HIGH-SPEED RAIL PROJECTS
IN THE UNITED STATES:
IDENTIFYING THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS
PART 2
Allison L. C.
de Cerreño, Ph.D.
Shishir Mathur, Ph.D.
a report cosponsored by the
a publication of the
Mineta Transportation Institute
Created by Congress in 1991
Many individuals from around the
country aided the authors in the creation of this report. Some provided their
time for interviews and reviews of the different drafts, while others helped to
find written documentation of historical and current facts. In particular,
Allison C. de Cerreño would like to thank the following individuals for their
contributions to the Northeast Corridor and Keystone Corridor cases: Charlie
Banks, R.L. Banks & Associates; John Bennett, Amtrak; James Boice,
Connecticut Department of Transportation; Eric Bugaile; Peter Cannito, MTA
Metro-North; David Carol, Charlotte Area Transit System; Calvin Cassidy,
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation; Mortimer Downey, PB Consult, Inc.;
Toby Fauver, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation; David Gunn; Emmanuel
"Bruce" Horowitz, ESH Consult; David Matsuda, Office of Senator
Lautenberg; Richard Peltz, Appalachian Regional Commission; Catherine
Popp-McDonough, SEPTA; Michael Saunders, Federal Highway Administration; Bill
Schafer, Norfolk Southern Corporation; Peter Stangl; Brian Sterman, FTA; Louis
Thompson, Thompson, Galenson and Associates, LLC; and Thomas Till, Discovery
Institute. She also thanks Dan Leavitt, California High-Speed Rail Authority
for his time in updating her on the current status of high-speed rail efforts
in
Special thanks are extended to George Haikalis, who provided a number of historical documents no longer easily found, including the summary report that Dr. de Cerreño in search of the Keystone Corridor's earlier attempts at high-speed rail which were all but forgotten, and Steven Greenfield of Parsons Brinckerhoff, who managed to track down the full preliminary report on the feasibility of high-speed rail in the Keystone Corridor. And, finally to members of Amtrak's Planning and Analysis and Government Affairs Departments who provided several documents and the speed restriction tables for the NEC, spent time with the author showing her how to interpret them, and arranged for additional discussions on numerous technical questions.
Shishir Mathur would like to thank the following individuals for their contributions to the Chicago Hub case: John Bennett, Amtrak; David Carol, Charlotte Area Transit System; Emmanuel "Bruce" Horowitz, ESH Consult; Merrill Travis, Lower Cost Solutions, Inc,; John Schwalbauch, Illinois Department of Transportation; Ethan Johnson, Wisconsin Department of Transportation; Stuart Nicholson, the Ohio Rail Development Commission; John Hey, Iowa Department of Transportation; Ellis Tompkins, Nebraska Department of Roads; Rodney Massman, Missouri Department of Transportation; Mike Bedore, Michigan Department of Transportation; Drew Galloway, Amtrak; Joby Berman, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority; Emil Frankel, Parsons Brinckerhoff; Rick Harnish, Midwest High Speed Rail Coalition; and Rick Tidwell, Metra.
Finally, both authors extend their thanks to Howard Permut, MTA Metro-North, for his thoughtful comments and suggestions during numerous rounds of the report. Thanks are offered also to MTI staff, including Research Director Trixie Johnson, Research and Publications Assistant Sonya Cardenas, Webmaster Barney Murray, and Graphic Artist Shun Nelson. Editing and publication services were provided by Catherine Frazier and Project Solutions Network, Inc.
Key Findings and Lessons Learned 2
Goals, Definitions, and Methodology 9
Update on Earlier Cases and HSR Initiatives 10
Challenges in Implementing HSR in the States 14
The Chicago Hub and Midwest Regional Rail Initiative 17
History of HSR in the Midwest 17
HSR Efforts within the States 28
Possible Issues and Next Steps 50
History and Development of the Corridor 56
History and Development of the Corridor 92
Findings, Lessons, and Themes 139
Key Findings and Lessons Learned 139
Map of Proposed Midwest Regional Rail System 24
The Keystone Corridor, Philadelphia to Harrisburg 53
The Keystone Corridor, Philadelphia to Pittsburgh 54
Bypass of 30th Street Station 77
Ownership of and Operations on the NEC 89
NEC Weekday Revenue Passenger Train Movement, 2006 91
Recommended Time Line from Redirection Study 105
Lines Comprising the Chicago Hub 21
MWRRS Plan: Train Travel Times 25
MWRRS Plan: Operating Revenues, Costs, and Operating Ratio 26
MWRRS Plan: Capital Investment by Corridor 27
Attributes Related to HSR Alternatives C, D, and E 60
Costs of SOGR and High-Speed Service (millions of 1996 $) 65
Service Alternatives under SOGR 65
Funding Share of KCIP Program Elements ($ millions) 69
Funding Schedule ($ millions) 70
KCIP Program Element Costs, 2002 vs. 2004 ($ millions) 73
Revised Funding Schedule ($ millions) 74
Program Elements: Total Expenditures per Time Period ($ millions) 74
December 2004 Revised Funding Schedule ($ millions) 75
Planned Work on the Keystone Corridor in FY 2005 75
NEC Ridership: DC-NYC, 1968-1976 (thousands) 94
Cost of Program Elements by State ($ millions) 100
PEIS and Redirection Study Program Elements and Costs ($ millions) 104
NECIP Budget Revisions, 04/79-01/82 ($ millions) 108
Redirection Study/FPEIS Recommendations vs. Actual Improvements 110
Estimated Cost of Trip-Time-Related Improvements ($ millions) 117
Funds Obligated under NECIP, FY 1976-1995 ($ thousands) 120
NEC Goals for and Current Status of Trip Times and Frequencies 133
In August 2005, the Mineta
Transportation Institute issued the report, High-Speed Rail Projects in the
This report is, in essence, volume 2 of the previous study. Like the first study, this report also used a comparative case study approach based on an extensive literature review as well as interviews with primary and secondary sources. Sources in the literature review were drawn from historical, governmental, and legal documents, as well as business plans, feasibility studies, and related media articles.
This effort adds to the earlier work
with three additional cases--the Chicago Hub consisting of eight lines in eight
states; the Keystone Corridor between
Some of the key findings and lessons learned from the previous study are bolstered by these three cases. Furthermore, this study provides several additional themes for consideration, the following in particular:
The Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridor experiences call into question whether they can be replicated in areas where Amtrak (National Railroad Passenger Corporation) does not own the line.
The cases in the report help highlight the tension between needing to keep costs low and finding the needed funds so that goals can be met.
Finally, together with the
examples from the first study, the cases in this study suggest that an
important discussion needs to occur about whether efforts aimed at incremental
HSR (that is, rail that uses existing technologies and rights-of-way [ROW], but
undergoes improvements to allow for speeds up to 150 mph) are more likely to
meet with success in the current political climate than are those aimed at new
HSR (rail requiring new ROW and technologies imported from Europe or Asia that
typically allow for speeds in excess of 200 mph). The answer to this question
could change the course of both policies and funding aimed at instituting HSR
in the
While each case summary provides a discussion of key findings and lessons specific to that corridor, the cases presented in this report, along with those of the first report, provide several broader findings and lessons. This section highlights these findings, along with lessons that will prove important for HSR initiatives around the country.
Leadership coupled with means and
authority are required to implement change. HSR projects are expensive, take
many years to complete, and require coordination among and between a number of
key actors and stakeholders. The case studies of this report and its
predecessor, which included
In the Keystone Corridor, this set of
factors has been the most important in contributing to its current success. In
earlier attempts at HSR in
Given the need for the combination of these three factors to be present for successful HSR outcomes, the Chicago Hub faces several obstacles. First, despite the support of several state legislators and state department of transportation (DOT) officials, as a whole, the Hub has lacked strong and consistent leadership. Second, funding for the Hub has not been secured (though two small segments have funding for certain improvements). Third, no formal authority or structural process that would make HSR-specific improvements has been identified. The end result is that while some coordination exists, specific roles and responsibilities are unclear, and overall, the states and other stakeholders are not moving in concert with each other to implement HSR.
The actors providing the leadership, the means, and the authority to implement change may vary according to specific circumstances and factors. On the NEC, the federal government and Amtrak played the central roles, while on the Keystone Corridor, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT); and Amtrak, under the leadership of David Gunn, played these critical roles. In both cases, Amtrak could provide authority since it owned the lines, or in the case of the NEC, most of the line. On the Keystone Corridor, because the costs associated with the modifications were not extensive, the state government and Amtrak could include them in their annual budgets, thus providing the means and avoiding the need for political campaigns to build support.
On the NEC, the costs were more
significant as were the challenges faced by multiple owners, multiple states,
and many more operators. Thus, the involvement of the federal government was
more important. On the Chicago Hub, progress has been piecemeal, with only two
relatively small segments progressing forward at this point--one between
The Keystone Corridor demonstrates the potential for HSR improvements without major federal support. Nevertheless, given the experience on the Northeast Corridor and the overall lack of progress on HSR in the United States over the past four decades, there is good reason to believe that a federal vision for HSR is needed along with a national network strategy for rail that combines passenger, freight, non-HSR intercity, and HSR rail, and addresses how each also links to nonrail modes of transportation. Along with this, federal funding is also important, especially for the larger and multistate projects. Indeed, as the experience of the NEC demonstrates, without the public funding provided by the federal government, even the successes that have been realized would not have occurred.
Reiterating the findings in the first
study, without a broad vision, or at least guidance and standards, states will
continue to fill the void with multiple types of models--constitutional
amendments and legislation (like Florida and California), multistate compacts
(like the Chicago Hub), public-private partnerships (like what was envisioned
during the 1980s in Pennsylvania)--without a sense of what is most likely to
succeed. Worse, without a national network strategy for rail, the
The goals for any major capital investment project are rarely unidimensional. However, in the case of HSR, the goals are not only multidimensional but also sometimes conflicting. While some focus on the need for the highest speeds, others argue that accessibility, frequency, and on-time performance are more important (basically, more efficient and reliable intercity rail). These different goals lead to very different markets, technologies, funding sources, and overall outcomes, with those focusing on speeds proposing new HSR and those focusing on other attributes looking toward incremental HSR.
Developing clear and consistent goals around which to build a consensus is important for successful outcomes in HSR. On the Keystone Corridor, the unsuccessful effort in the 1980s that resulted in a recommendation for magnetic levitation (Maglev) had multiple goals--economic development, higher rail share of travel, travel-time savings--with no clear prioritization among them. Indeed, a substantial minority of those involved in the effort did not fully support the final recommendation, believing that lower cost alternatives should be considered. In contrast, the most recent effort on the Keystone Corridor stressed two much more straightforward goals--bringing the line up to a state of good repair and improving trip times.
Equally important, all the key
stakeholders (in this case, operators) along the Keystone Corridor see some
benefit accruing from the goals and related projects entailed in the current
effort. Amtrak will increase and enhance its service, with corresponding ridership
and revenue increases. PennDOT will be able to fulfill several objectives
related to its broader transportation goals for the corridor.
The NEC's experience has been somewhat mixed in terms of goals and benefits. The earliest goals were identified in terms of reducing trip times, but they were negotiated based on political need rather than objective criteria or analysis, and whether they were fully agreed upon by all the stakeholders involved is not clear. In terms of benefits, as early as 1978, the Federal Railroad Administration and Amtrak came under criticism for not addressing the concerns and needs of the various stakeholders along the corridor, notably the commuter and freight railroad operators. Under the later electrification project on the north-end of the corridor, similar concerns were raised as well as additional concerns by other nonoperating stakeholders along the NEC, and as was seen, finding operational support and funding for those improvements that do not clearly benefit certain stakeholders has proven difficult.
To date, the overarching goals of the Midwestern states are to increase connectivity, reduce trip times between major Midwestern cities, and provide multimodal connections to improve system access. These goals have meant that the Midwestern states have moved toward a more regional framework to plan for HSR, which, critics point out, has meant inclusion of corridors that have little potential to attract ridership, and an estimated project cost that, in light of limited funding, is almost impossible to finance. Further, the matrix of benefits in the Chicago Hub remains very much unclear. For the Chicago Hub to have any opportunity for success, it is critical that the private railroad companies that own the majority of the ROW, Metra (the commuter rail), and the environmental groups be included in the planning process so they can work together to develop and prioritize goals and identify benefits.
In addition to the findings and lessons learned, some important themes for consideration bear mentioning.
On both the NEC and the Keystone Corridor, ownership of the ROW by Amtrak proved critical. Ownership of the ROW allowed Amtrak the authority to more easily deal with capital investment decisions, signaling, dispatching, power distribution, and maintenance decisions to implement HSR. It also reduced costs since there was no need to purchase new ROW and, in the case of the Keystone Corridor Improvement Program (KCIP), allowed the avoidance of certain environmental requirements because most of the improvements occurred in the current ROW and did not reflect a new service in themselves.
In contrast, except for one relatively
small segment, the Chicago Hub is not owned by Amtrak, and unlike the NEC on
which the other owners were public entities, the Chicago Hub's spokes are
primarily owned by various private railroad companies. The result is similar to
what is seen on the western portion of the Keystone Corridor, between
Harrisburg and Pittsburgh--there is no clear authority for implementing HSR,
and the costs to do so will be much more significant since in many cases
separate tracks will be required for passenger trains operating at higher
speeds. In fact, the only section of the Chicago Hub that has been upgraded in
speed in recent years (95 mph) is the Amtrak-owned segment from just outside of
Among the key findings on the Keystone Corridor was that because the costs to implement change in the most recent effort were reasonable, they were more easily accepted and achieved. This was also seen on the two segments of the Chicago Hub where track improvements have been made to eventually allow for 110 mph service; associated costs were relatively low and could be budgeted within an already existing program. However, as the experience on the NEC demonstrates, trying to reduce costs too much can lead to the situation where the goals are left unmet. From the earliest years of the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP) through the later electrification project on the north-end, there was a reluctance to commit the necessary funding to fully complete the project. The end result of this lack of commitment was difficulty in meeting many of the goals that were set. Worse, without the necessary funding, the plans had to be redrawn and revised numerous times, leading to delayed implementation and higher costs in the long term. Finally, making decisions based on the trip-time savings and costs of each project individually ignored the possibility of reaping greater savings by combining the projects.
The first study suggested that there
were opportunities for both incremental and new HSR in the
Perhaps the most resounding theme for
consideration is that in the
Nevertheless, this is a point worth
serious consideration, given the costs of new HSR; current political apathy
(and in some cases outright antipathy) surrounding rail more broadly and new
HSR more specifically; the perceived risks associated with "unproven"
HSR technologies in the United States; and the fact that the few places where
success has occurred (even if modest in many respects) have implemented
incremental HSR. While incremental rail may be viewed by some as
"settling" for the second-best choice, without stronger and
consistent financial and political commitment on both the part of the federal
government and the states, it may be the only means for having any HSR in the
In August 2005, the Mineta Transportation Institute issued the report, High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States: Identifying the Elements for Success . The report noted that since the 1960s, high-speed ground transportation (HSGT) has "held the promise of fast, convenient, and environmentally sound travel for distances between 40 and 600 miles."See C. de Cerreño, et. al., High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States., p. 1. After briefly discussing the difference in experiences with HSGT between the United States and its Asian and European counterparts, the report proceeded to review three U.S. cases--Florida, California, and the Pacific Northwest--as a means for identifying lessons learned for successfully implementing high-speed rail (HSR) in the United States.
This report follows and adds to the earlier study, also using a comparative case study approach, with three additional cases--the Chicago Hub, the Keystone Corridor, and the Northeast Corridor. While some of the lessons learned and themes for consideration from the previous study are bolstered by these three cases, additional lessons are more apparent, particularly as one looks to the two cases--the Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridor--in which higher speeds have been achieved.
As with the earlier report, the goal of
this study is to identify lessons learned for successfully implementing HSR in
the
Given the early stages of most of these projects, "success" is defined by whether a given HSR project is still actively pursuing development or funding. However, in the case of the Northeast Corridor, a fuller discussion of success is provided, since HSR has been implemented on that corridor for some time now.
With respect to other definitions, HSR
in the
Incremental HSR--uses existing
technologies and rights-of-way (ROW) but makes improvements to allow for speeds
up to 150 mph (though most projects in the
New HSR--requires new ROW
and technologies imported from Europe or
Additionally, some efforts have been
aimed at implementing an entirely new type of technology--magnetic levitation
(Maglev)--now in revenue service in
Since the publication of the first
report, there has been little movement on HSR in the
At the time the work was being
conducted on the first report, the situations in
In 2006 the Florida High Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA) issued its report to the governor and legislature. The report noted that although the amendment had been repealed, the FHSRA continued negotiations with Fluor-Bombardier, which had provided the first-ranked proposal responding to FHSRA's 2002 Request for Proposals. The negotiations have centered on certain potential changes to the proposal that would incorporate several attributes of the second-ranked proposal, including the addition of a second track in certain locations. At the same time, FHSRA has remained in discussions with Global Rail Consortium, which submitted the second-ranked proposal and has solicited additional information from them, specifically related to the levels of private participation in the project.See Florida High Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA), 2006 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, http://www.floridahighspeedrail.org/uploaddocuments/p25 2006_Report_to_the_Governor_and_the_Legislature.pdf (accessed 6/9/06), 2; also see C. de Cerreño, et.al., High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States, pp. 27-43.
In addition to continuing negotiations
and discussions with Fluor-Bombardier and Global Rail Consortium, the FHSRA
also changed its preferred route option for the new HSR, which would connect
No new recommendations were offered by the FHSRA to the governor and legislature, though the Authority reiterated the 2005 recommendation to complete the two key memoranda of agreement--one with Florida Department of Transportation and one with the Greater Orlando Aviation Authority--which are needed before the Record of Decision can be finalized. FHSRA believes that these steps need to be taken to preserve the ability to locate a new HSR system in the existing public right-of-way along a key section of the corridor, even if HSR is not pursued at this time.See FHSRA, 2006 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, pp. 3-4.
Nevertheless, given that funding for
HSR was cut by Governor Jeb Bush in fiscal year (FY) 2004 and has not been
reintroduced, and that the Governor's office remains not only unsupportive but
also actively opposed to HSR, at the moment the situation appears rather bleak,
at least for new HSR in
In some ways
In November 2005, the California High Speed Rail Authority
(CHSRA) unanimously approved the certification of the final Environmental
Impact Statement. This was followed by the Federal Railroad Administration's
issuance of a Record of Decision. Yet, after more than a decade of working
toward the implementation of a 700-mile, new HSR system in
In January 2006, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger announced a $222 billion, 10-year public works bond, which while mentioning HSR, did not include any funding for it. As a result, members of the Legislature began discussing postponing a $9.95 billion HSR bond measure from November 2006 to November 2008 (it had already been postponed from the November 2004 ballot).See California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA), "What's New," http://www.cahighspeedrail.ca.gov/wahts_new/default.asp (accessed 6/1/06). On June 29, 2006, the legislature voted unanimously to postpone the vote again.See "Lawmakers Vote to Axe High-Speed Rail Bond From November Ballot," Associated Press, http://www.sacbee.com/state_wire/story/14271924p-15082433c.html (accessed 6/29/06).
According to Dan Leavitt, Deputy
Director of the CHSRA, postponing the ballot has serious consequences for HSR
in
The three cases together in this report provide some interesting comparisons to each other and to the earlier cases as well. While the Chicago Hub remains in the planning stages (and significantly behind California and Florida), the Keystone Corridor is in the midst of incremental improvements to increase speeds up to 110 mph (with potential additional increases over time), and the Northeast Corridor (NEC) is the closest the United States comes to true HSR, with speeds of up to 150 mph in certain locations.
Like
Unlike
The Chicago Hub (2,313 miles) is significantly larger than either the NEC (456 miles) or the Keystone Corridor (104 miles). There are two segments of the Chicago Hub that are roughly the same length as the Keystone Corridor (118 miles and 80 miles) and on which some improvements are being made. However, each of these segments is significantly smaller than the full Hub, each represents only a portion of two different spokes of the Hub, and unlike the Keystone Corridor, they do not connect the end-point cities.
The costs associated with change on the full extent of the Chicago Hub are significantly higher than with the most recent efforts on the Keystone Corridor (though on the segments mentioned above, the costs are comparable).
The ROW is largely owned by private freight operators on the Chicago Hub; on the Keystone Corridor, Amtrak (National Railroad Passenger Corporation) owns the portion of the corridor on which incremental improvements are being made; and on the NEC, Amtrak owns the majority of the line, with public agencies owning the remainder.
There is no clear overall authority or dominant player on the Chicago Hub, while on the Keystone Corridor, Amtrak and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation clearly played the lead role.
Owing in part to its multistate nature, there is no formal institutional framework on the Chicago Hub as one sees on the Keystone Corridor or even on the NEC.
Who benefits and by how much is less clear with the Chicago Hub than with the Keystone Corridor or the NEC. Worse, while on the Keystone Corridor all the stakeholders see some benefit, on the Chicago Hub some stakeholders may see a negative impact if HSR is implemented.
As will be seen after reviewing the experiences on the Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridors, all of these points call into question the ability of the Chicago Hub to move from early planning to full implementation of HSR.
In an October 1994 article by Louis
Thompson, "High-Speed Rail (HSR) in the
HSR carries large volumes of people using limited space.
HSR consumes less energy and emits less pollution than automobiles and airplanes under certain conditions.
HSR can operate directly in and out of city centers, unlike airplanes.
HSR's marginal operating cost per person is small once the infrastructure is built, so that if volumes are high enough, this mode can provide the lowest-cost travel.See Louis S. Thompson, "High-Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States--Why Isn't There More?" Japan Railway & Transport Review (October 1994): pp. 34-35.
On the other hand, Thompson also notes several disadvantages:
HSR can be extremely expensive to build (particularly for new HSR).
HSR is limited in coverage, since it can only go where there are tracks (and finding those tracks and ROW today is increasingly difficult).
HSR is not a proven mode in
the
Additional challenges for HSR in the
To date, in most attempts to implement
HSR in the
The subsequent pages of this report
explore the cases in depth, tracing historical efforts aimed at implementing
high-speed rail as well as the most recent challenges and status of each of the
corridors. The next section of this report covers the Chicago Hub and Midwest
Regional Rail Initiative, describing the initiatives being taken by each state
to move HSR forward in the region and providing an assessment of the various
stakeholder interests that will need to be taken into account as the effort
progresses. The fourth section explores the Keystone Corridor, tracing several
unsuccessful attempts aimed at implementing HSR in the
The Midwest, with
The
Nevertheless, the Chicago Hub and Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) together serve as a counterpoint to the experiences of the Keystone Corridor and Northeast Corridor. The Chicago Hub and MWRRI demonstrate the difficulty in moving HSR initiatives forward without the combined presence of leadership, means, and authority. They also demonstrate the difficulty in trying to implement an HSR network that crosses multiple states in the absence of significant political and financial support from the federal government.
Historically, the motivation to plan for HSR in the
However, development of HSR in the
One of the first attempts to examine the feasibility of HSR in
the
All of these studies were conducted in
parallel with and sometimes as a result of regional-level efforts to develop
HSR in the
Because the beneficial service of and profitability of a high speed intercity rail passenger system would be enhanced by establishing such a system which would operate across state lines it is the policy of the states party to this compact to cooperate and share jointly the administrative and financial responsibilities of preparing a feasibility study concerning the operation of such a system connecting major cities in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri, and any other State which subsequently becomes a participant through enactment of the compact.See Missouri Revised Statutes, Transportation Services, § 680.175 (August 1997), "Interstate High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Network Compact," http://ssl.csg.org/compactlaws/intercityhighspeedrail.html (accessed 4/3/06).
The compact further noted that:
The states of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri and all other states which subsequently enter into this compact, hereinafter referred to as "participating states," agree to, upon adoption of this compact by the respective states, jointly conduct and participate in a high speed intercity rail passenger feasibility study by providing such information and data as is available and may be requested by a participating state or any consulting firms representing a participating state or the compact. It is mutually understood by the participating states that such information shall not include matters not of public record or of a nature considered to be privileged and confidential unless the state providing such information agrees to waive the confidentiality.See Ibid.
Although the compact did not result in actual development of regional HSR, and was ultimately repealed by many of the participating states, it represented the first formal attempt by a group of Midwestern and Eastern states to study the feasibility of developing a regional HSR system.
Interest in HSR in the Midwest received
a boost in 1990 when a group of high-level public and government officials
toured
The purpose of the report was, "to
investigate the economic and financial potential for constructing and operating
a HSR system in one of two corridors...between Chicago and Minneapolis-St. Paul."
The corridors examined were a southern corridor linking
Similar interest in exploring the
potential for HSR in the Chicago-Detroit line led the DOTs of Illinois,
In 1991 the federal government, under
the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) called for
selection of not more than five corridors to be designated as HSR corridors.
These included the
While the earlier regionwide effort--through the Interstate High Speed Intercity Rail Passenger Network Compact--was unsuccessful, renewed regional efforts were made in the form of the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission (MIPRC) and the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI).
Under the auspices of the Midwestern
Legislative Conference (MLC), the pro-HSR legislators of several Midwestern
states formed a task force in December 1996. A regional association of state
legislatures representing 11 Midwestern states (
Over the next four years, the task
force decided to create the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Commission
(MIPRC) through the Midwest Interstate Passenger Rail Compact drafted by the
task force. The states of
While the legislators were garnering
political support for HSR, the state DOT officials joined efforts to prepare a
regional plan for HSR. This effort gave rise to a loose consortium of state DOT
officials called the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI), of which the
MIPRC is supportive. The MWRRI "began in 1996 under the auspices of the
Mississippi Valley Conference--a regional division of the American Association
of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)."See Indiana High Speed Rail Association, "A
History of the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative,"
http://www.indianahighspeedrail.org/history.htm (accessed 12/1/05). The
representatives of the state DOTs of Indiana,