MTI Report 04-05

(CNN)--U.S. mass transit systems were put on higher alert after Thursday's bombings in London, with officials in major cities urging Americans to go about their business but be on the lookout for anything suspicious... New York Police Commissioner Ray Kelly told CNN his officers were "doing everything that's prudent, everything that we reasonably can do to protect the city." But he said it was impossible to put a police officer "on every train all the time, or one on every station all the time."

( http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/07/07/us.response/ ; Posted: Thursday, July 7, 2005, 11:41 pm EDT (03:41 GMT))

While the most significant terrorist attacks--such as the sarin attack in Tokyo or the bombing of the Paris Metro--garnered worldwide public attention during the 1990s, popular and political response in the United States was generally muted. Perhaps this was because attacks on U.S. transit systems were still quite rare; perhaps this was due to Americans' legendary parochialism; or perhaps it simply reflected wishful thinking. Whatever the reasons for this indifference, it was not justified.

During the mid-1990s, four separate acts of terrorism and extreme violence on U.S. transit and rail systems killed fourteen and injured more than one thousand.1 While police and intelligence officials who oversee transit properties grew much more vigilant and vocal in the late-1990s in calling for increased attention to the vulnerability of public transit systems to terrorist acts, the issue still had not caught the attention of most transit passengers, voters, members of the media, or elected officials.

This all changed, of course, on September 11, 2001. While the focus of the 9/11 attacks was on a different part of the transportation system, the effects on the affected public transit systems were dramatic and, in the case of New York, long-lasting. The vulnerability of open, accessible public transit systems and their passengers to terrorist acts was cast in the sharpest possible relief. Concern over the vulnerability of transit systems has been heightened further by the more recent, deadly, March 11, 2004, attacks on commuter rail trains in Madrid, Spain, and the July 2005 attacks on the London Underground and bus systems. The London attacks, in particular, dominated news coverage for at least a week and raised popular concern over transit terrorism in the United States such that transit security in the United States is now widely viewed as an important public policy issue.

The attention and subsequent fear generated by these attacks have clearly motivated policymakers into action. Indeed, one of the more sobering lessons from the research reported here is that significant system- or industry-wide changes in security planning have often required either prolonged exposure to lower-scale attacks (such as those perpetrated by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) against transit systems in greater London) or a mass casualty event (such as in Tokyo, Madrid, or most recently, London). Absent such events, concerns--even repeated, dire warnings by vigilant police and intelligence officials--have too often gone unheeded by many elected officials.

Research Approach

Research on transit security in the United States has mushroomed since 9/11; this study is part of that new wave of research. This study contributes to our understanding of transit security in several ways. Perhaps most important, we employ a wide array of approaches and methods to examine a complicated issue: How are transit managers around the United States and around the world working to better protect their systems and passengers from terrorist attacks? To address this question, we have pursued a multipronged research approach.

We reviewed and synthesized nearly all previously published research on transit terrorism and updated previous efforts to systematically chronicle previous terrorist attacks on transit systems around the globe.

We complemented these detailed case studies and interviews with a comprehensive survey of 113 of the largest transit operators in the United States regarding prior threats and attacks, past and current security planning and policing efforts, and approaches to four security strategies: policing, technology/hardware, public education/outreach, and crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED).

We conducted detailed interviews with federal officials here in the United States responsible for overseeing transit security, and with transit industry representatives both here and abroad, to learn about efforts to coordinate and finance transit security planning.

We conducted detailed case studies of terrorist attacks on transit systems in London (prior to July 2005), Madrid, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C. These case studies involved reviews of documentary evidence and other written materials, and in-depth interviews with transit officials and other key stakeholders.

Thus, our multipronged research approach is both domestic and international, as well as qualitative and quantitative, all in an effort to increase the reliability of our findings on this complex issue.

A second distinguishing feature of this research reflects the experience and expertise of the research team. We are scholars of architecture and urban design, civil and transportation engineering, and transportation and urban planning, and not intelligence, policing, or security. We have, therefore, approached this research from the perspective of the people who finance, design, build, operate, and use public transit systems, rather than from the perspective of those who police them.

For example, the role of system design in transit security has received far less attention in most previous research on transit security than policing or surveillance. A specific focus of this work is on system design. We conducted inspections of transit stations in each of the systems studied, and we collected detailed information on attitudes toward and applications of CPTED strategies in our survey of U.S. transit operators.

A third and final distinguishing feature of this research is that it updates the findings and conclusions of many previous studies in this fast moving and rapidly evolving literature. We found from our survey, for example, that security planning efforts have progressed significantly at U.S. transit systems since a 2002 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) survey of transit operators was published in 2003.

Layout of the Study

The study is composed of six sections. Following the introduction, the second section presents a comprehensive look at This research-literature review gives particular emphasis to design strategies. Building on two earlier Mineta Transportation Institute reports, the section includes a history and chronology of terrorist attacks on railway systems, extending the inventory of terrorist attacks to 2004,2 and providing basic information about the medium of attack, the type of transit system attacked (heavy rail, commuter rail, light rail), and the impact of the attack (number of casualties).

The next section, See Securing Transit Systems in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit Operators presents the results of a Web-based survey administered to 120 transit agencies in 108 cities in the United States. The survey assesses (1) how the threat of terrorism affects the transportation security decisions of agencies; (2) how such decisions have changed after the events of September 11, 2001; (3) how agencies effectively identify and assess vulnerabilities in their transportation systems; (4) what measures they are taking to increase transit security; and (5) the relative importance they place on different security strategies such as CPTED, public education and user outreach, policing, and security hardware and technology.

Transit agencies do not operate in a policy vacuum. Their planning efforts against terrorism are determined largely by policies and funding allocations at the state and federal levels. The fourth section, See Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: Interviews with Key U.S. Stakeholders assesses the federal government's role in the security of urban rail transit in the United States. Drawing from interviews with officials in a number of federal agencies, this section discusses and analyzes initiatives taken by the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Transit Administration, and the Federal Railroad Administration. The section also reports on interviews with officials from the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and security personnel from Amtrak, the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

"Case Studies of Contemporary Terrorist Incidents," the next section, draws from the literature and first-hand interviews with transit officials in five cities--London, New York, Tokyo, Paris, and Madrid--to present five case studies of contemporary terrorist incidents: (1) the terrorist attacks waged by the Irish Republican Army against the London Underground, (2) the Fulton Street Station fire bombing in New York, (3) the sarin chemical agent release by members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult on the Tokyo subway system, (4) the bombings on the Paris rail system by Algerian terrorists, and (5) the Al Qaeda attack on the Madrid rail line. The case studies detail the incidents and discuss the emergency and long-term design and policy responses to them.

The last section, "Transit Security Strategies of International Agencies," reports on interviews with transit officials from Paris, Tokyo, London, Madrid, and Brussels to better assess the role of transit system design and operation in both exacerbating and minimizing terrorist attacks. This section also compares transit security policies in different countries and elaborates the goals of the different international transit agencies, their security measures and strategies, and the challenges they face in securing their systems.

From the hundreds of pages of interview transcripts, survey results, and fieldwork notes, we distill the analyses in these six sections into what we see as twelve important lessons from the recent experience of efforts to prepare for, discourage, mitigate, and respond to terrorist attacks on urban public transit systems around the world.

Findings: A Dozen Lessons Learned

1. Public transit systems are open, dynamic, and inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks; they simply cannot be closed and secured like other parts of the transportation system.

Public transit systems are a central part of urban life. They assemble strangers from diverse economic, social, ethnic, and religious backgrounds and convey them though a wide array of neighborhoods and districts. They are, by definition, open, dynamic systems that cannot be closed and regulated like the air transport system.3 Such sentiments were expressed repeatedly by the hundreds of people interviewed and surveyed for this research. Not surprisingly, most of the transit managers and security officials who responded to our survey viewed their transit systems as "very vulnerable" to terrorist attacks.

While public officials understandably call for efforts to make transit systems 100 percent safe, it is simply impossible to secure the thousands of bus stops, hundreds of miles of bus routes, many dozens of miles of rail rights-of-way, and the hundreds of stations used daily by millions of passengers in most large metropolitan areas. The challenge is especially daunting given a growing wave of suicide bombers who are willing to risk capture or death to execute an attack. According to an official interviewed in Madrid,

I have to say that security does not exist. What does exist are methods to lessen insecurity. You never know what is going to happen. I am telling you this because when the politicians tell you that these methods will guarantee our security, it is all false.

Said another Madrid official,

You should accept that there is an inherent vulnerability to the system, and if you want to run an open mass transit system you live with the vulnerabilities and try to tackle them through intelligence and stopping these people before they actually get in.

Such sentiments raise legitimate, and perhaps troubling, questions about whether transit security planning efforts are perceived by transit officials as more symbolically effective (at creating a sense of safety among the public) than substantively effective (in reducing the likelihood and/or magnitude of a terrorist attack). At the very least, they reflect the daunting challenges to security planning for open, accessible transit systems.

2. The threat of transit terrorism is probably not universal; most attacks in the developed world have been on the largest systems in the largest cities.

While the chronology of terrorist attacks on transit systems reviewed in the section "Securing Urban Rail Transit Systems against Terrorism: A Review of the Literature" documents hundreds of incidents occurring over many decades, the deadliest and most politically influential of these have occurred on the largest transit systems in the most politically and economically powerful world cities, such as London, Madrid, Moscow, New York, Paris, and Tokyo. This suggests that efforts to combat transit terrorism should be focused on cities and transit systems where the likelihood and potential effects of terrorism are greatest.

This observed asymmetry of risk likely reflects both the symbolic importance of particular world cities, and the fact that transit use tends to be concentrated in the largest and most densely developed metropolitan areas. As noted in the third section, See Securing Transit Systems in the Post-9/11 Era: A Survey of U.S. Transit Operators the ten largest U.S. transit systems (operating in nine metropolitan areas) carried 65 percent of all transit trips reported to the Federal Transit Administration for 2002, while the hundreds of remaining transit systems carry the remaining 35 percent. Of all 2002 U.S. transit trips, 39 percent occurred in one metropolitan area, New York, and 31 percent of all U.S. transit trips were carried by just one system, the New York MTA.4

While the most dramatic attacks have occurred mostly on major systems in world cities, this does not mean, of course, that local bus service or smaller cities are safe from attack. In the developing world, terrorist attacks on transit are more likely to occur on buses than on trains. Further, as noted in the sections and See Institutional Responses to Increasing Transit Security Threats: Interviews with Key U.S. Stakeholders security experts report that some terrorists have on occasion chosen to attack unexpected targets in order to elevate fear and anxiety among the general population. But while smaller U.S. cities--like Oklahoma City--are clearly not safe from terrorist attacks, the very small role played by public transit in these cities (where the mode share of trips can dip below 1 percent) suggests that they are a far less likely venue for an attack than larger cities where the role and visibility of public transit are proportionally much greater.

3. The asymmetry of transit terrorism risk is at odds with a political system of public finance that favors distributing funding somewhat equally across jurisdictions.

Given the observed asymmetry of risk, how should security resources be deployed? If strategic transit security policies start from the premise that attacks will inevitably occur, then "success" is not elimination of all attacks, but preventing and/or minimizing the most damaging attacks, which are most likely and most deadly on the largest transit systems. While focusing security efforts on large transit systems in New York, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, for example, may motivate terrorists to shift their focus to smaller systems and smaller cities, such a shift could be viewed as evidence of success in securing the most symbolically significant and attractive targets.

However, there is a strong tendency in the public finance of transportation, and indeed in most realms of public finance, to distribute funding widely among political districts and jurisdictions. This helps to explain why federal per-rider transit subsidies tend to be far higher in places like Chapel Hill, North Carolina, than in places like New York City. This natural tendency to spread out money evenly does not square with the asymmetry of transit systems' risk of terrorist attack, and may undermine the effectiveness of federal and state transit security policies and programs. Thus, despite New York's domination of U.S. public transit patronage, it is unlikely that the U.S. Congress--comprising entirely geographically based representatives concerned with the distribution of resources among their competing jurisdictions--will see fit to devote a third or more of all federal transit security resources to the New York metropolitan area.

4. Transit managers are struggling to balance the costs and (uncertain) benefits of increased security against the costs and (certain) benefits of attracting passengers.

Transit managers are in the business of attracting and conveying paying customers. They endeavor to provide safe, fast, and reliable service at a reasonable price, but transit systems worldwide have struggled in a losing, century-long battle with private vehicles for market share in urban travel--especially in most U.S. cities. Thus, from the perspective of transit system planners and managers, safety and security are important, albeit intermediate, means to the end goal of carrying passengers. As one transit industry official put it, "What's important to remember is that public transport companies are responsible for satisfying the mobility needs of citizens. They are not security agencies."

With respect to the sometimes competing objectives of maximizing security versus maximizing ridership, one London interviewee noted,

Our primary function is to get loads of people to use trains. Security, I would suggest, is still seen as a secondary but integral function. So you won't have the world's most secure station built, but you'll have the world's most cost-effective station built with security enhancements.

Calls for increased attention to security have come in recent years from passengers, the media, local officials, and state and federal governments. With respect to the latter, mandates for regular and comprehensive security planning, more formalized safety and emergency response procedures, increased policing and surveillance, and so on were criticized by many of the transit officials we interviewed (both domestic and international) as unfunded mandates that strain already depleted transit system budgets. Indeed, the need for increased security funding was the central finding of the 2003 GAO study of transit security in the United States, and such calls for increased funding were echoed in this research.

According to one transit official interviewed, transit terrorism is a tremendous burden for agencies because they "have to be lucky all the time, while the terrorists only have to be lucky once." Regarding the need for public subsidies to support security expenditures, another interviewee noted, "In the end, public transport is a business...There comes a point at which the businessman will say that the security measures will cost him more than the revenues. The key issue for addressing risk is to get things down to `ALARP' as we call it, `as low as reasonably practical.'"

In addition to concerns over the costs of security programs, many of the transit officials also expressed concerns over the uncertain nature of the risks and the uncertain effectiveness of increased security expenditures. "How," several of those interviewed asked, "should systems evaluate costs and benefits in such uncertain environments?" Further, what techniques or approaches offer systems the most security bang for the buck? In response to such questions, the transit systems examined for this study have pursued an array of ways to prioritize expenditures on security:

customizing security measures based on a detailed evaluation of risk for each site (Paris).

assessing risks based on station location, socio-demographics of the region, and delinquency rates of surrounding population (Madrid).5

focusing efforts on terminal stations, the most heavily patronized stations, and stations near government buildings (Tokyo).

giving top priority to securing sites with concentrations of hazardous materials (Paris).

conducting public surveys of riders' perceptions and concerns to help prioritize needs (Madrid).

5. Given the varying roles and mandates of agencies of the central government (ministries, federal agencies, and so on), intelligence services, police agencies, and transit operators on matters of security, close coordination and cooperation are critical to effective transit security planning.

Many of our interviewees spoke of the need for a multilayered and multipronged system of security in which various agencies play very different roles. Many transit officials with whom we spoke suggested that interagency cooperation is common to the industry, which bodes well for increased coordination with police and security agencies in the years ahead. One U.S. transit industry representative put it this way:

The transit industry, because it's public, is very mutually supportive. Transit agencies aren't in competition with each other. In fact, we have a long history of aiding one another with training programs. Even if you've hired a consultant to help you with a program, we've seen people really sharing that program or that information. One of the roles that [the American Public Transportation Association plays is that] we're a conduit for the sharing of a lot of that information.

Many of those interviewed emphasized the importance of clearly defining roles and responsibilities among actors. Several also stressed the need for frequent and regular interaction among agencies to share information and agree on common strategies and tactics. Concluded one London interviewee,

Partnership is not easy. You have to invest time, and emergencies are not the time to meet your counterpart in different agencies.... Resilience is about coordinating and facilitating efforts of all the disparate, separate agencies to ensure better quality of performance, aiding and leading to a more effective prevention or recovery than might otherwise be the case.

Finally, several of the transit officials interviewed noted that APTA, the leading U.S. transit industry organization, has come to play an increasingly central security coordinating and information-brokering role, and, in doing so, has come to more closely resemble the activities of the International Union of Public Transport (UITP) outside of the United States.

6. An important benefit of improved coordination is standardization of emergency training, security audits, and disaster preparedness procedures, and the issuance of common guidelines about security.

While the airline industry has adopted common international security standards and procedures, many other modes--and in particular public transit--have not done so. For example, several of our European interviewees noted that while many European Union (EU) member countries have developed highly integrated international passenger rail service, similarly integrated systems of rail security have been slow in coming.

Likewise, while the many transit agencies typically operating in larger metropolitan areas have developed reciprocal integrated fare and passenger information protocols, efforts to integrate and standardize security practices and procedures among transit systems within metropolitan areas and between them are relatively new.

Such standardization can be particularly helpful to smaller transit operators that do not have the resources to independently develop security standards and procedures. For example, standardizing safety guidelines and signage, the structure and content of security announcements, and the marking of emergency exits on trains and in stations can all help passengers avoid confusion in times of emergency. Likewise, standardizing security training of personnel--drivers, supervisors, and managers--can improve coordination with police, fire, and intelligence officials in times of emergency. Many of the respondents from U.S. transit agencies surveyed for this research noted that, under the guidance of the federal government, standardized security plans and training programs were being integrated into already established emergency response training programs traditionally aimed at responding to personal and property crime and smaller-scale emergencies.

7. Despite significant progress in increasing coordination between transit and police/
intelligence agencies, much work remains.

Despite significant and ongoing efforts to improve the coordination and cooperation between the many, largely independent transit agencies operating in large U.S. metropolitan areas, seamless integration of routes, schedules, and fares has long proven elusive. Given the widely divergent goals and objectives of public transit and police/intelligence agencies, the challenges to increased coordination and cooperation are even greater.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to improved coordination identified in this study concerns ambiguity and uncertainty over lines of authority and responsibility. Put simply, it is not always clear who is responsible for what. Said one European transit industry representative we interviewed,

The public authorities are responsible for security. If there is a terrorist incident or attack, the transit authorities are responsible for restoring traffic as soon as possible. They [the transit agencies] should also help the public authorities to organize first aid and emergency response, but they are not responsible to follow up the threat or to investigate the threat.

Despite the many challenges, nearly everyone queried agreed that increased coordination was needed. Such coordination can take many forms: (1) coordination between neighboring transit agencies; (2) coordination among local, state, and federal law enforcement officials; (3) information sharing with the media and the public; (4) the improved dissemination of best practices in security planning; (5) consistent emergency response procedures and protocols; (6) improved integration of different security-related technologies; and (7) increased international cooperation in sharing information and best practices. With regard to the latter, one official interviewed noted, "The threat is international and the way you need to deal with it is an international effort," although several other interviewees cautioned that while international threats call for international collaboration, security measures should not be applied equally in all places; they should be customized according to local organizational/governmental structures, transit system size, age, and characteristics, and the specifics of local cultures and norms.

8. Passenger education and outreach is a challenge; informed passengers can increase surveillance and safety, but fearful passengers may stop using public transit.

Although most of the officials surveyed and interviewed agreed that public education and outreach had become an important part of transit security planning, respondents were in general more ambivalent about education and outreach than about policing, technologies, or CPTED. In particular, many cited the challenge of raising awareness without raising fear. One of the officials we interviewed in Madrid said that their goal following the March 11, 2004, attacks was to augment feelings of security and diminish feelings of insecurity: "The methods we chose and implemented after the March attack were not so much about combating terrorism; rather they were used to help riders recover a feeling of security."

While our interviews suggest that passenger outreach efforts on security have been more common outside the United States, nearly all those to whom we spoke agreed that it is a delicate balance between creating a perception of excessive, pervasive security (which is both costly and can incite fear among passengers) and too little security (which can promote a sense of danger and unchecked lawlessness). Said one transit industry official, "You have to reassure but not scare off passengers, because if you exceed a certain level [of police activity] it might be considered that you are in a very insecure place."

Enlisting the public's help in security surveillance can be effective, but entails risks. Excessive marketing of vigilance can create an environment of paranoia, where everything and everyone can be viewed as potential threats. Such paranoia can suppress ridership while overwhelming transit officials with security tips, and panicked passengers can compound damage after an attack.

Further, a strong emphasis on police and public surveillance can lead to social profiling, and with it losses of privacy and civil rights. Said one interviewee,

Here [in Spain] there would be a lot of problems and it wouldn't be convenient to start screening passengers. People will not accept being identified, profiled, and searched, even if it is a random manner, because when you select, you elect and you have to do this with a certain objective and clear parameters. You will be accused of discrimination because this is labeling, marking people with certain physical features.

9. The role of crime prevention through environmental design in security planning is waxing.

Most of our survey and interview respondents were familiar with the concept of CPTED, and most viewed CPTED--which considers how the physical design of spaces can affect both the likelihood and impact of criminal or terrorist activity--as an important longer-term strategy to address both crime and terrorism on transit systems. According to the respondents to our survey, CPTED was given much less weight in security planning prior to 9/11. Since 9/11, however, over 80 percent of the respondents now believe that CPTED is a somewhat or very effective strategy in preventing terrorist attacks. This ranking of effectiveness is similar to both policing and security hardware and technology strategies, and well ahead of public education and outreach.

According to one of our interviewees in Madrid, "Security is based on prevention, and prevention begins with design. A station designed without security criteria would be much more insecure and expensive to protect."

While the potential effectiveness of CPTED was widely touted by those queried, many also noted that design is a longer-term strategy. CPTED strategies can be cost-effectively incorporated into new stations and terminals, such as in the new Météor and Eole Lines in Paris, the new Line 11 in Madrid, and the new Bilbao subway in Spain. On the other hand, most interviewees thought retrofitting old stations to be extremely costly for the most part. Concluded one interviewee regarding the retrofit of older stations, "The best you can do is to use some passive methods such as mirrors, cameras, and increased lighting."

Even among officials interviewed who work primarily in policing and security, knowledge of and enthusiasm for CPTED principles was widespread. For example, one London transit police official said,

If you take a station like Baker Street, it's very dark [and listed as a historically significant] building so there are limitations on what can be done to change the appearance and structure. Not very much can be done at all. We'd like better lighting, more CCTV [closed-circuit television]. We'd like cleaner lines. Any vending machines that are brought in, we'd like them to have sloping tops so nothing can be put on top of them. We'd like them to be totally accessible or totally enclosed so they're easy to search or impossible to put something in. We look at tamper-evident seals [on entryways to areas closed to the public], which can't be physically locked. When it comes to new stations, bigger, brighter areas, clear sight lines, certainly those are the kinds of things that we would seek to influence.

10. Since 9/11, transit agencies are more likely to adopt comprehensive, multipronged
approaches to security planning than in years past.

Our survey and interviews focused in detail on four types of security strategies--policing, technology, education and outreach, and CPTED. We found that attention to all these strategies has increased since 9/11, and over half of the respondents now view all four strategies as central or significant parts of security planning efforts.

Prior to 9/11, most of the respondents to our national survey of large transit operators said they had emphasized policing and hardware/technology in security planning, and placed far less stock in either public education or CPTED. While the survey respondents believed that the importance of policing and hardware/technology increased after 9/11, their assessments of the importance of public education and, especially, CPTED increased even more.

This broad support for all four security strategies reflects a consensus among those surveyed and interviewed regarding the need for a comprehensive, multipronged approach to transit security planning. Several interviewees cautioned against becoming too reliant on just one or two strategies. As one of our London interviewees noted,

Each one (strategy) on its own can't work in isolation. I don't think that one of them sits out on its own. You've got to do each one. And you've got to have an element of each one in terms of being able to combat terrorism or crime in general.

11. The public transit industry is vulnerable to security policies or programs that reduce the speed, comfort, or convenience of transit, and may benefit significantly from policies that increase the attractiveness of transit.

Despite significant public investments over the past three decades, public transit systems around the United States continue to lose market share to private vehicles. Many transit systems have made important strides in increasing the comfort, safety, and convenience of using transit, but matching the speed and flexibility of private autos remains a challenge. Transit security policies and programs that increase the hassle of, or delays in, riding buses and trains may significantly undermine an already vulnerable and distressed industry. For example, the random bag and parcel inspections instituted on the New York transit system following the July 2005 attacks on the London public transit systems will add stress and delays on the United States' most heavily patronized transit system--stress and delays that inevitably make traveling by other modes relatively more attractive.

Many transit system managers said that new security measures should enhance the perceived safety and attractiveness of their systems, and not add to delays, inconvenience, or perceptions of heightened risk. The importance of creating safe, attractive systems for passengers, report some transit officials, is sometimes lost on security officials; as one interviewee from London said prior to the July 2005 attacks,

It's trying to balance providing maximum security while still providing the kind of service people expect. People still want to go from point A to point B as fast as possible. They don't want to be delayed, even for security reasons. So that's the balance...it's still a struggle... I think that is something that in the future has to evolve, to where you have that perfect balance where you can say, "I think we're providing as much security as we can," but it's also seamless to the customer so you don't have an operational slowdown.

12. Given the uncertain effectiveness of antitransit terrorism efforts, the most tangible benefits of increased attention to and spending on transit security may be a reduction in transit-related personal and property crimes.

Terrorist attacks on transit systems in the United States and abroad have increased in recent years in both frequency and severity. Likewise, public and political concern over the issue has skyrocketed since 9/11. The fact remains, however, that transit patrons remain far more likely to be victimized by personal crime than a terrorist act.

According to Federal Transit Administration data, an average of 279 people have been killed on or by public transit each year over the past decade. In addition, an annual average of 18,748 people have been injured on or by public transit over the same period. Crimes ostensibly unrelated to transit use--such as being robbed or killed while waiting at a bus stop--would push these figures far higher. This means that, between September 11, 2001, and August 11, 2005, more than 1,100 people have been killed on or by public transit, and more than 75,000 have been injured on or by transit in the United States6

Further, studies have repeatedly shown that fear of crime is a significant deterrent to transit use for many people.7 So while political attention and public resources are currently focused on transit terrorism, reductions of personal and property crimes on public transit systems could prove to be a significant collateral benefit of safer, more secure public transit systems.

In both our review of the research literature and in several of our interviews were repeated suggestions for a "dual-use strategy," whereby antiterrorism measures may be effective in reducing transit crime. Coincident with new security measures on the Tokyo Metro, both robberies and thefts are down substantially. Likewise, fewer crimes were reported in the period following the implementation of random parcel inspections in Madrid.

Such complementary benefits, however, are not assured without careful attention to congruency between anticrime and antiterrorism measures. Some of those interviewed suggested that anticrime and antiterrorism efforts are not always reciprocal and complementary. "By preparing your system to react to terrorist attacks, you also prepare it to react to different types of crime...But the other way around is not always true" (Madrid transit official).

However, others argued that anticrime and antiterrorism efforts worked very much hand in hand. Said one London transit official:

It's easier for a terrorist to operate in an environment that is disorderly, that does not give the appearance that someone is in charge; the area does not look secure. Actually taking care of the little things, and insuring that there is order and maintenance, sends a signal that it's hard to operate illegally or carry out an attack in this environment. There's a deterrent effect.

Postscript

Whether these findings are discouraging or heartening depends on one's perspective. The stakes are high, the risks uncertain, and the solutions unclear. The July 7 and 21, 2005, subway and bus attacks in London offer a sobering reminder that transit systems remain inherently vulnerable to terrorist actions, even on systems where security and vigilance have been the modus operandi for decades. While public transit systems are likely to remain attractive and vulnerable targets for terrorists, U.S. transit systems are today better coordinated, policed, monitored, and designed, and staff and passengers are better informed and prepared than just a few years ago. How effective these efforts will be (or have already been) in deterring or minimizing a terrorist attack is unclear. What is clear, however, is that crimes of all types--political, personal, and property--drive riders away from transit systems. So if the recent rise in transit security planning deters a major terrorist attack, or simply the activities of a lone pickpocket, the transit industry will be better off as a result.

Introduction

For those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, public transportation offers an ideal target.

--Jenkins and Gerston, 2001

The events of September 11, 2001, brought the issue of transportation security and terrorism to the forefront of civil society. While transportation security officials had been aware of the possible threat of terrorist attacks on transportation networks for some time, these tragic events revealed both vulnerabilities in security systems and the previously unimaginable consequences of such breaches. Public surface transportation systems are especially attractive targets for would-be terrorists wanting to cause the maximum amount of disruption and harm.See Balog, Devost, and Sullivan 1997. Such systems serve very large numbers of people over extensive networks of stations, stops, and facilities. In the United States, 74 rail transit systems operate 18,000 vehicles in 38 cities; collectively, these systems carry 3.4 billion passenger trips annually. The wide use of rail transit systems by many segments of the public makes them especially attractive targets for terrorists wanting to maximize disruption and harm. Accordingly, concerns about transit security rank high among transportation officials and transit riders.

The vulnerability of railway systems lies in the fact that they are very open and accessible, with fixed, predictable routes and access points. Their openness and anonymity make it easy for potential terrorists to hide in crowds without arousing suspicion. Securing such open and public systems presents a series of problems. The volume of passengers makes it impossible for transit operators to employ many of the security tactics used by commercial aviation.See Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies 1996. Preventive security measures on public transit, such as the screening of passengers and luggage with X-ray machines and metal detectors, hand searches, passenger profiling, chemical- and bomb-sniffing dogs, and armed guards, would lead to intolerable delays and costs. The need for transit agencies to offer transit systems that are accessible, convenient, and affordable for daily users thus conflicts with many security goals. In cities around the globe, people choose between public transit and private automobiles for many trips. Private vehicle use is growing in most cities, resulting in worsening congestion and air pollution. Attractive, convenient public transit systems help to mitigate many of the problems of widespread auto use, and provide mobility for those who do not have access to automobiles, including the young, elderly, disabled, and poor. Security measures that cause inconvenience, delay, or added cost to travel by public transit are likely to shift travelers and cities toward greater dependence on private vehicles. Therefore, balancing transit riders' desire for convenience, accessibility, and affordability with security measures presents a challenge to transit operators.See United States General Accounting Office 2002 (b).

A 1997 survey sponsored by the Transportation Research Board assessed both the perceptions of transit system managers regarding terrorism and security as well as the status of agencies' existing emergency preparedness, planning, and response procedures. Over 40 U.S. transportation agencies participated in the survey, including agencies that provide rail service and coordinate bus systems. Urban and commuter rail systems ranked the highest in terms of the perceived risk as targets of terrorism. Detonation of explosive devices was perceived to pose the greatest threat to transit systems. A majority of the agencies surveyed had actually dealt with bomb threats in addition to a variety of other security threats.See Boyd and Sullivan 1997.

Transit Security in an International Context

Security on mass transit is a global issue. Indeed, many transit systems around the world have been victimized by terrorists, including the railway systems of New York, London, Paris, Tokyo, Madrid, and Moscow. An analysis of terrorist attack trends indicates that their lethality has increased over time. In addition, the number of attacks against transportation systems increased in the 1990s. In 1991, transportation systems were the target of 20 percent of all violent attacks. This rose to almost 40 percent by 1998. Jenkins' (1997, 2001) comprehensive chronology of 900 terrorist attacks involving surface transportation from 1920 to 2000 provides an analytical model useful in identifying the most salient patterns and trends. He finds that about two-thirds of the attacks were intended to kill people (as opposed to simply disrupting transit operations), while 37 percent of the attacks actually resulted in fatalities. Of the incidents with fatalities, about three-fourths caused more than one death, and 23 percent caused 10 or more deaths.

International case studies of surface transportation systems that have suffered terrorist attacks can offer examples of both vulnerabilities to terrorist threats, and effective measures for their prevention, mitigation, and response. Such case studies offer lessons on preparedness, response, and recovery that may apply to other transportation systems with similar physical and organizational characteristics, including those in the United States. While some case studies of transit terrorist attacks exist, such as Jenkins (1997) or Jenkins and Gerston (2001), they are almost exclusively descriptive narratives of the events or assessments of the police and emergency responses that followed them. The existing literature on transit terrorism does not identify and compare the social and environmental characteristics of the transit systems that have been hit by terrorism, or the strategies that transit agencies around the world are adopting to offer protection to their riders. While intelligence systems have globalized rapidly in response to recent terrorist attacks, planning to prevent and mitigate terrorist attacks on transit systems is far more insular. Additionally, most research on transit terrorism has centered on the role of policing and technology in mitigating terrorist attacks.See Policastro and Gordon 1999; and Alternative Technologies 1993. There has been far less investigation of how system design and public education may be employed to both reduce the likelihood of attacks and minimize the impact of attacks when they occur. Resources such as the public outreach tool kit for "Transit Watch" and the Volpe Center's "Security Design Considerations for Transit Vehicles and Facilities" have more recently been funded by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA).

Conceptual Model of Transit Terrorist Events

Following the July 2005 bombings in London, concerns with transit security rank very high among transportation officials and transit riders. Deterring and minimizing terrorist attacks involves assessments of vulnerabilities, the mitigation of weaknesses in the system, and the development of effective response and emergency plans. Yet planning for transit security to date has largely been ad hoc and often ambiguous. For example, surface transportation security tends to focus less on deterrence and more on mitigation, quick response, and the rapid restoration of services after an incident.

In contrast, the study that follows examines and compares responses to transit terrorist incidents, conceptualizing a process that extends over a very long time frame, approximating the life of the transit system. The analysis of international terrorist incidents that follows has gathered information relevant to each of the four stages described below:

Stage One--Planning, Designing, and Building: It is important to incorporate into the planning and physical design of a transit system the best current knowledge of terrorist threats, thereby minimizing through system design the potential damage of incidents that could occur at any time, even decades later. The choice of materials for the construction of stations and vehicles, for example, should be made on the basis of full consideration of terrorist attacks; the provision of ventilation systems should include considerations of fire suppression, anthrax, and possible chemical attacks; the selection of computerized communications and control systems should be informed by their potential vulnerabilities; and the architecture of stops, stations, and vehicles should incorporate design principles that minimize their vulnerabilities, maximize their ability to continue functioning under difficult circumstances, and facilitate responses by emergency personnel.

Stage Two--Planning for Incident Response: The vulnerability of transit systems to terrorist attacks should be reviewed periodically throughout the operational life of a transit system so security officials can refine planning in response to evolving threats. For example, interagency cooperation should be encouraged and staff training should be updated. Sufficient information also must be provided to passengers so, in the event of an incident, they will know how to respond. In addition to the actions of transit operators and their funding agencies, law enforcement and intelligence efforts by agencies charged with counterterrorism should be ongoing.

Stage Three--Immediate Response to Incidents: If and when an incident occurs, the immediate response--including clearance, search, rescue, recovery, and the restoration of service--constitutes a critical stage. While the actions in this stage may last only a few weeks, they provide invaluable information for security planners as terrorist incidents are such infrequent events. With respect to this research, deconstructing the role of system design and operations in exacerbating or minimizing the effects of the attack can be used to help plan and operate safer public transit systems in the future and provide for continuity of operations in emergency situations.

Stage Four--Long-Term Recovery: The final stage in responding to a terrorist incident may last for years, and constitutes the redesign, reconstruction, and operation of the system under new rules and procedures that are influenced by the incident and what has been learned during the planning and rebuilding process. This stage also involves restoring public trust in the security of the transit system.

Scope of the Problem, This Research, and Policy Responses

MTI Report 04-05

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables