt, 60 hertz single phase catenary system" so that electric-powered trains could run from Washington DC through to Boston, Massachusetts. The project would include installation of substations and switching stations, improvements to signal and communications systems, and either lower tracks or modified overhead bridges to provide sufficient clearance.
Electrification with increased vertical clearance--This alternative would be identical to that proposed, but with increased minimum vertical clearances to accommodate double-stacked intermodal container rail freight.
Other forms of electrification--This alternative would examine whether there were any significant environmental differences between the system proposed by Amtrak and the one already in use by MTA Metro-North (11,500 volt, 25 hertz). It would also examine the alternative of a third rail system.
No build--this alternative involved examining nonelectric powered trains for the NEC, including gas turbine hydraulic drive locomotives similar to the Turboliner used on the Empire Corridor; diesel-electric locomotives so that the corridor need not be electrified, but locomotives would not have to be switched in New Haven; liquefied natural gas (LNG) locomotives that would still necessitate a switch at New Haven; and finally, the no-action alternative.See U.S. DOT, FRA, Scoping Document, pp. 7-8.
In October 1992, Congress passed the Amtrak Authorization and Development Act which amended Title VII of the 4R Act of 1976 to include a new section, stipulating that the Secretary of Transportation submit a program master plan for the establishment of "regularly scheduled, safe, and dependable" service between New York City and Boston of three hours or less, including intermediate stops. (Trip times for the north-end of the corridor had slipped back to roughly 4 hours, 30 minutes [4:30] by this point.) The act also authorized $470 million during FY 1993 and FY 1994 for the NECIP.See Pub. L. 102-533.
In September 1993, the Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Report (DEIS/R) for the New Haven-Boston project was released. At the time the report was issued, roughly 60 percent of the design for the system was complete and Amtrak was estimating that construction could begin as early as spring 1994.See U.S. DOT, FRA, Office of Railroad Development, Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Report: Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification--New Haven, CT to Boston, MA, DOT/FRA/RDV-93/01-A [hereafter, DEIS/R-1] (Washington DC: FRA, September 1993), 1:ES-1. The full proposal to reduce express trip times to less than three hours included the following elements:
Installation of a constant-tension simple overhead catenary system ("constant-tension" catenary is mandatory for speeds above 125 mph. Weights are hung at intervals along the system to counter the weather effects that cause wires to sag when the weather is warm and tighten when the weather is cool. The result is maintained alignment of the catenary and better contact with the surface of the trains.)
Four substations and overhead or underground utility supplies to provide electricity from the local utility companies to the substations. Each of the substations would "consist of a fenced area of approximately 0.5 acres."
Three switching stations and 18 paralleling stations
Bridge modifications-- either lowering of the tracks, raising the bridges, or replacing the bridges.See U.S. DOT, FRA, DEIS/R-1, 1:ES-5.
Amtrak also proposed increasing current service from 10 round-trips daily to 26 round-trips daily--16 express service trains, with speeds up to 150 mph, and 10 local trains in each direction. Ridership was projected to increase by over 93 percent by 2010, and forecasts assumed 37.8 percent of automobile riders in the corridor would shift to the intercity service.See Ibid., p. ES-6.
In addition to the alternatives specified in the scoping document, the DEIS/R also proposed two route alternatives: (1) the Shore Line Route, which ran adjacent to the coast in Rhode Island and Connecticut and (2) the Inland Route, which ran via Hartford, Springfield, and Worcester. The DEIS/R concluded that the Shore Line Route was preferable because of greater travel-time reductions, fewer freight operations and grade crossings, and better vertical alignment.See Ibid., p. 2-3.
Comments and
Responses--Frequently Cited Issues
The comments and responses to the DEIS/R raised a number of concerns. Several of the most frequently cited issues, and how they were addressed by the Final EIS/R (FEIS/R), are discussed briefly in the next few paragraphs.
Freight rail
The greatest concerns related to freight rail were expressed by the Providence & Worcester Railroad Company (P&W), which would be most affected by HSR on the north-end of the NEC. Broadly, P&W noted that while the DEIS had stated the electrification "could" have a negative effect on freight rail, it did not offer a "thorough or accurate assessment of the impacts and fails to identify or evaluate the mitigating measures necessary to ameliorate the adverse impacts." More specifically, P&W's concerns had several facets, including the following:
Negative impacts on existing freight service, resulting from delays caused by both the proposed construction and narrower operating windows as a result of increased passenger rail and HSR activities
Limitations on future rail freight growth resulting from narrower overall operating windows and the proposed restriction of freight rail to nighttime operations
Limitations on the growth of new rail-oriented industry along the corridor which would not be able to increase capacity since they would not be assured of "dependable and flexible" freight rail service on the corridor; and,
Insufficient vertical clearances, which again would adversely affect current and future rail freight operations on the line.See U.S. DOT, FRA, Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report: Comment Letters and Public Hearing Transcripts, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification--New Haven, CT to Boston, MA [hereafter, FEIS/R-4], DOT/FRA/RDV-94/01-D (Washington DC: FRA, October 1994), 4:MC 3-14.
The FEIS/R responded to some of these concerns, noting that several measures, "primarily the reinstallation of previously existing side tracks," had been included in The Northeast Corridor Transportation Plan to incorporate capacity improvements that addressed freight rail concerns.See U.S. DOT, FRA, Office of Railroad Development, Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Report: Technical Studies, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification--New Haven, CT to Boston, MA, DOT/FRA/RDV-93/01-B [hereafter, DEIS/R-2] (Washington DC: FRA, September 1993), 2:3-18.
Electromagnetic fields (EMF)
A number of letters were received from
residents along the
Moveable bridges/marine traffic
Criticism expressed by the boating community in southeastern Connecticut, the Coast Guard, and the Connecticut Department of Transportation revolved around the opening and closing of four moveable bridges and the potential impact on marina traffic accessing Long Island Sound. Broadly, the concern was that with more trains running along the corridor, the bridges would have to be closed for longer periods of time, which would narrow the window for boats to cross.
Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, Amtrak needed to obtain a Water Quality Certification from the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). As a condition of obtaining the certification, Amtrak agreed to a cap on the number of trains it could run along this section of the corridor, and it committed to a change in policy that would allow the default position of the bridges to be open for marine traffic. In other words, unlike most locations around the country (including the ConnDOT-owned portion of the NEC within Connecticut) where bridges remain closed and open for marine traffic at specified times of the day, along this section of the NEC, the bridges are kept open for marine traffic, and they are closed a certain number of times each day for the railroads to cross.
The DEP issued the certification to Amtrak in 1996, with a cap of 34 trains per day. (Amtrak was running 17 trains per day at the time.) This cap is limited to passenger trains; it does not include freight trains.See Amtrak Planning and Analysis Department, e-mail communication, 4/10/06. Nevertheless, this cap has been pointed to as one of the key constraints on high-speed rail along the corridor.See James Boice, Connecticut Department of Transportation, 6/8/06.
Grade crossings.
Comments suggested that closing the grade crossings would affect access between properties adjacent to the rail tracks and the shoreline. The FEIS/R noted that "no grade crossing eliminations are planned or required as part of the Proposed Action." Further, "Under NECIP, th e States are responsible for elimination of public grade crossings. As a consequence, it is the States' decision whether and when to implement the plan."See U.S. DOT, FRA, FEIS/R-4; U.S. DOT, FRA, FEIS/R-3, 3:13.
Also mentioned in the comments were concerns related to noise and vibration caused by HSR, negative visual impacts and obstructions related to the poles and catenary wires, as well as discussion over whether the forecasts for modal shifts from air and automobile to HSR were valid, and whether the alternative routes had been thoroughly investigated and assessed.
On this last point, the earlier
assessment of the three route alternatives--the Shore Line realignment, the
The Program
Master Plan
In July 1994, in response to the earlier Amtrak Authorization and Development Act, Secretary of Transportation Federico Peña issued The Northeast Corridor Transportation Plan: New York City to Boston . This program master plan not only covered the electrification and trip-time goals, but also included capacity improvements and recapitalization projects to bring the line up to a state of good repair. The FRA estimated that the trip-time goals could be achieved by 1999, with an estimated cost of $1.255 billion in FY 1993 dollars ( See Estimated Cost of Trip-Time-Related Improvements ($ millions) ).
An additional $606 million would be needed for capacity improvements to ensure efficient operation and growth of freight and commuter services on the line (See Capacity Improvements).See U.S. DOT, FRA, Office of Railroad Development, The Northeast Corridor Transportation Plan: New York City to Boston [hereafter, NECTP: NYC-Boston], Report to Congress (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, July 1994), 1:I-2. Finally, funds of roughly $1.2 billion would be needed for recapitalization related to the north-end (See Recapitalization). The total for these three components was $3.1 billion (in 1993 $).See U.S. GAO, Need for Applying Best Practices, p. 13.
According to the master plan, Amtrak would be responsible for managing the program. Because some of the elements would benefit other stakeholders as well, responsibility for implementation would be shared by Amtrak, the commuter railroads, the freight railroads, and state governments.See Ibid., 3.
In terms of scheduling work, expected
completion for the entire program was estimated at 2010, with electrified
operations between
Projects directly affecting three-hour trip times for NYC-Boston service
Projects that increased capacity to enable operation of planned commuter and freight services through 2010 while maintaining the three-hour trip time for intercity rail
Projects critical to achieving a state of good repair, with priority given to safety issues and/or facilities in advanced stages of deteriorationSee U.S. DOT, FRA, NECTP: NYC-Boston, p. I-7.
According to the report, roughly $594 million was already appropriated for the trip-time improvements and $60 million was already programmed by the commuter agencies for portions of the corridor not owned by Amtrak. The remainder would be derived from subsequent authorizations.See Ibid., p. I-5.
By 1995, Congress had appropriated $3.3
billion for the NECIP (including all monies under the earlier program begun in
the mid-1970s) and the funds had been obligated as shown in See Funds Obligated under NECIP, FY 1976-1995 ($
thousands).See U.S. GAO, Resources,
Community, and Economic Development Division, "Amtrak's Northeast Corridor
Funding Needs," GAO/RCED-95-152R (Washington DC: GAO, April 13, 1995),
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/154032.pdf (accessed 6/21/05), p. 2. While
many improvements were made on the north-end between FY 1991 and FY 1995, key
improvements remained outstanding. Most notably, the electrification system
still needed to be constructed, the signal system needed to be modernized, and
bridge clearances had to be increased. Construction of the electrification
system was scheduled to begin in fall 1995, with timing contingent on obtaining
certifications and approvals from
Before moving ahead, it is worth spending a moment on See Funds Obligated under NECIP, FY 1976-1995 ($ thousands). The dollar amount shown for the north-end electrification appears very high (more than double that obligated for the south-end), given that electrification on the north-end remained outstanding at the end of FY 1995. The design phase for the north-end was 90 percent complete at this time, but no construction had occurred.See Ibid., p. 36. Indeed, in April 1995, Kenneth Mead, then director of transportation issues at the U.S. GAO, reported to Senator Mark Hatfield that an additional $133.2 million was still needed through FY 1999 to complete the north-end electrification.See U.S. GAO, "Amtrak Northeast Corridor Funding Needs," p. 3.
Funds Obligated under NECIP,
FY 1976-1995 ($ thousands)15
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Cost Category
|
South-end
|
North-end
|
Total
|
Bridge
Repair/Replacement
|
|||
Signal/Traffic
Control
|
|||
Electrification
(electric traction system)
|
|||
Track/Track-Related
|
|||
Tunnels
|
|||
Service
Facilities
|
|||
Stations
|
|||
Equipment/High-Speed
Trainsets
|
|||
Other
|
|||
Total
|
|||
|
Source: |
|||
This apparent incongruence in the
federal obligations appears to have resulted from the following scenario. In
May 1992, the original contractor, Morrison-Knudsen (
In the meantime, according to U.S. GAO reports to both the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, while the focus for the past two decades had been on improvements needed for HSR along the corridor, substantial investment was also needed to "correct the deterioration" of the south-end of the corridor. The cost for this rehabilitation was estimated to be between $2.5 and $3.5 billion over a 10-15 year period, and included rehabilitation of the electric traction system; rehabilitation of the Baltimore and Potomac Tunnel in Baltimore City; rehabilitation and/or replacement of several bridges, interlockings, and track structures; and rehabilitation of the signal system.See U.S. GAO, "Amtrak's Northeast Corridor Funding Needs," pp. 2-4; U.S. GAO, Amtrak's Northeast Corridor, pp. 2 and 47-49. Of the $200 million federal appropriation in FY 1995, Amtrak allocated 57.5 percent ($115 million) to the south-end to begin this work.See U.S. GAO, Amtrak's Northeast Corridor, p. 50.
Delays on the
North-end
Back on the north-end, in December
1995, Amtrak awarded a $321 million fixed-price contract to BBC/MEC to build
the electrification system between
The groundbreaking ceremony for the electrification was held two months later in July 1996, a little over two years after the estimated dates given in the DEIS/R. Project delays began almost immediately, both in the electrification work and on the trainsets. In terms of the electrification, delays resulted from numerous sources, including unanticipated conditions, slow production, and safety incidents.See U.S. DOT, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report: Amtrak's High-Speed Rail Electrification Project, RT-2000-020 (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, December 14, 1999, Exhibit 2, p. 10. In October 1997, BBC/MEC submitted a revised schedule, with an end date for the completion of the electrification that was three months later than initially projected. However, by March 1999, it was clear that the building and testing of the electrified line was sufficiently delayed to push completion out to June 2000. Amtrak announced new timing projections, suggesting that limited service would be introduced in December 1999, with full completion of the electrification in June 2000.See Ibid., p. 10.
BBC/MEC faced difficult working
conditions in the
According to Amtrak, however, not all the delays and cost overruns (which, by the end of the project had more than doubled the original contract to $680 million) were caused by unanticipated and difficult working conditions. In August 1999, Amtrak documented "numerous occasions" in which the contractor failed to have necessary equipment, personnel, and/or supplies in place to conduct the work in a timely fashion.
In that same year, a former BBC/MEC employee filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court under the whistle-blower provision of the False Claim Act, charging noncompliance and unsubstantiated and questionable claims on the part of BBC/MEC as well as an additional contractor, J.F. White Contracting Co. Additional allegations included the intentional use of defective materials.See "Company Officials Deny Overrun Allegations," The Associated Press State & Local Wire (September 24, 2000), LexisNexis (retrieved 2/27/06); National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP), "June 2000 Hotlines" 142 (June 9, 2000), http://www.narprail.org/h0006.htm#142 (accessed 2/27/06) On June 7, 2000, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) raided the BBC/MEC office in Old Saybrook, Massachusetts that was overseeing the project, taking computers, financial statements, and other documents related to the lawsuit. (The suit was eventually settled in October 2005, with BBC/MEC and J.F. White Contracting Co. agreeing to pay Amtrak $24.75 million while not formally admitting any wrongdoing.See Donna de la Cruz, "Foreign, U.S. Firms to Pay Feds Nearly $25 Million for Inflating Amtrak Claims," The Associated Press State & Local Wire (October 11, 2005), LexisNexis (retrieved 2/27/06); "National Briefing/Washington: Agreement Reached in Amtrak Case," New York Times (October 12, 2005); also see Amtrak, Office of the Inspector General, Semiannual Report to Congress: April 1, 2000-September 30, 2000 (Washington DC: Amtrak, October 2000), http://www.amtrakoig.com/reports/ATK220200.PDF (accessed 2/27/06), pp. 2 and 15; Amtrak, 2001 Annual Report, 20.)
In September 1999, Amtrak announced that in addition to the electrification delays, the Acela trainsets would not be ready until Spring 2000, owing to additional design modifications. Nevertheless, Amtrak was committed to beginning limited HSR service in January 2000, with two daily round-trip trains using refurbished Metroliner trainsets.See U.S. DOT, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report, pp. 1-2.
The Results
Though three years behind the schedule
identified in the 1994
Northeast Corridor Transportation Plan , in January 2000, Amtrak
introduced limited HSR service between
According to a U.S. GAO report issued in February 2004, only 5 of the 17 work elements required to achieve the three-hour train service had been completed by March 2003. Fewer than one-third of the elements (21 of 72) intended to improve infrastructure and enhance track capacity had been completed; the remainder were either determined to be incomplete or their status was unknown. Furthermore, according to the U.S. GAO, while work continued in some areas, "...there does not appear to be an effort to complete the project or meet the trip time goal."See U.S. GAO, Need for Applying Best Practices, pp. 3-4.
The U.S. GAO further suggested that there were four shortcomings in Amtrak's overall management that led to its inability to meet all the goals specified:
While Amtrak may not have adopted the FRA plan, neither did it develop its own comprehensive plan, instead managing individual project components and losing sight of the overall program objectives.
Similarly, Amtrak's financial management was not comprehensive; it focused on the short-term with "spend plans" focused on specific work elements and based on annual appropriations and spending.
While Amtrak worked with stakeholders, it did not fully integrate their interests into the project goals.
Amtrak was unable to effectively make use of information to manage problems that arose during the course of the work.See Ibid., pp. 26-28.
Interestingly, while an earlier criticism of the NECIP had been the management of the process by the FRA, in the case of the NHRIP, the FRA was criticized in the U.S. GAO report for not providing enough oversight of the process.
According to Amtrak, it had never intended that the FRA master plan serve as a blueprint for its efforts on the north-end of the corridor, and it had never formally adopted the plan nor managed its projects in accordance with it.See Ibid., Need for Applying Best Practices, p. 15. One former Amtrak employee noted that the master plan was helpful in helping Amtrak and the states think through what could be done for the entire corridor given sufficient funding. However, because the master plan did not focus specifically on HSR, there were items that conflicted with projects needed for HSR and some that just did not contribute to HSR implementation.
Indeed, in fairness to Amtrak, the October 1994 FEIS/R did make clear that the projects identified in the master plan were "separate and distinct from the electrification project that is the subject of [the] FEIS/R....To the extent that they have not been addressed in the PEIS or in previous site-specific environmental reviews, they will become the subject of additional site-specific reviews...at times consistent with project development."See U.S. DOT, FRA, Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report and 4(f) Statement: Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification--New Haven, CT to Boston, MA, DOT/FRA/RDV-94/01-A (Washington DC: FRA, October 1994), 1:1-6. Whether these site-specific reviews were ever conducted is unclear.
Current Status and Challenges
Incremental high-speed rail on the Northeast Corridor has already been implemented, and has existed for a number of years now, but several challenges remain both for high-speed service and intercity rail service more broadly. Moreover, some of the institutional and funding decisions that may be taken in the next few years could either spell a future of sustained and strengthened HSR or the end of it on the corridor.
Institutional
Challenges
The Northeast Corridor is currently
caught up in the larger debate, still being played out, over the future of
Amtrak itself and whether the NEC should remain part of the national passenger
network system, either as separate from the rest of the system, or with
ownership of the infrastructure and operations split apart. In many ways, the
reasons for the institutional difficulties stem back to the creation of Amtrak
itself. According to Thomas Till, Managing Director of the
According to the Northeast Corridor
Action Plan, produced by the
Lack of public accountability and transparency--Even though the NEC functions very differently from much of the Amtrak network, financial reporting of NEC operations and maintenance activities is often combined with the rest of Amtrak's operations, making it difficult to discern actual costs on the line.See Voorhees Transportation Center, Northeast Corridor Action Plan, p. 2. Amtrak's current Board of Directors has recently moved to address this lack of transparency on the NEC by providing separate capital and operating figures for the NEC's train operations and infrastructure costs.See Amtrak, FY07 Grant and Legislative Request (March 2006), 12, http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/FY07GrantLegislativeRequest.pdf (accessed 6/20/06).
Financial and institutional instability--Chronic and continuing underfunding by the federal government and the resulting threats of bankruptcy have plagued Amtrak in recent years and brought a great deal of uncertainty.See Voorhees Transportation Center, Northeast Corridor Action Plan, p. 2.
Complicating this, as Thompson points
out, is the fact that Amtrak has three different functions around the
In February 2002, the Amtrak Reform Council, an independent federal commission established to review Amtrak's performance, submitted its recommended action plan for Amtrak to Congress. It called for a "new business model for Amtrak and the introduction of competition in train operations." Specifically, it recommended splitting Amtrak into three separate entities: a federal oversight agency, a government-owned and operated corporation to control the NEC infrastructure currently owned by Amtrak, and a passenger railroad operating company.See Amtrak Reform Council, "Today, the Amtrak Reform Council Releases its Action Plan for the Restructuring and Rationalization of the National Railroad Passenger System," Press Release (February 7, 2002), p. 1. The goal was to provide a situation in which Amtrak could "focus on its core business of running trains and not be forced to focus on maintaining the Northeast Corridor...[or] its government functions."See Ibid., 1.
In 2003, the Bush Administration incorporated many of these ideas into the Passenger Rail Investment Reform Act, which was introduced in the House of Representatives (H.R. 3211) by Representative Don Young (R, AK) and in the Senate (S. 1501) by Senator John McCain (R, AZ). The Act was intended to make "key reforms to transition Amtrak into a purely operating company, create a federal-state partnership to support passenger rail, introduce market-based competition to the system and set up an interstate compact to maintain the heavily used Northeast Corridor service."See U.S. DOT, "The Bush Administration Introduces the Passenger Rail Investment Reform Act in Congress, Transportation Secretary Mineta Invites Serious Dialogue on Amtrak Reform," Press Release, DOT 62-05, April 14, 2005, http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot6205.htm (accessed 6/6/06). There was insufficient support for the act to be passed. The bill was reintroduced in Congress in 2005, but in April of that year, the U.S. GAO released a report suggesting that it was "premature to separate management of Northeast Corridor infrastructure from operations."See U.S. DOT, Office of the Inspector General, "Reauthorization of Intercity Passenger Rail and Amtrak," Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, US Senate--Statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, US Department of Transportation, CC-2005-030 (Washington DC: GAO, April 21, 2005), p. 11. Again, the bill did not pass.
In the meantime, Amtrak released its own proposal in April 2005 calling for "reform from all sides," and agreeing that "business as usual [is] not sustainable."See Amtrak, "Amtrak Strategic Reform Initiatives, FY06 Grant Request: Rebuilding America's Passenger Rail System--Overview," (May 2005), 1, http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/strategic-slides06.pdf (accessed 6/7/06). The proposal identified three basic principles:
Roles of intercity passenger rail and of Amtrak must be uncoupled
Future of passenger rail depends on federal capital funding match program
Realizing full potential requires competition of services and functionsSee Ibid.
It then outlined several structural, operating, and legislative initiatives to help achieve these, including state-led corridor development, funding of NEC backlog needs, and creation of a capital matching program similar to matching programs for highways and transit. Looking forward, Amtrak also proposed changes in railroad retirement and in labor rules, believing them both to be essential to the future economic well-being of Amtrak.See Amtrak, Amtrak Strategic Reform Initiatives and FY06 Grant Request (April 2005), 32, http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/strategic06.pdf (accessed 6/20/06).
It is unclear which of these proposals, if any, will be ultimately pursued. Equally uncertain is the future of HSR on the corridor, particularly since in many discussions the HSR component gets lost in the overall debate.
Operations and
Maintenance Challenges
At the same time as it is facing these broader institutional issues, Amtrak's HSR operations and overall capacity on the NEC continue to be hampered as well. On the north-end, HSR operations through MTA Metro-North territory continue to be challenged by narrow track centers, which prevent the tilt mechanism from being used, and high commuter rail volumes, which limit frequency and speeds. (While the need to update the catenary in this section is also important, it is currently being addressed by ConnDOT.) As a result, maximum authorized speeds through this section of the corridor remain significantly lower than what is typically thought of as high-speed rail.
Also important on the north-end are the
issues revolving around the water-borne traffic and the demands imposed by the
boating community on the
Thus, while the policy change allows an
increase in the number of trains and therefore an increase in train traffic,
the bridges remain a key obstacle for HSR, since they still will be moveable
with the default position "open" to accommodate marine traffic. The
bridges will close only for those 38 trains per day. This makes it more
difficult at best, and possibly highly unlikely, to meet the trip-time goal of
three hours between
On the south-end of the corridor, capacity remains very much constrained, with insufficient infrastructure to handle the high volumes of commuter and intercity rail traffic (not to mention freight). In addition, many years of deferred maintenance have led to deterioration of the infrastructure that does exist. In 2005, the cost to bring the entire corridor to a state of good repair (SOGR) was estimated at roughly $5 billion (the bulk of which is on the south-end).See U.S. GAO, Reauthorization of Intercity Rail and Amtrak, p. 9. Together, these challenges have led to an increase in trip times on the south-end so that, while the goal of 2-hour-40-minute service was realized some years ago, the trip time between New York City and Washington DC has again lengthened by roughly nine minutes.
The Acela
Technology
The centerpiece of Amtrak's NEC system is the Acela. By FY 2004, the Acela program on the NEC accounted for almost 25 percent of the total Amtrak ridership on the corridor and 44 percent of the revenues.See U.S. GAO, Amtrak: Acela's Continued Problems, p. 1. Nevertheless, there has also been much discussion, debate, and litigation regarding the Acela trainsets that were purchased as part of the overall electrification program.
With the exception of the Talgo
trainsets introduced in the Pacific Northwest in the 1990s, until the Acela,
there had not been a new intercity passenger rail design for trains in the
Beyond the debate over the type of
trainset, the final decision to contract with Bombardier-Alstom also remained a
source of contention, particularly when it was disclosed in March 2000 that the
attractive financial package offered had included a $1 billion loan to Amtrak
from
In a 2005 report, the U.S. GAO cited several problems that plagued the development of the Acela and continue to present difficulties.
Manufacturing and production delays
Bombardier-Alstom did not deliver the first Acela until October 2000, one year behind schedule. Within the next two years, multiple lawsuits were filed by Bombardier-Alstom (November 2001) and Amtrak (November 2002) as each charged the other was not fulfilling its obligations under the contract. According to Bombardier, Amtrak "repeatedly changed its design specifications, supplied defective designs, meddled in the design and construction process, and withheld progress payments." Amtrak argued that Bombardier "violated the terms of the contracts by delivering the trainsets late."See Bombardier Corporation v National Railroad Passenger Corporation, No. 02-7125, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 357 U.S. App. DC 129.
In March 2004, Bombardier and Amtrak executed a settlement agreement that resolved their differences and dismissed the outstanding litigation between the parties. Pursuant to the settlement, Bombardier agreed to "complete specified modifications to the equipment, resolve outstanding technical issues, extend the warranty, and made certain commitments regarding the reliability of the equipment." Agreement was also reached to transition the maintenance of the equipment to Amtrak in October 2006, seven years earlier than previously agreed. Commitments were also made by Bombardier to "turn over source code, train employees, and provide options to Amtrak for the purchase of parts and inventory needed to maintain the equipment for the ten years following settlement." For its part, Amtrak agreed to pay Bombardier up to $42.5 million of the funds previously withheld as milestones were met leading up to October 2006.See Amtrak, Consolidated Financial Statements, September 30, 2005 and 2004, (February 2006), http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/05financial.pdf (accessed 6/7/06), p. 14.
The use of new technologies
Much of the technology utilized for the Acela was new and those technologies that had been utilized previously (e.g., the tilt mechanism) had not been used in the combination planned for the Acela.
New safety standards to accommodate HSR.
Between 1996 and 2000, the period during which the Acela was being developed, the FRA and Amtrak were involved in discussions regarding safety regulations pertaining to HSR. New rules were issued regarding track safety, passenger safety, and train control. In particular, "push-pull" operations, those in which a locomotive is placed at one end of the train with an unpowered cab control car at the other, were prohibited for HSR. The ruling resulted in Amtrak having to purchase additional locomotives at a cost of roughly $100 million.See U.S. GAO, Amtrak: Acela's Continued Problems, pp. 6-7.
Abbreviated testing of the trainsets prior to
their placement into revenue service
.
However, within two years of the first trainset being placed into revenue service, Amtrak had to remove all the Acelas due to equipment problems in August 2002. Though service was restored within two months, less than three years later, in April 2005, the trainsets were again removed from service due to brake problems, and not fully restored until the fall of that year.See Ibid.
The overall outcome was that the vehicles that were developed were heavier and wider than intended and were thus, unable to meet the final goals as established by the program. For example, within the Metro-North territory, the tilt mechanism cannot be used because the track centers are too narrow for the widths of the trains. (It should be noted that there is some debate about whether using the tilt feature would have been possible even with more narrow trains since the FRA requires track centers of at least twelve feet for tilting to be used and there are many locations within Metro-North territory where track centers are less than this.) Nevertheless, it is important to point out that from a marketing standpoint, the Acela brand has been well received and continues to woo new passengers.
Assessment of the Case
By the definition utilized in this
research, the Northeast Corridor is a successful case of incremental HSR in the
However, if one delves a bit further into the initial goals for the corridor and whether they have been realized, success is less definitive and some potential lessons become more apparent.
The Goals
The goals for the original NECIP and the later electrification project were not, according to Thompson, unidimensional. There were direct goals for the project, and other, less obvious goals for U.S. DOT, like supporting minority and women businesses and pursuing environmental mitigation while implementing the NECIP, the largest project directly managed by U.S. DOT in its history.See Thomson, personal communication, 5/15/06.
The following paragraphs assess several different goals specific to HSR for both the NECIP and for the later electrification project to provide a sense of which goals were met and which were not.
Trip Times,
Frequency, and Reliability
When all is said and done, the keys to success for any rail project relate to service provided as measured by trip times, frequency, and reliability. Nevertheless, the most enduring of the various goals identified throughout the thirty-plus years of HSR-related initiatives on the NEC related to trip times. The answer to whether this was helpful or harmful to the overall project is mixed. Some practitioners have suggested that while the focus on trip times appears to have been a successful way of garnering political support for the NECIP, it also led to decisions on specific projects that increased costs unnecessarily and diverted resources from other potential projects that might have had a more enduring and positive effect on overall operations along the corridor. Others argue that the focus on lower trip times was truly necessary since reduced trip times are the key to HSR effectively competing with air and automobile travel.
There is some truth in both assessments: the early vision was for HSR on the NEC to compete with air and automobile traffic, so trip times were an important part of the mix of factors (including frequency and reliability) that would help woo those who would otherwise opt for plane or car. However, for what was ultimately an incremental rail program on a ROW shared with commuter and freight rail--characterized by insufficient funding and capacity to make the changes truly needed to enable the highest speeds along the majority of the line--frequency and reliability were truly the more critical factors in increasing ridership. Perhaps the greatest failing was in not recognizing this difference.
Based on the 4R Act, the NECIP
originally stipulated trip-time goals for express service with limited stops of
3 hours, 40 minutes (3:40) between
Trip time goals for the south-end were realized as early as 1986, when trip times were reported at 2 hours, 36 minutes (2:36). However, trip times soon began to increase again and two decades later, primarily as a result of deferred maintenance, trip times on the south-end are significantly slower, with most express trips scheduled for 2 hours, 50 minutes (2:50).
Express trip times between New York
City and Boston are currently between 3 hours, 30 minutes (3:30) and 3 hours,
40 minutes (3:40), well short of three hours or less, and not a decisive
advantage over the airlines (to borrow Perl's description of the earlier
Metroliner experience) in terms of market penetration. Further, as Peter
Cannito, President of MTA Metro-North, points out, the nature of the
competition changed during the development and implementation of the
electrification project, making HSR less valued and potentially reducing
receptivity. In particular, when the initial discussions for the north-end
began, there was no serious competition from the airlines flying from
Thus, on the north-end, although the original goal of 3 hours, 40 minutes (3:40) identified in the NECIP has been met, the goal set out under the electrification project remains unfulfilled. There are four years remaining in which to fulfill this trip-time goal, and there are some additional improvements still being made that may shave time off the current trip. Thus, whether Amtrak will eventually meet the trip time goal on the north-end by 2010 is unknown at this time.
In terms of frequencies, See NEC Goals for and Current Status of Trip Times and Frequencies shows that the goals for both the south-end and north-end that were specified in the 1978 FPEIS have been met. However, the north-end goal was revised in later years and a new completion date of 2010 set; it has not yet been met. Given the continuing cap on the number of daily trains and the "open" default position for the area's moveable bridges--both due to the waterborne traffic in Connecticut--it is unlikely that either of the two 1994 goals will be met within the next four years.
Finally, though not continuously acknowledged as a goal in discussions on the NECIP and NHRIP, a third area in which the success of HSR on the NEC is questionable is reliability of service. The March 1979 U.S. GAO report, Problems in the Northeast Corridor Railway Improvement Project , noted that the FRA had the following on-time performance goals for the NEC once the NECIP was completed: 75 to 80 percent on-time performance on the south-end and "somewhat higher" on the north-end.See U.S. GAO, Problems in NEC Project, p. 17. Between FY 1994 and FY 2002, Amtrak appears to have exceeded that goal: on-time performance for the entire NEC averaged 82-89 percent.See U.S. DOT, "Intercity Passenger Rail and Amtrak," Testimony Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies, United States Senate--Statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. DOT, CC-2005-037 (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, May 12, 2005), http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/MeadMay12SenateAppropsHearing2.htm (accessed 4/10/06). However, primarily related to deteriorating infrastructure on the corridor, overall on-time performance fell to only 80 percent in FY 2003. In FY 2004, it dropped again, with the Acela service averaging only 74 percent.See Ibid. Finally, in FY 2005, on-time performance for the NEC averaged 81.6 percent for Metroliner service, 77.2 percent for regional service, and 76.4 percent for the Acela.See Amtrak, Monthly Performance Report for September 2005 (Washington DC: Amtrak, November 4, 2005), p. E-11, http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/0509monthly.pdf (accessed 4/3/06). (While the problems with the Acela trainsets are generally pointed to for this decrease in Acela on-time performance during FY 2005, it is worth noting that FY 2005 on-time performance for the Acela was actually a bit higher than in FY 2004, and, as of March 2006, fiscal-year-to-date performance on the Acela averaged 83.1 percent with Metroliner service at 85.5 percent.See Amtrak, Monthly Performance Report for March 2006, (May 15, 2006), p. E-8, http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/0603monthly.pdf (accessed 6/8/06).)
Some, like Carol, suggest that the Acela is still within the five-year period when many new technologies need to have the "kinks" worked out. However, the fact that overall on-time performance has been declining since FY 1994 suggests that the problem stems from additional and potentially more costly factors like deferred maintenance. More importantly perhaps, as Cannito points out, "success begets success," while failures make it difficult to find continued funding.See Carol, personal communication, 10/27/06. In the political context within which the NEC is situated, falling on-time performance, coupled with the fact that Acela service has been stopped twice since its inception and continues to have reliability problems, is a serious impediment to further HSR support.
Cost Estimates
and Project Schedules
Meeting targeted completion dates and cost estimate goals was another way in which implementation of HSR on the NEC was not successful. From the very beginning of the NECIP through the electrification of the north-end, Amtrak and the FRA repeatedly underestimated time and financial needs, often setting completion deadlines and cost estimates, only to find themselves unable to meet those goals. For example, as Carol points out, Amtrak created the goal of "HSR by 2000." When the trainsets were delayed a year, the press coverage was very negative even though it is not uncommon for new trainsets to be delayed much longer than one year.See Carol, personal communication, 10/27/05; Cannito, personal communication, 11/22/05.
The U.S. GAO report pointed out that a
number of project goals remain outstanding, and some, like the flyover at Shell
Interlocking (where eastbound Amtrak trains join the MNR-owned ROW) may never
occur. However, many individuals involved in the NECIP and NHRIP at different
times over the years have suggested that the flyover was not cost-effective
anyway. It would have been extremely expensive and would not have necessarily
resulted in significant time savings since upon joining the commuter-rail line,
Amtrak trains would still need to wait at times for commuter trains to pass. As
a much less costly alternative, MTA Metro-North is currently reconfiguring the
Shell interlocking with Amtrak funding so trains will be able to move through
the interlocking at 45 mph instead of 15 mph. Other project elements, like the
replacement of the catenary system (from a static system to constant tension)
along the MTA Metro-North-owned portion of the corridor in
Other Lessons
The NEC is one of the few examples (the
Keystone Corridor potentially being a second and the Empire Corridor an
arguable third) of HSR in the
The Role of
the Federal Government
While the role of the federal government, and the FRA in particular, has been debated from time to time, and while the degree of federal support for HSR on the NEC wavered from time to time (indeed, some would argue sufficient commitment never fully existed), one fact remains clear: without the public funding provided for the corridor by the federal government, even the successes that have been realized would not have occurred.
Leadership also proved important in the
process, particularly the leadership provided by Senator Pell in the earliest
years and by Senator Lautenberg and by CONEG in the 1990s. However, just as
leadership was important for obtaining funding at key moments, the lack of
continuous leadership is also reflected in the inconsistent federal support
during both the early years of the NECIP and the later electrification project.
One could also argue that this lack of continuous leadership is reflected in
the ability of the
Multiple
Owners and Operators
The existence of multiple owners and operators along the NEC ROW, each with its own set of concerns and thoughts about who should bear the costs, made implementing HSR significantly more challenging (even though the other owners were all public entities) and made the federal government's role that much more important. Intercity high-speed rail and commuter passenger rail (not to mention freight rail) have different goals and objectives. While some improvements benefited several stakeholders, others did not, making it difficult to find the operational support and funding streams needed to complete the projects to allow HSR operations along the entire segment.
An example of this is the replacement of the catenary on the north-end. In the early years of the NECIP, when the FRA had the primary responsibility for the project, rehabilitation of the entire corridor was programmed in the NECIP. However, in later years, once Amtrak had taken primary responsibility, the catenary improvements in the MTA Metro-North territory were excluded from both the planning and the program budget. Excluding this key segment of the corridor has added to the difficulties Amtrak has had in fulfilling the original NECIP and overall NHRIP goals.
Looking forward, according to Bennett, the future of HSR on the NEC is intricately tied to two key issues:
How to maintain and replace
expensive infrastructure to bring the entire corridor, from
How to invest in and add to the capacity and functionality of the corridor to improve the quality and level of service
The answers to both of these issues require a larger vision for the NEC, in order to determine its role in the broader transportation system in the Northeast, with respect to Amtrak's overall operations and HSR.See Bennett, personal communication, 11/1/05.
The Cost of
"Doing it on the Cheap"
Funding was, and remains, a fundamental challenge on the NEC in several ways. First, on both the north-end and south-end, it is clear that funding was a key driver of which improvements were made and which ones were not. This tension between financial needs and the lack of commitment to provide full funding is evident in the earliest discussions leading up to the $1.825 billion NECIP when actual need to meet the proposed goals was estimated at almost double that figure. The same tension was also seen during the NHRIP on the north-end of the NEC. Trying to "do it on the cheap," as one former Amtrak official pointed out, led to the mixed success evident today.
Ironically, doing it on the cheap, often led to increased costs over time since plans had to be constantly redrawn, timing changed, and resulting implementation decisions did not always meet the original goals. Worse, the result of this project-by-project examination was the relegation of the broader vision to an incremental process. Those involved were so focused on the specific projects that the decisions made sometimes conflicted with the original goals and intent.
This incremental process was clearly
apparent in the back-and-forth funding and scope discussions as projects were
added in, leading to rising costs, and then taken out when Amtrak was told by
Congress and/or the FRA to reduce costs. This same process occurred, though not
as clearly in the record, during the electrification between
Making decisions based on the trip-time savings and costs of each project individually, however, ignored the possibility of reaping greater savings by combining the projects. The incremental process did not allow for this kind of assessment and decision-making.
Finally, a broader question related to who should fund HSR on the NEC remains. As with other corridors around the country with limited funding sources, the central issue revolves around who benefits from HSR service. Amtrak maintains the tracks along most of the NEC and thereby keeps service running for all the operators using its ROW. Thus, the federal government argues that the states should take more of a role in funding. However, most of the states along the NEC prefer not to provide funding for services on the corridor. Further, not all states benefit to the same degree from intercity HSR on the NEC. Regardless of how the question of funding streams is resolved, one lesson from the early years of the NECIP is that, assuming the authority and capability exists, the fewer institutions responsible for the overall programming and implementation, the better.
Findings, Lessons, and Themes
The previous sections assessed each case, highlighting individual findings and observations. The following paragraphs review the three cases more comprehensively, identifying common findings, lessons learned, and themes for consideration.
Key Findings and Lessons
Learned
The cases presented in this report,
along with those of the first report, provide several important lessons for
those trying to implement HSR in the
Leadership, Means, and
Authority
HSR projects are expensive, take many
years to complete, and require coordination among and between a numbers of key
actors and stakeholders. The case studies of this report and its predecessor,
which included
Section 4 demonstrated that in the case
of the Keystone Corridor each one of these factors alone proved insufficient
for successful implementation of HSR. In the mid-1960s, the means were
available, but the authority and leadership were lacking. In the early 1980s,
leadership was in place, but again, clear authority was lacking. Although the
PHSIRPC had been established it was mandated to phase out after a certain
period of time and it was never clear who would be responsible for implementing
the changes they recommended. Only in the most recent effort were leadership
(the
Similarly, section 5 demonstrated that
implementation of HSR on the NEC was moved forward most successfully when the
federal government provided the leadership (via Congress), the means (federal
funding with Amtrak able to implement operational and infrastructure
modifications), and the authority (via Congress and U.S. DOT) to implement
change. This is not to say that other difficulties did not arise. Indeed, the
1979 report by the comptroller general of the
In contrast, during the later effort on
the north-end of the NEC, leadership was not as strong or consistent, though it
existed in the form of Senator Lautenberg and, to some degree, CONEG. Further,
while Amtrak had some authority to implement change, it was very much limited,
in part by the fact that it did not own the entire corridor on the north-end.
In the absence of the combination of these three factors, while the north-end
was eventually electrified, not all infrastructure changes were made and, more
importantly, specific external stakeholder interests (notably the
Given the need for the combination of these three factors to be present for successful outcomes in HSR, the Chicago Hub faces several obstacles. First, in spite of the support of several state legislators and state DOT officials, as a whole, the Hub has lacked strong and consistent leadership. Second, full funding has not been secured. Third, no formal authority that would make HSR-specific improvements has been identified. The end result is that while some coordination exists, specific roles and responsibilities are unclear, and overall, the states and other stakeholders are not moving in concert with each other to implement HSR.
Who Should
Play These Roles?
The actors providing the leadership,
the means, and the authority to implement change may vary according to specific
circumstances and factors. On the NEC the federal government and Amtrak played
the central roles, while on the Keystone Corridor the
Need for a
Federal Vision
The Keystone Corridor demonstrates the potential for HSR improvements without major federal support. Nevertheless, given the experience on the Northeast Corridor and the overall lack of progress on HSR seen over the past four decades, there is good reason to believe that a federal vision for HSR is needed. Needed additionally is a national network strategy for rail that combines passenger, freight, non-HSR intercity, and HSR rail, and addresses how each also links to nonrail modes of transportation. Along with this, federal funding is also important, especially for the larger and multistate projects. Indeed, as the experience of the NEC demonstrates, without the public funding provided by the federal government, even the successes that have been realized would not have occurred.
Reiterating the findings in the first
study, without a broad vision, or at least guidance and standards, states will
continue to fill the void with multiple types of models--constitutional
amendments and legislation (like Florida and California); multistate compacts
(like the Chicago Hub); public-private partnerships (like what was envisioned
during the 1980s in Pennsylvania)--without a sense of what is most likely to
succeed. Worse, without a national network strategy for rail, the
Clear Identification of Goals
and Benefits
The goals for any major capital investment project are rarely unidimensional. However, in the case of HSR, the goals are not only multidimensional but also sometimes conflicting. While some focus on the need for the highest speeds, others argue that accessibility, frequency, and on-time performance are more important (basically, more efficient and reliable intercity rail). These different goals often lead to very different markets, technologies, funding sources, and overall outcomes, with those focusing on speeds proposing new HSR and those focusing on other attributes looking toward incremental HSR.
Developing clear and consistent goals around which to build a consensus is important for successful outcomes in HSR. On the Keystone Corridor, earlier efforts aimed at new HSR noted multiple goals--economic development, higher rail share of travel, travel-time savings--without prioritizing them. Indeed, when the commission's final report was issued suggesting that Maglev was the best option, it noted that a substantial minority believed that lower cost alternatives should be considered if monies were not forthcoming. The report also notes that while modest upgrades to Amtrak's service would yield significant trip-time savings, such upgrades provided the least economic benefit. Finally, the chairman focused on travel speeds, noting that "speed sells." Even within the commission, the goals were not clear, making it more difficult to reach consensus among other stakeholders. In the most recent effort, the goal was much more straightforward--fix the line and improve trip times.
Related to this, all the key
stakeholders (in this case, operators) along the Keystone Corridor see some
benefit accruing from the goals identified in the KCIP. Amtrak will increase
and enhance its service, with corresponding ridership and revenue increases.
PennDOT will be able to fulfill several of its own objectives related to
broader transportation goals for the corridor. SEPTA will benefit from
increased capacity and infrastructure improvements. Finally,
The NEC's experience has been somewhat mixed in terms of goals and benefits. The earliest goals were identified in terms of reducing trip times, but the exact goals were actually negotiated rather than based on objective criteria or analysis, and whether they were fully agreed upon by all the stakeholders involved is not clear. In terms of benefits, as early as 1978 the NECIP was coming under criticism for not addressing the concerns and needs of the various stakeholders along the corridor, notably the commuter and freight railroad operators. Under the NHRIP, similar concerns were raised as well as additional concerns by other nonoperating stakeholders (e.g., the marina interests) along the NEC and, as was seen, finding operational support and funding for those improvements that do not clearly benefit certain stakeholders has proven difficult.
To date, the overarching goals of the Midwestern states are to increase connectivity, reduce trip times between major Midwestern cities, and provide multimodal connections to improve system access. These goals have meant that the Midwestern states have moved towards a more regional framework to plan for HSR, which, critics point out, has meant inclusion of corridors that have little potential to attract ridership and an estimated project cost that, in light of limited funding, is almost impossible to finance. Further, the matrix of benefits in the Chicago Hub remains very much unclear. For the Chicago Hub to have any opportunity for success, it is critical that the private railroad companies that own the majority of the ROW; Metra (the commuter rail); and the environmental groups be included in the planning process so they can work together to develop and prioritize the goals and identify benefits.
Themes for Consideration
In addition to the findings and lessons learned, some important themes for consideration bear mentioning.
Private ROW Ownership and
Success
Can the NEC and the Keystone Corridor be replicated without ownership of the ROW by a single passenger rail entity?
On both the NEC and the Keystone Corridor ownership of the ROW by Amtrak proved critical. Ownership of the ROW allowed Amtrak the authority to more easily deal with signaling, dispatching, power distribution, and maintenance decisions to implement HSR. It also reduced costs since there was no need to purchase new ROW and, in the case of the KCIP, also allowed the avoidance of certain environmental requirements since most of the improvements occurred in the current ROW and did not reflect a new service in themselves.
In contrast, except for one relatively
small segment, the Chicago Hub is not owned by Amtrak, and unlike the NEC on
which the other owners were public entities, the Chicago Hub's spokes are
primarily owned by private railroad companies. The result is similar to what is
seen on the western portion of the Keystone Corridor--there is no clear
authority for implementing HSR, and the costs to do so are much more
significant since in many cases separate tracks will be required for passenger
trains operating at higher speeds. In fact, the only section of the Chicago Hub
that has been upgraded in speed in recent years is the Amtrak-owned segment
from just outside of
The Cost of Keeping Costs Lower
Keeping costs lower helps, but there are costs to "doing it on the cheap."
Among the key findings on the Keystone
Corridor was that because the costs to implement change in the most recent
effort were reasonable, they were more easily accepted and achieved. Similarly,
in the Chicago Hub area--the one area where the tracks have been upgraded to
110 mph maximum allowable speed (though speeds remain lower because other
upgrades are still not in place)--it was relatively inexpensive and costs could
be covered under a broader statewide infrastructure initiative in
Moving Beyond U.S.
Is
the
The first study in this series
suggested that there were opportunities for both incremental and new HSR in the
Beyond the fact that Amtrak owns the lines for both the Keystone Corridor and the NEC, another factor that stands out is that they are both incremental rail initiatives that build upon what already exists. In contrast, earlier attempts at HSR on the Keystone Corridor that stressed new HSR or Maglev technologies failed as did Florida's and Texas' attempts at new HSR. Many other initiatives that focus on new HSR have also failed to progress.
Should the
Focus Be on Incremental HSR?
Perhaps the most resounding theme for
consideration is that in the
Nevertheless, this is a point worth
serious consideration given the costs of new HSR; current political apathy (and
in some cases outright antipathy) surrounding rail more broadly and new HSR
more specifically; the perceived risks associated with "unproven" HSR
technologies in the United States, and the fact that the few places where
success has occurred (even if modest in many respects) have implemented
incremental HSR. While incremental rail may be viewed by some as
"settling" for the second-best choice, without stronger and
consistent financial and political commitment on both the part of the federal
government and the states, it may be the only means for having any HSR in the
Endnotes
Executive
Summary
Allison L. C. de
Cerreño, Daniel M. Evans, and Howard Permut, High-Speed Rail Projects in the
Ibid., 5 and 75. For the report, see U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), High-Speed Ground Transportation for America (Washington DC: FRA, 1997), p. 9-1.
Introduction
C. de Cerreño, et.
al., High-Speed
Rail Projects in the
Washington State
Department of Transportation, "Transportation Plan Update,"
http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/planning/wtp/documents/FutureVision.htm
(accessed 6/27/06).
Florida High Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA), 2006 Report to the Governor and the Legislature , http://www.floridahighspeedrail.org/uploaddocuments/p25 2006_Report_to_the_Governor_and_the_Legislature.pdf (accessed 6/9/06), 2; also see C. de Cerreño, et.al., High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States , pp. 27-43.
FHSRA, 2006 Report to the Governor and the Legislature , pp. 3-4.
California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA), "What's New," http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/wahts_new/default.asp (accessed 6/1/06).
"Lawmakers Vote to Axe High-Speed Rail Bond From November Ballot," Associated Press, http://www.sacbee.com/state_wire/story/14271924p-15082433c.html (accessed 6/29/06).
Dan Leavitt, Deputy Director, California High Speed Rail Authority, personal communication, 6/5/06.
Louis S. Thompson,
"High-Speed Rail (HSR) in the
The Chicago
Hub and Midwest Regional Rail Initiative
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, Wisconsin Rail Issues and Opportunities Report , p.11, http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/projects/state/docs/rail-issues-chap1.pdf (accessed 3/25/06).
Merrill Travis, President, Lower Cost Solutions, Inc., and Ex-Chief, Bureau of Railroads, Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT), personal communication, March 31, 2006.
Missouri Revised Statutes, Transportation Services, § 680.175 (August 1997), "Interstate High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Network Compact," http://ssl.csg.org/compactlaws/intercityhighspeedrail.html (accessed 4/3/06).
Travis, personal communication, 3/31/05.
C. de Cerreño, et.
al., High-Speed
Rail Projects in the
Council of State Governments, "Midwestern Legislative Conference," http://www.csgmidwest.org/About/MidwesternLegislativeConference.htm (accessed 4/1/06).
HB 1363, http://www.house.mo.gov/bills00/bills00/HB1363.htm (accessed 4/3/06).
Indiana High Speed Rail Association, "A History of the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative," http://www.indianahighspeedrail.org/history.htm (accessed 12/1/05).
Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06.
Transportation
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Network for the 21st Century: Executive Report (September
2004), 5, http://www.dot.state.wi.us/projects/state/docs/railmidwest.pdf
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The Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT), "Approved Project Briefing: Midwest Regional Rail Initiative Phase VI," http://www.dot.state.oh.us/ohiorail/Project%20Briefings/May%202005/State%20of%20Wisc%20-%20MWRRI%20 Briefing.htm (accessed 9/20/05).
TEMS,
U.S. DOT, FRA, Chicago-St. Louis HSR
Project: Final Environmental Impact Statement FHWA-IL-EIS-99-01-F
(Washington DC: U.S. DOT, January 2003), p. 3-1,
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Interstate Passenger Rail Commission (MIPRC), "Midwest Regional Rail
Initiative Update September 2004," http://www.miprc.org/sept2004.asp
(accessed
12/15/05).
John Schwalbauch, Chief, Bureau of Railroads, Illinois DOT, personal communication, 11/10/05.
Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06.
Association of American Railroads, "Chicago Project/Create," http://www.aar.org/Create/Create_main.asp (accessed 4/3/06).
Travis, personal communication, 3/31/06.
MIPRC,
"Midwest SAFETEA-LU Rail Projects/Authorizations,"
http://www.miprc.org/portal/uploads/lkliewer/Midwest_SAFETEA_projects.doc
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"Fresh Blow to
Rail Plan: Push to Relieve Local Freight Bottlenecks Loses Canadian
Nat'l," Crain's
Chicago Business (January
16, 2006)
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=12ba94b7092a5c64287b719a388b92a8&_docnum=
1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkVA&_md5=028ceef560971ae32ffb7073425b2da8
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National
Association of Railroad Passengers, "Chicago-Detroit Service Levels,"
http://www.narprail.org/cms/index.php/resources/more/slevdet/ (accessed
4/6/06).
FRA, "Chicago Hub
Network," http://www.fra.dot.gov/us/content/648
(accessed 8/1/05).
Wisconsin DOT (WisDOT), "Michigan's Incremental Train Control System (ITCS)," http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/news/docs/thu-williams.pdf (accessed 9/21/2006).
Marv Balousek,
"Executive Q&A: Safety of Rail Crossings Give Him Pause:
WisDOT, Wisconsin Rail Issues and Opportunities Report (Madison: WisDOT, 2004), p.6, http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/projects/state/docs/rail-issues.pdf (accessed 3/25/06).
MIPRC, "
WisDOT, "Milwaukee Intermodal Terminal Renovation--Phase 1," http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/projects/state/amtrak-phase1.htm (accessed 3/30/06).
Transportation
Research Board (TRB), "
Ethan Johnson, Program and Planning Analyst, Bureau of Planning and Economic Development Wisconsin DOT, personal communication, 11/8/05.
Johnson, personal communication, 5/19/06.
Wisconsin Association of Railroad Passengers, "Wisconsin Passenger Rail Service Poll," (June 18, 2002), http://www.wisarp.org/BadgerPoll.htm (accessed 11/8/05).
MIPRC, "
Indiana Department of Transportation, Indiana Rail Plan , http://www.in.gov/dot/div/multimodal/railroad/chapter_2.pdf (accessed 4/2/06).
TEMS,
Stuart Nicholson, Public Information Officer, Ohio Rail Development Commission, personal communication, 11/7/05.
TEMS and HNTB,
Inc., The
Ohio & Lake Erie Regional Rail Ohio Hub Study: Executive Summary
, Prepared for the Ohio Rail Development Commission (ORDC) and the DOTs of
Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania (October 2004),
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(accessed 12/6/2005).
Ohio
Rail Development Commission, "On Track: Ohio & Eight Other States
Reaffirm the Viability of High Speed Passenger Rail," Press Release
(December 14, 2004),
http://www.dot.state.oh.us/OHIORAIL/Press%20Releases/04%20-%20MWRRS.htm
(accessed 2/5/06).
Nicholson, personal communication, 5/19/06.
Nicholson, personal communication, 11/7/05.
John Hey, Passenger Rail Analyst, Iowa DOT, personal communication, 12/16/05.
Ellis Tompkins, Division Manager, Rail and Public Transportation, Nebraska Department of Roads, personal communication, 12/8/05.
MIPRC, "
FRA, "Chicago Hub Network," (accessed 1/4/06).
Rodney Massman, Administrator of Railroads, Missouri DOT, personal communication, March 13, 2006.
Massman, personal communication, 12/15/05.
Massman, personal communication, 3/13/06.
MIPRC, "
John Bennett, AECOM Consult, personal communication, 10/5/05.
Drew Galloway, Chief of Transportation Planning Analysis, Amtrak, personal communication, 12/16/05; Travis, personal communication, 12/8/05.
Schwalbach, personal communication, 11/10/05; Nicholson, personal communication, 11/7/05.
Bennett, personal communication, 10/5/05; Joby Berman, Deputy Chief of Engineering, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, personal communication, 11/8/05.
ODOT,
"Approved Project Briefing: Midwest Regional Rail Initiative Phase
VI,"
http://www.dot.state.oh.us/ohiorail/Project%20Briefings/May%202005/State%20of%20Wisc%20-%20MWRRI%20Briefing.htm
(accessed 9/20/05).
Emil Frankel,
Senior Vice President, Parsons Brinckerhoff, personal communication,
11/7/05.
Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06.
American Public Transportation Association, SAFETEA-LU: Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy for Users: A Guide To Transit-Related Provisions (Washington DC: APTA, September 2005), http://www.apta.com/government_affairs/safetea_lu/documents/brochure.pdf (accessed on 9/15/05).
David Hunt, "State Rail Plans--Legislative Update & Implications for SCORT," presented to AASHTO Standing Committee on Rail Transportation (August 29, 2005).
Tompkins, personal communication, 12/8/05, notes that at this point there is no political support for Nebraska's participation in the MWRRS.
Berman, personal
communication, 11/8/05; Frankel, personal communication,
11/7/05.
Rick Harnish, Executive Director of the Midwest High Speed Rail Coalition, personal communication, 11/10/05.
Rick Tidwell, Deputy Executive Director, METRA, personal communication , 11/14/05.
Johnson, personal communication, 11/8/05.
Bennett, personal communication, 10/5/05.
Galloway, personal communication, 12/16/05.
Massman, personal communication, 12/15/05.
Travis, personal communication, 3/31/06.
Hey, personal communication, 12/16/05.
Dane Alliance for Rail Transit, "About DART," http://www.danerail.org/about.php (accessed 9/28/05).
Prorail, "Madison Train Station Proposal," http://www.prorail.com/madison.html (accessed 8/11/05).
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Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06.
Institute of Governmental Studies University of California, "High-Speed Rail in California" (January 2006), http://www.igs.berkeley.edu/library/htHighSpeedRail.htm (accessed 12/14/05).
California High Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA), "How Californians View the High-Speed Train Project," http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/plan/pdf/Plan_7.pdf (accessed 12/15/05).
Travis, personal communication, 5/19/06.
Travis, personal communication, 12/8/05.
Frankel, personal communication, 11/7/05.
Massman, personal communication, 12/15/05.
Harnish, personal communication, November 10, 2005.
The Keystone Corridor
U.S. DOT, FRA, Technical Monograph: Transportation Planning for the Philadelphia-Harrisburg "Keystone" Railroad Corridor [hereafter, Technical Monograph ] (Washington DC: FRA, March 2004), 1:ES-1.
Amtrak's Fiscal Year runs from October 1 through September 30. Amtrak, "News Release: Annual Amtrak Ridership of 25.4 Million Marks Third Straight Year of Record Increases," 10/19/05, http://w ww.railserve.com/railnews/newsjump. cgi?http:// www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2Copy/News_Release_Page&c=am2Copy&cid=1093554022797&ssid=180; also http:// www.lightrail.org/facts/fa_amtrak-003.htm (accessed 1/9/06).
Amtrak, "News Release: Annual Amtrak Ridership."
Catherine Popp-McDonough, Manager, Grant Development, SEPTA, E-mail Correspondence, 2/9/06. These figures were confirmed by Amtrak, though the latter reports $22.9 million total for the Keystone Corridor and NEC, combined. However, this slight discrepancy is likely due in part to Amtrak and SEPTS having different fiscal years.
"SEPTA Regional Rail--Route Ridership Summary 2005, Route: R5 Thorndale/Paoli, Weekdays Schedule," provided by unnamed source, SEPTA Route R5.
U.S. DOT, FRA,
Technical
Monograph: Transportation Planning for the Philadelphia-Harrisburg
"Keystone" Railroad Corridor (Washington DC: FRA, March
2004),
2:A-1 to A-2.
Bill Schafer, Director of Corporate Affairs, Norfolk Southern Corporation, personal communication, 2/10/06.
David W. Messer, Triumph II: Philadelphia to Harrisburg , 1828-1998 (Baltimore: Barnard, Roberts and Co., Inc., 1999), pp. 10-11.
Parsons Brinckerhoff/Gannett Fleming (PBGF), Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, Phase 1 , Prepared for the Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985), p. 1-2.
PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, p. 1-3.
R.L. Banks & Associates, Delta Development Group, Gannett Fleming, and Urban Engineers, Keystone Corridor Assessment and Business Plan: Technical Report--Task IV, Business Plan , Submitted to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, December 23, 1997 [hereafter, KC Business Plan: TR--Task IV ], Appendix, p. 3.
FRA, Technical Monograph , 1:2-11.
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), "Amtrak: Cost of Amtrak Railroad Operations," Fact Sheet for the Honorable Arlen Specter and the Honorable John Heinz, US Senate, GAO/RCED-86-127SF (Washington DC: GAO, March 1986), p. 1, http://archive.gao.gov/d13t3/129743.pdf (accessed 2/1/06).
55 P.S. § 671 (2005). Note that while other states have since repealed this Compact, the Commonwealth has not formally done so to date.
55 P.S. hub-and-spoke 684 (2005).
Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (PHSIRPC), Final Report: Executive Summary (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, January 1990), 3; also see PBGF, "Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report," pp. 1-4 and 1-5.
PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report, Phase I , Prepared for Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985), 2-1; also see PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Executive Summary, Phase 1 , Prepared for the Pennsylvania High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (February 1985), p. 1.
PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Executive Summary , p. 6; PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report , Table 10 - 1.
PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report , p. 11-5.
PBGF, Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Executive Summary , p. 13.
PBGF, Pennsylvania High
Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Preliminary Report ,
pp. 12-6 to 12-7.
For the approved guidelines, see High Speed Rail Association, "Standard Guidelines for Revenue and Ridership Forecasting," (September 25, 1986), copy of the document provided by Pennsylvania Department of Transportation.
PBGF, "Market Demand" in Pennsylvania High Speed Rail Feasibility Study: Executive Summary , Prepared for the Pennsylvania high Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Commission (July 1986), executive summary final page.
55 P.S. § 691 (2005); also see PHSIRPC, Final Report , p. 4, and the Chairman's Report.
Harry Stoffer, "US Air Invests in Maglev Rail Project," Pittsburgh-Post Gazette (April 2, 1993), LexisNexis (retrieved 4/4/06).
U.S. GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: Financial Performance of Amtrak's Routes, Report to Congressional Committees , GAO/RCED-98-151 (Washington DC: GAO, May 1998), p. 32.
FRA, Technical Monograph , 1:ES-2. The deferred maintenance figure comes from R.L. Banks & Associates, Delta Development Group, Gannett Fleming, and Urban Engineers, Keystone Corridor Assessment and Business Plan: Executive Summary , Submitted to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, December 23, 1997 [hereafter, KC Business Plan: ES ], p. 19.
U.S. GAO, Surface Infrastructure: High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States , Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, GAO/RCED-99-44 (Washington DC: GAO, January 1999), 49, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99044.pdf (accessed 2/1/06).
U.S. GAO, Intercity Passenger
Rail: Financial Performance of Amtrak's Routes ,
pp. 6 and 40.
Richard Peltz, Alternate Federal Co-Chair, Appalachian Regional Commission, personal communication, 4/4/06. Peltz was formerly Deputy Secretary for Local & Area Transportation at PennDOT (1995-2002).
R.L. Banks & Associates, et al., KC Business Plan: ES , p. 8.
R.L. Banks & Associates, et al., KC Business Plan: TR--Task IV , pp. 13-14.
Ibid., and Appendix A, pp. 27-28.
Amtrak, "Amtrak's Vision for America's High Speed Rail Program" (Spring 2002), http://www.amtrak.com/about/government-hsr-index.html (accessed 2/18/04), and Amtrak, "Atlantic Coast High Speed Rail Corridor," http://www.amtrak.com/press/HSR-atlanticcoast.html. Also see CONEG Policy Research, Inc. "Intercity Passenger Rail," Getting There from Here 1 (March 2001), http://www.coneg.org/reports/gt/go01-03.htm. The figure cited in the latter two is $140 million; on the more general Amtrak page, it is cited at $150 million.
Dan Cupper, "Big Bucks for Amtrak's Keystone Corridor," Trains 60, no. 2 (February 2000): 28.
TrainWeb, "Highlights of Amtrak's FY1999-2002 Strategic Business Plan: Maximizing Amtrak's Potential in the Marketplace," http://www.trainweb.com/amplan/hilites.html (accessed 12/8/05).
"Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and National Railroad Passenger Corporation for The Keystone Corridor Improvement Program " [hereafter, "KCIP Agreement 2002"], April 4, 2002, p. 2.
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), PennPlan Moves! Pennsylvania Statewide Long-range Transportation Plan, 2000-2025 (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: PennDOT, January 2000), 48, http://www.dot.state.pa.us/internet/web.nsf/infoPennPlanMoves?OpenForum (accessed 2/2/06).
Pennsylvania State Transportation Advisory Committee (TAC), Pennsylvania Statewide Passenger Rail Needs As sessment: Technical Report" (Harrisburg: TAC, December 2001), p. 6.
Ibid., Corridor Profile Harrisburg-Philadelphia, p. 4.
Ibid., Corridor Profile Pittsburgh-Harrisburg.
"KCIP Agreement 2002," pp. 5-7.
FRA, "Keystone
Corridor," http://gis.fra.dot.gov/content3.asp?P=652
(accessed 1/24/05).
David Gunn,
former CEO and President of Amtrak, personal communication,
3/21/06.
Peltz, personal communication, 4/4/06.
PennDOT, "Governor Rendell Announces $125 Million for Public Transportation Improvements," October 10, 2003, http://www.dot.state.pa.us/internet/secinet.nsf.
Gunn, personal communication, 3/21/06.
"Pennsylvania Governor Rendell, Amtrak President Gunn Announce Keystone Corridor Improvement Plan; Philadelphia-Harrisburg Trip Will be Shorter; Safety to be Improved," PR Newswire 7/20/04, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m4PRN/is_2004_July_20/ai_n6115256 (accessed 1/24/05).
"Keystone Corridor to Be Upgraded," International Railway Journal (September 2004), online, http://www.findarticles.com/articles/mi_inOBQQ/is_9_44/ai_n6239858 (accessed 1/24/05) .
"Amendment
No. 1 to the Agreement Between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation and National Railroad Passenger Corporation for the Keystone
Corridor Improvement Plan" [hereafter, "Amendment 1"], July 19,
200 4,
5-6.
FRA, Technical Monograph , 1:ES-6.
"Keystone Corridor Improvements Yield Higher Speeds," Destination: Freedom Newsletter 6, no. 48 (November 21, 2005), online, accessed 11/22/05; "Governor Rendell, Amtrak Announce $145 Million Upgrade of Keystone Passenger Rail Service" PR Newswire (September 12, 2006), LexisNexis (retrieved 9/29/06).
Calvin Cassidy, Rail Project Coordinator, Bureau of Public Transportation, PennDOT, personal communication, 2/2/06.
McDonough, e-mail communication, 2/9/06.
Schafer, personal communication, 2/1/06.
Cassidy, personal communication, 2/2/06.
FRA, Technical Monograph , 1:6-10.
U.S. DOT, Federal Transit Administration, "Department Of Transportation Disability Law Guidance: Full-Length, Level-Boarding Platforms In New Commuter And Intercity Rail Stations," http://www.fta.dot.gov/14531_17513_ENG_HTML.htm (accessed 4/5/06).
FRA, Technical Monograph , 1:8-6.
Norfolk Southern Corporation, Corporate Affairs, Letter to Planners of Passenger Train Projects, June 15, 2005.
The Northeast Corridor
Average MAS calculated using Maximum Authorized Speed and Speed Restriction Tables, provided by Amtrak's Planning and Analysis Department.
Michael Saunders, Program Manager for Public-Private Partnerships, Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Personal communication, 10/12/05.
Voorhees Transportation Center, "Northeast Corridor Action Plan: A Call for a New Federal-State Partnership," Draft Document 12/11/05, 1; U.S. GAO, Intercity Passenger Rail: Amtrak's Management of Northeast Corridor Improvements Demonstrates Need for Applying Best Practices , Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, GAO-04-94 [hereafter, Need for Applying Best Practices ] (Washington DC: GAO, February 2004), p. 1.
Amtrak, "News Release: Annual Amtrak Ridership of 25.4 Million Marks Third Straight Year of Record Increases" (October 19, 2005), http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=Amtrak/am2Copy/News_Release_Page&c= am2Copy&cid=1093554022797&ssid=181 (accessed 1/19/06).
Information on ownership and operations from U.S. GAO, Northeast Rail Corridor: Information on Users, Funding Sources and Expenditures , Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, US Senate, GAO/RCED-96-144 (Washington DC: GAO, June 1996), 8. Mileage for the segments is derived from speed restriction tables provided by Amtrak's Planning and Analysis Department.
Long Island Railroad Annual Ridership, http://www.mta.nyc.ny.us/mta/ind-perform/annual/lirr-ridership.htm (accessed 2/8/06).
U.S. GAO, Intercity Passenger
Rail: Congress Faces Critical Decisions in Developing a National Policy,
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Railroads , Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, House of Representatives--Statement of JayEtta Hecker,
Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues, GAO-02-522T (Washington DC: GAO,
April 11, 2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02522t.pdf
(accessed 6/23/05), p. 3.
Bill Schafer, Director Corporate Affairs, Norfolk Southern Corporation, personal communication 2/10/06.
U.S. GAO, Problems in the Northeast Corridor Railway Improvement Project , Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, CED-79-38 (Washington DC: GAO, 29 March 1979), p. 3.
Anthony Perl, New Departures: Rethinking Rail Passenger Policy in the Twenty-First Century (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2002), p. 140.
Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor, "The Northeast: Twenty Years of High Speed Rail," http://www.sehsr.org/reports/time2act/actchapter5.html (accessed 2/8/06).
U.S. DOT, Two-Year Report on the
Northeast Corridor (Washington DC: U.S.
DOT, February 1978), 2, http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/RRDev/1978a.pdf
(accessed 8/31/05).
Perl, New Departures , p. 143.
U.S. DOT, Two-Year Report on the Northeast Corridor , p. 6.
Perl, New Departures , p. 145.
"TurboTrain," http://www.sikorskyarchives.com/train.html (accessed 2/8/06).
New York Times , Information Bank Abstract (April 9, 1970), LexisNexis online (retrieved 2/9/06).
Russell Garland, "Amtrak Plans New High-Speed Trains Despite Past Failures," Providence Journal-Bulletin (January 9, 2000), LexisNexis online (retrieved 2/9/06).
For an excellent description of the politics in the years immediately preceding and following this act, see Perl, New Departures , pp. 91-100.
New York Times , Information Bank Abstract (July 9, 1973), LexisNexis online (retrieved 2/9/06).
New York Times , Information Bank Abstract (June 11, 1976), LexisNexis online (retrieved 2/9/06).
U.S. GAO, Problems in the Northeast Corridor Railway Improvement Project [hereafter, Problems in NEC Project ], p. 5.
U.S. GAO, Problems in NEC Project , 5; and U.S. DOT, FRA, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement [hereafter, FPEIS ], FRA-RNC-EIS-77-01-F (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, June 1978), 1:1-1. Also, U.S. DOT, FRA, Northeast Corridor: Achievement and Potential [hereafter, NEC: Achievement and Potential ] (Washington DC: FRA, November 1986), p. 1-15.
Bechtel Incorporated, Northeast Corridor High Speed Rail Passenger Service Improvement Project: Task 11S--Improvement Plan for Physical Plant with Estimated Cost, Final Report , Prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office of Northeast Corridor Development, FRA-ONECD-75-11S, (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, August 1975), 1:4-25.
U.S. DOT, FRA, FPEIS , p. ES-1.
U.S. DOT, T wo-Year Report on the Northeast Corridor (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, February 1978), p. 11.
U.S. GAO, Problems in NEC Project , p. 9.
National Academy of Public Administration, "The Great Railway Crisis," Cited in U.S. GAO, Problems in NEC Project , p. 8.
U.S. DOT, FRA, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification New Haven, CT to Boston, MA: Record of Decision--Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report and 4(f) Statement , DOT-FRA-RDV-94-01-G [hereafter, Record of Decision ] (Washington DC: FRA, May 1995), ROD-4.
Ibid; also
Emmanuel S. "Bruce" Horowitz, ESH Consult, personal communication,
5/10/06.
U.S. DOT, FRA, FPEIS , pp. 1-9 and 1-11.
U.S. DOT, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project: Redirection Study [hereafter, Redirection Study ] (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, January 1979), p. i.
U.S. DOT, FRA,
Northeast
Corridor Improvement Project: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement--Comments and Responses [hereafter, FPEIS-3 ],
FRA-RNC-EIS-77-01-F (Washington
DC: U.S. DOT, June 1978), 3:5-7.
U.S. DOT, Redirection Study , pp. 6-9.
U.S. GAO, Problems in NEC Project , p. ii.
U.S. DOT, FRA, NEC: Achievement and Potential , pp. A-5 to A-6.
Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor, "The Northeast: Twenty Years of High Speed Rail"; Louis S. Thompson, Thompson, Galenson and Associates, LLC, (formerly Director of NECIP, Federal Railroad Administration), personal communication, 5/15/06.
Thompson, personal communication, 5/15/06.
U.S. DOT, FRA, NEC: Achievement and Potential , p. ES-3.
Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc., Cambridge Systematics, Inc., Regional Science Research Institute, CONEG High Speed Rail Regional Benefits Study: Summary Report , Prepared for the Coalition of Northeast Governors High Speed Rail Task Force (October 1990), p. ES-2.
Ibid., p. 3-4; see p. A-3 for the forecast of additional passengers wooed from air and roads.
U.S. DOT, FRA, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification New Haven, CT to Boston, MA: Scoping Document , DOT-FRA-RDV-92-01 [hereafter, Scoping Document ] (Washington DC: FRA, April 1992), p. 3.
U.S. GAO, Amtrak's Northeast Corridor: Information on the Status and Cost of Needed Improvements, Briefing Report to the Chairman , Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, US Senate, GAO/RCED-95-151BR [hereafter, Amtrak's Northeast Corridor ] (Washington DC: GAO, April 1995), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/rc95151b.pdf (accessed 6/21/05), p. 30.
Horowitz, personal communication, 5/10/06; and Thompson, personal communication, 5/15/06.
U.S. DOT, FRA, Scoping Document , pp. 7-8.
U.S. DOT, FRA, Office of Railroad Development, Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Report: Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification--New Haven, CT to Boston, MA , DOT/FRA/RDV-93/01-A [hereafter, DEIS/R -1] (Washington DC: FRA, September 1993), 1:ES-1.
U.S. DOT, FRA, DEIS/R-1 , 1:ES-5.
U.S. DOT, FRA, Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report: Comment Letters and Public Hearing Transcripts, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification--New Haven, CT to Boston, MA [hereafter, FEIS/R-4 ], DOT/FRA/RDV-94/01-D (Washington DC: FRA, October 1994), 4:MC 3-14.
U.S. DOT, FRA, Office of Railroad Development, Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Report: Technical Studies, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification--New Haven, CT to Boston, MA , DOT/FRA/RDV-93/01-B [hereafter, DEIS/R-2 ] (Washington DC: FRA, September 1993), 2:3-18.
U.S. DOT, FRA, FEIS/R-4 ; U.S. DOT, FRA, Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report: Response to Comments on Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Report, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification--New Haven, CT to Boston, MA [hereafter, F EIS/R-3 ], DOT/FRA/RDV-94/01-C (Washington DC: FRA, October 1994), 3:8.
Amtrak Planning and Analysis Department, e-mail communication, 4/10/06.
James Boice, Connecticut Department of Transportation, 6/8/06.
U.S. DOT, FRA, FEIS/R-4 ; U.S. DOT, FRA, FEIS/R-3 , 3:13.
U.S. DOT, FRA, Office of Railroad Development, The Northeast Corridor Transportation Plan: New York City to Boston [hereafter, NECTP: NYC-Boston ], Report to Congress (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, July 1994), 1:I-2.
U.S. GAO, Need for Applying Best Practices , p. 13.
U.S. DOT, FRA, NECTP: NYC-Boston , p. I-7.
U.S. GAO, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, "Amtrak's Northeast Corridor Funding Needs," GAO/RCED-95-152R (Washington DC: GAO, April 13, 1995), http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat1/154032.pdf (accessed 6/21/05), p. 2.
U.S. GAO, Amtrak's Northeast Corridor , pp. 37-39 and 45.
U.S. GAO, "Amtrak Northeast Corridor Funding Needs," p. 3.
U.S. GAO, Need for Applying Best Practices , pp.17 and 22; also, Robert Corriea, "Mass. Electric Shares Amtrak Electrification Pact," Providence-Journal Bulletin (December 13, 1995), LexisNexis (accessed 4/10/06).
U.S. GAO, Need for Applying Best Practices , p. 22.
Corriea, "Mass. Electric Shares Amtrak Electrification Pact."
U.S. GAO, "Amtrak's Northeast Corridor Funding Needs," pp. 2-4; U.S. GAO, Amtrak's Northeast Corridor , pp. 2 and 47-49.
U.S. GAO, Amtrak's Northeast Corridor , p. 50.
Amtrak, 2001 Annual Report
,
http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/01annualrpt.pdf
(accessed 2/27/06), p. 20.
U.S. GAO, Amtrak: Acela's Continued Problems Underscore the Importance of Meeting the Broader Challenges in Managing Large-Scale Projects , Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Railroads, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives -- Statement of JayEtta Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, GAO-05-698T [hereafter, Amtrak: Acela's Continued Problems ] (Washington DC: GAO, May 11, 2005), p. 4.
U.S. DOT, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report: Amtrak's High-Speed Rail Electrification Project , RT-2000-020 (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, December 14, 1999, Exhibit 2, p. 10.
"Company Officials Deny Overrun Allegations," The Associated Press State & Local Wire (September 24, 2000), LexisNexis (retrieved 2/27/06); National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP), "June 2000 Hotlines" 142 (June 9, 2000), http://www.narprail.org/h0006.htm#142 (accessed 2/27/06)
Donna de la Cruz, "Foreign, U.S. Firms to Pay Feds Nearly $25 Million for Inflating Amtrak Claims," The Associated Press State & Local Wire (October 11, 2005), LexisNexis (retrieved 2/27/06); "National Briefing/Washington: Agreement Reached in Amtrak Case," New York Times (October 12, 2005); also see Amtrak, Office of the Inspector General, Semiannual Report to Congress: April 1, 2000-September 30, 2000 (Washington DC: Amtrak, October 2000), http://www.amtrakoig.com/reports/ATK220200.PDF (accessed 2/27/06), pp. 2 and 15; Amtrak, 2001 Annual Report , 20.
U.S. DOT, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report , pp. 1-2.
U.S. GAO, Need for Applying Best Practices , p. 20.
U.S. GAO, Need for Applying Best Practices , pp. 3-4.
Ibid., Need for Applying Best Practices , p. 15.
U.S. DOT, FRA, Final Environmental Impact Statement/Report and 4(f) Statement: Northeast Corridor Improvement Project Electrification--New Haven, CT to Boston, MA , DOT/FRA/RDV-94/01-A (Washington DC: FRA, October 1994), 1:1 - 6.
Thomas Till, Managing Director, Cascadia Center for Transportation and Regional Development, Discovery Institute (formerly Executive Director of the Amtrak Reform Council), personal communication, 5/12/06.
Louis S. Thompson, "Options for Federal Ownership of the Northeast Corridor (NEC) Infrastructure" (December 12, 2005), Provided by the author.
Voorhees Transportation Center, Northeast Corridor Action Plan , p. 2.
Amtrak, FY07 Grant and Legislative Request (March 2006), 12, http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/FY07GrantLegislativeRequest.pdf (accessed 6/20/06).
Voorhees Transportation Center, Northeast Corridor Action Plan , p. 2.
Louis Thompson, "High Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States: Why Is It So Limited?" p. 6, report provided by the author.
Amtrak Reform Council, "Today, the Amtrak Reform Council Releases its Action Plan for the Restructuring and Rationalization of the National Railroad Passenger System," Press Release (February 7, 2002), p. 1.
U.S. DOT, "The Bush Administration Introduces the Passenger Rail Investment Reform Act in Congress, Transportation Secretary Mineta Invites Serious Dialogue on Amtrak Reform," Press Release, DOT 62-05, April 14, 2005, http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot6205.htm (accessed 6/6/06).
U.S. DOT, Office of the Inspector General, "Reauthorization of Intercity Passenger Rail and Amtrak," Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine, US Senate--Statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, US Department of Transportation, CC-2005-030 (Washington DC: GAO, April 21, 2005), p. 11.
Amtrak, "Amtrak Strategic Reform Initiatives, FY06 Grant Request: Rebuilding America's Passenger Rail System--Overview," (May 2005), 1, http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/strategic-slides06.pdf (accessed 6/7/06).
Amtrak, Amtrak Strategic Reform Initiatives and FY06 Grant Request (April 2005), 32, http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/strategic06.pdf (accessed 6/20/06).
Amtrak Planning and Analysis Department, e-mail communication, 4/10/06
U.S. GAO, Reauthorization of Intercity Rail and Amtrak , p. 9.
U.S. GAO, Amtrak: Acela's Continued Problems , p. 1.
Bruce Goldberg, "Metroliner's Amazing Race," Trains 66, no. 6 (June 2006): 49.
Paul McKay, "Bombardier's $1-Billion Trade Secret: How Canada's Hidden Loan to Amtrak Sealed Deal for Quebec Firm; Export Development Corp. Bailed Out U.S. Giant While Liberals Slashed VIA Rail Funding," The Ottawa Citizen (March 18, 2000), p. A1.
Leo King,
"Acela Woes Recede," Destination: Freedom Newsletter 3, no. 34
(August 19, 2002), http://www.nationalcorridors.org/df/df08192002.shtml#Acela
(accessed 6/27/06).
Bombardier Corporation v National Railroad Passenger Corporation, No. 02-7125, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 357 U.S. App. DC 129.
Amtrak, Consolidated Financial Statements, September 30, 2005 and 2004 , (February 2006), http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/05financial.pdf (accessed 6/7/06), p. 14.
U.S. GAO, Amtrak: Acela's Continued Problems , pp. 6-7.
David Carol, Project Manager, Charlotte Area Transit System, and formerly Vice President of High Speed Rail Corridor Development at Amtrak, personal communication, 10/27/05.
John Bennett, Vice President, AECOM Consult, personal communication, 11/1/05.
Thomson, personal communication, 5/15/06.
Peter Cannito, President MTA Metro-North, and formerly VP Engineering at Amtrak, personal communication, 11/22/05.
U.S. GAO, Problems in NEC Project , p. 17.
U.S. DOT, "Intercity Passenger Rail and Amtrak," Testimony Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies, United States Senate--Statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. DOT, CC-2005-037 (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, May 12, 2005), http://appropriations.senate.gov/hearmarkups/MeadMay12SenateAppropsHearing2.htm (accessed 4/10/06).
Amtrak, Monthly Performance
Report for September 2005 (Washington DC: Amtrak,
November 4, 2005), p. E-11, http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/0509monthly.pdf
(accessed 4/3/06).
Amtrak, Monthly Performance
Report for March 2006 , (May 15, 2006), p. E-8,
http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/0603monthly.pdf (accessed 6/8/06).
Carol, personal communication, 10/27/06.
Carol,
personal communication, 10/27/05; Cannito, personal communication,
11/22/05.
Bennett, personal communication, 11/1/05.
Cannito, personal communication, 11/22/05.
U.S. DOT, FRA,
R esearch
Results: Instrumented Wheel System Results Verified the High Speed Safety
Standards, RR00-05
(Washington DC: FRA, November 2000), p. 3,
http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/Research/rr00_05.pdf (accessed 6/27/06).
Abbreviations and Acronyms
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About the Authors
ALLISON L. C. DE CERREÑO, PH.D. , Principal
Investigator
Allison L. C. de Cerreño is Co-Director of the Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management, Assistant Research Professor, and Research Scientist at the New York University Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York. She also serves as Executive Director of the National Association of City Transportation Officials, Inc., (NACTO). Prior to joining the Rudin Center, Dr. C. de Cerreño was Director of Science & Technology Policy at the New York Academy of Sciences (1998-2002). Prior to that, she was Associate Director (1996-1998) of Studies and Research Associate for Latin America (1991-1996) at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. C. de Cerreño taught courses in international relations at Hunter College (1991-1994) and at City College (1996).
She currently sits as Secretary of TRB's Intercity Rail Passenger Systems Committee. Her transportation-related publications include: Pedestrian and Bicyclist Standards and Innovations in Large Central Cities (NYU Wagner Rudin Center, January 2006); High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States: Identifying the Elements for Success (MTI, August 2005); Context Sensitive Solutions in Large Central Cities (FHWA, February 2004); Evaluation Study of the Port Authority of NY & NJ's Value Pricing Initiative (RPI, January 2004); Funding Analysis for Long-Term Planning (NYU Wagner Rudin Center, July 2003); Dividing the Pie: Placing the Transportation Donor-Donee Debate in Perspective (NYU Wagner Rudin Center, May 2003); and The Dynamics of On-Street Parking in Large Cities (NYU Wagner Rudin Center, December 2002), a version of which was accepted in 2004 for publication in the Transportation Research Record by the Transportation Research Board. Other publications include: Pollution Prevention and Management Strategies for Mercury in the NY/NJ Harbor (New York Academy of Sciences-NYAS, May 2002); Maintaining Solid Foundations for Hi-Tech Growth: Transportation & Communications Infrastructure in the Tri-State Region (NYAS, 2001); University-Industry-Government Relations: Obstacles and Opportunities (NYAS, 1999); and Scientific Cooperation, State Conflict: The Roles of Scientists in Mitigating International Discord (NYAS, 1998).
SHISHIR MATHUR, PH.D.
Shishir Mathur is an assistant professor in the Urban and Regional Planning Department at the San José State University. He obtained a master's degree (1997) in Urban Planning from the School of Planning and Architecture, New Delhi, India, and a Ph.D. (2003) in Urban Design and Planning from the University of Washington. His professional experience in planning includes work in India as well as in the United States as a consultant, researcher, and instructor. His work in India included consulting in the fields of physical and land-use planning, infrastructure planning, and urban design. His work in the United States includes research and teaching in the fields of public finance, urban economics, housing, land-use policy, infrastructure planning and finance, strategic planning, and systems analysis.
Peer Review
San José State University, of the California State University system, and the MTI Board of Trustees have agreed upon a peer view process to ensure that the results presented are based upon a professionally acceptable research protocol.
Research projects begin with the approval of a scope of work by the sponsoring entities, with in-process reviews by the MTI research director and the project sponsor. Periodic progress reports are provided to the MTI research director and the Research Associates Policy Oversight Committee (RAPOC). Review of the draft research product is conducted by the research committee of the board of trustees and may include invited critiques from other professionals in the subject field. The review is based on the professional propriety of the research methodology.
3. The trip time between Pittsburgh and Philadelphia on the then-current service offered by Amtrak was 7 hours.
4. Capital Cost Estimates are for base demand in 1983 dollars and include track/guideway and structures, stations, electric traction, signals and communication, maintenance facilities, vehicles, and engineering & construction management.
7. PennDOT's share of the track work includes $2,986,535 provided in January 2000 as emergency funding.
8. PennDOT's share of the track work includes $2,986,535 provided in January 2000 as emergency funding.
9. Although it is not specified in the table, from the remainder of the discussion, these appear to be passenger trips.
12. DCP-DeLeuw, Cather/Parsons & Associates; PM-Program Management; SE-Systems Engineering, from: U.S. DOT, FRA, Northeast Corridor Improvement Project: Redirection Study (Washington DC: U.S. DOT, January 1979), p. 8; figures with PM/SE identified from: U.S. GAO, Problems in the Northeast Corridor Railway Improvement Project , p. 36.